AustLII Home | Databases | WorldLII | Search | Feedback

Australian Indigenous Law Reporter

Australian Indigenous Law Reporter (AILR)
You are here:  AustLII >> Databases >> Australian Indigenous Law Reporter >> 2002 >> [2002] AUIndigLawRpr 52

Database Search | Name Search | Recent Articles | Noteup | LawCite | Help

McGlade, Hannah --- "ATSIC Pilot Projects: Regional Treaty Making in Western Australia? - Digest" [2002] AUIndigLawRpr 52; (2002) 7(3) Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 73


Inquiries and Reports – Australia

ATSIC Pilot Projects: Regional Treaty Making in Western Australia?

Hannah McGlade

National Treaty Conference

Murdoch University Western Australia

28 June 2002

Following the election of the Gallop Labor Government in Western Australia, it was determined that ‘[t]here is a need for a new and just relationship between the Government of Western Australia and Aboriginal Western Australians’.[1] This new relationship was evidenced by the ‘Statement of Commitment to a New and Just Relationship’ signed by ATSIC and the West Australian State Government on 10 October 2001. ATSIC, as a party to the agreement, was supported by the Western Australian Aboriginal Native Title Working Group, the Western Australian Community Controlled Health Organisation and the Aboriginal Legal Service of Western Australia.

The purpose of the Statement is to ‘agree on a set of principles and a process for the parties to negotiate a State-wide framework that can facilitate negotiated agreements at the local and regional level’. If we understand the concept of treaty promoted by ATSIC, to include regional treaty agreements that may take the form of legislation and/or contract, then clearly the process envisaged by this Statement of Commitment in Western Australia falls within the treaty concept.

The principles intended to be pursued within this regional agreement or treaty making process, as set out in the statement, include:

In the ATSIC report accompanying the statement it is noted that the past two decades have seen Aboriginal policy and administration accorded a ‘low political priority’ that has resulted in little improvement in the social and economic position of Western Australian Aboriginals. The significant ‘conflict over land and cultural heritage’ is also noted.[2] Before examining this statement it is worthwhile remembering a few of these very serious conflicts in recent Western Australian history.

Following the historic decision of the High Court in Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992)[3] the WA Richard Court Government responded by legislatively extinguishing native title and replacing it with a lesser form of statutory title. This State legislation was ultimately rejected by the High Court of Australia in Western Australia v Commonwealth (1994-1995)[4] as discriminatory and inconsistent with s 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).

In the 1980s the Federal Labor Government led by Bob Hawke committed itself to national land rights legislation. They proposed that this legislation be based on principles which entitled Aboriginal people to hold land under inalienable freehold title, protect sacred sites, control mining and access mining royalties and receive compensation for land lost. A fierce anti land rights campaign was waged by the Western Australian Chamber of Mines, and the WA State Government led by Brian Burke was said to have ‘dumped the reform legislation’, persuading Prime Minister Hawke to abandon the proposal for national land rights.[5]

In 1980, the destruction of Aboriginal cultural sites was highlighted by the dispute at Nookanbah. Aboriginal Heritage protection legislation then in place did not stop the intrusive petroleum exploration of sacred lands. The then State Government of Charles Court enlisted the police en masse to ensure that the US company Amex had free access to the site in complete disregard of the opposition of the traditional owners.

The Statement of Commitment signed last year looks to ‘a new relationship’. Hopefully it will mark a turning point in the history of race relations in Western Australia. Following its election the new State Government also commissioned a major report by former Rio Tinto Vice-President Paul Wand known as the ‘Wand Review’. This report considered how the State government could best facilitate the settlement of the State’s 130 native title applications. The review was premised on recognition by the State that litigation of native title was not a preferred option. According to Deputy Premier Eric Ripper ‘[i]gnoring Indigenous aspirations for recognition of traditional ownership is an invitation for long, costly and bitter legal battles’.[6] The Wand Review confirmed to the State that it should actively resolve native title claims by way of mediation, negotiation and conciliation conducted in a just and proper manner. Some of the recommendations made in the Wand Review include:

The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) as amended in 1998 has established a legislative framework for agreement making with respect to native title. A native title agreement may be reached by way of a native title consent determination, an agreement reached under the future act process and by way of an Indigenous Land Use Agreement (‘ILUA’). The National Native Title Tribunal provides mediation assistance to parties in the agreement making process.

In Western Australia the following consent determinations of native title have been made: Nhanawangka, Spinifex, Tjurabalan, Kwirrikurra, and Karajarri. The Tjurabalan consent determination accepted by Justice Carr of the Federal Court in August 2001 at Halls Creek recognises the right of native title holders to:

The importance of a well considered approach to agreement making, one that arguably is driven by Indigenous peoples interests and desires for self-determination, was recently highlighted by criticisms of the Nhanawangka agreement. According to newspaper reports, the pastoral lease access protocols which form part of the agreement and which place onerous burdens on native title holders who wish to access their land are unworkable. Traditional native title holders now believe that they were better off before the agreement was made.[9]

There have been many agreements, some confidential, reached through and sometimes outside of the future act process. A recent example of such an agreement is that reached between the Southwest Boojarah People and Cable Sands (WA) Pty Ltd in respect of the grant of a mining lease.[10] Recently the President of the National Native Title Tribunal spoke of the growing confidence in the agreement making process and the increasing prevalence of ILUA’s. There are over one hundred separate ILUA negotiations being conducted Australia-wide. There are three different kinds of ILUA’s provided for under the Native Title Act, body corporate agreements, area agreements and alternative procedure agreements. These agreements must be about one or more of the following matters:

Native title as recognised by the High Court in Mabo and incorporated within the Native Title Act by s 10 is a broad concept or right that is based upon the traditional laws and customs of native title holders. Therefore the scope of matters that may potentially form part of an ILUA native title agreement may include all matters associated with Aboriginal laws and customs including governance and legal jurisdiction. According to Peter Yu, the ILUA provisions could be regarded as a significant step towards a comprehensive agreement-making model, one that could prove to be more effective than the mediation model of the NNTT.[12]

The importance of Aboriginal customary law was highlighted nationally well over a decade ago by the Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) who reported extensively into the matter. The failure of successive governments to implement the recommendations of the ALRC has been the subject of much criticism. The announcement recently by the WA Law Reform Commission of a State Inquiry into customary law will again raise the profile of this important issue. However the State has limited the terms of reference of the inquiry considerably by excluding matters relating to native title. Yet native title clearly provides the strongest legal basis for the recognition of customary law within the Australian domestic legal system.

Important Indigenous customary law initiatives have evolved in recent times independently of native title agreements or the ILUA process. Some of these initiatives were discussed at a recent ‘Governance’ conference organised by Reconciliation Australia. They include the Ali-Curang program in Katherine in the Northern Territory, the Aboriginal Justice Panel in South Australia, and the Aboriginal Justice Committees and Sentencing Circles of NSW under the jurisdiction of the AJAC.

ILUAs are binding agreements that once finalised are placed on a Register of Indigenous Land Use Agreements. The ILUA being registered as statutory agreement under the Native Title Act takes effect as a contract between the parties. According to a National Native Title Tribunal Fact Sheet, these binding ILUAs enable development to take place on the land and generally limits compensation payable to the native title group. Although native title is based on traditional laws and customs the ILUA statutory process does little to resolve outstanding issues concerning Aboriginal law, culture, jurisdiction and ultimately self-determination. As at April 2000 it was noted that almost all of the ILUAs that have been registered ‘have limited subject matter’, for example, a land transfer from a State to Local Government, telecommunication facilities, pipeline corridors, the surrender of native title rights or interests in horticultural land.[13]

The registration process appears to instead facilitate non-Indigenous development and compensation, in other words, acts that may amount to the extinguishment of native title. It has been noted that the terms of an ILUA negotiated by a non-Indigenous party will be fulfilled following registration, because the validation of those future acts has been confirmed. However Indigenous parties need to ask what recourse may be available to them in the event of a fundamental breach of the ILUA agreement, or what will happen to that agreement if the interests in land are subsequently transferred.14

Further a registered ILUA agreement will bind all native title holders, even those not involved in the negotiation of the agreement. By contrast though, it is only the non-Indigenous interests who become a party to the agreement who are so bound.[15] The point has been made that far greater flexibility is accorded to issues of future land management rather than Indigenous concerns.[16]

These concerns were raised to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Native Title and the Land Fund Inquiry into Indigenous Land Use Agreements.[17] As acknowledged by Sue Kee, a senior officer of the NNTT, ‘ [t]he crucial question is, will ILUA’s deliver outcomes that conform with Indigenous aspirations, and deal with the unequal balance of power experienced between Indigenous and non-Indigenous negotiating parties?’.[18]

Notwithstanding these limitations on the ILUA process, the extent of agreements being reached by Indigenous native title holders and corporate interests has wide-reaching significance. The nature of this kind of agreement making has been considered by Professor Marcia Langton, who is currently undertaking an audit of such agreement making as part of an Australian Research Council research project, noting that it has been ‘a feature of the Australian policy landscape for over twenty years’. Professor Langton has made the interesting observation that it is corporations, rather than governments, who have traditionally been prepared to treat with Aboriginal nations, recognising them as owners and custodians of their lands and waters. This landscape of agreement making is characterised as a surrogate instrument of engagement and governance in a context of legal pluralism that has denied rights of self-government.

Professor Langton notes that the Native Title Act which provides a trigger for agreement making, for example by way of the future act right to negotiate provisions, results in ‘governance procedures’. However, these are inferior to the rights of self-government established in Canadian and United States jurisdictions between government and First Nations Peoples.

One such example in this respect is the Nisga’a Final Agreement negotiated between the Nisga’a Nation, the Province of British Columbia (‘BC’) and the Canadian Federal Government.[19] This example of modern treaty-making is particularly relevant to Australia in that BC, like Australia, had no prior history of treaty making. BC was seen as terra nullius ‘an empty land free for the taking’. Although the British Crown in Canada had generally pursued a policy, reflected in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which recognised Aboriginal title, this did not occur in BC. The Province refused to recognise Aboriginal title, however in the face of a number of superior court decisions ultimately agreed to join the First Nations and the Federal Government and enter into a claims settlement process. The current BC treaty process began in 1990 with the establishment of a BC Claims Taskforce that looked at the scope of treaty negotiations, the organisation and processes to be used, interim measures and public education. The BC Treaty Commission was established in 1992 and supported by Provincial and Federal legislation and by a resolution of the First Nation’s Summit. The BC process is a voluntary one concerned with political negotiations through which the parties are attempting to ‘establish a new relationship based on mutual respect, trust and understanding’.[20]

In 2001 there were 50 First Nations engaged in the BC treaty process, this figure represents about 65 per cent of the Provinces’ registered Aboriginal population. The Commission adopts a six stage treaty process that is:

The Treaty Commission facilitates the negotiation of the treaties, developing policies and procedures, monitoring and reporting on progress of negotiations, identifying problems and offering advice and assistance with disputes. It allocates funding by way of loans to First Nations for treaty negotiation purposes however the ‘mounting debt’ to First Nations has been identified as a serious concern.

The Nisga’a Final Agreement was reached in 1998 and is the first modern day treaty reached in BC. It appears to deliver significant rights and benefits to the Nisga’a Nation. In particular it provides for confirmation of Nisga’a Title (a special form of freehold title) to nearly 2000 square kilometres of land. Importantly, this title includes ownership of forestry and sub-surface resources. It contains arrangements with respect to fishing and hunting and water access rights. The right of self-government is provided for and is reasonably comprehensive. The Nisga’a Nation has legislative jurisdiction with respect to Nisga’a Government, citizenship, culture, language, lands and assets. They have legal jurisdiction with respect to health, education, family law, social services and public order. Although the Nisga’a have not been accorded jurisdiction in respect of criminal law they are still able to establish a police force and a judicial body or Court that will administer Nisga’a laws.[22] Clearly the native title process established in Australia under the Native Title Act offers a very limited framework for agreement making in comparison with the BC treaty claims process.

The Statement of Commitment recently signed in Western Australia has committed the parties to a process of regional agreement making and contemplates a ‘Partnership Framework’. It is intended that this Framework will:

It appears that the Statement of Commitment will be facilitated by a new body, the Indigenous Affairs Advisory Committee (‘IAAC’) established under the Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority Act 1972 (WA) (‘AAPA Act’). The IAAC is comprised of the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, the Director-Generals of relevant State Government Departments and the ATSIC WA State Council ‘representing a single Aboriginal lobby group that will negotiate with the State Government on its delivery of services to Western Australians’.[23] It is further intended that the IAAC will ‘provide the forum for bringing together the various parts of Government that will be party to regional agreements and joining Commonwealth and State efforts to facilitate the achievement of real outcomes for Indigenous Western Australians’.[24] The IAAC will undertake its role through working group processes, meeting only twice a year to consider high level strategy. The State Department of Indigenous Affairs (DIA) will provide Secretariat and policy coordination support.The IAAC has agreed to commence implementation of the statement of commitment under three priority projects, being Tjurabalan, Martu and Northbridge.

The Tjurabalan priority project aims to utilise the significant opportunity provided by the native title consent determination. The Tjurabalan people of the East Kimberley region have now formed a Prescribed Body Corporate, as required under the Native Title Act,[25] which establishes the manner in which they hold and manage native title rights and interests. It has been agreed that the development of a comprehensive regional agreement between the Tjurabalan people, ATSIC and the State Government be negotiated and implemented. Some of the matters flagged include the development of a joint management plan for the Canning Stock Route and better use of government funding in the area to promote ATSIC’s economic and social development strategies. It is likely that the Tjurabalan people will wish to address other issues of concern, including customary law and family violence issues.

A Working Group has been establish to develop and negotiate a Tjurabalan Regional Agreement drafting the terms of reference for a scoping study which will be overseen by a project manager.

The Statement of Commitment will also be implemented through the Martu priority project using the opportunity provided by the imminent native title consent determination over Martu lands. A regional strategy for the Martu people has been considered for some time and there has been a history of conflict between Martu traditional owners and mining interests. Housing and infrastructure and service delivery are also paramount. Again the IAAC has agreed that the Working Group undertaken similar activities to Tjurabalan with respect to the negotiation of an agreement with the Martu people.

The Northbridge priority project is another focus area to implement the Statement of Commitment. The project is said to be based on the right of Aboriginal people to be included in the social, economic and cultural life of inner city Perth. It is considered that social problems in the area can be better addressed through partnerships that join up resources and strategies of Noongar people, State and Commonwealth Agencies, the Perth City Council, businesses and mainstream community groups. It is hoped that innovative initiatives to give Aboriginal people a positive and celebratory place in inner city Perth can emerge. Strategies concerning an Aboriginal cultural centre and youth employment and education may be developed. Another working group has been established chaired by the Chairperson of the Perth Regional ATSIC Council and including members from Premier and Cabinet, Police Service, DIA, Department of the Arts, Noongar Patrol, Perth City Council and Department of Community Development. The Working Group is in the process of developing short term strategy arising from Noongar youth visiting Northbridge.

An important priority focus that was identified by the IAAC under the Statement of Commitment is the issue of child abuse in Aboriginal communities. This serious problem was highlighted in 2002 by the coronial inquiry into the death of a young Noongar girl in a Perth Aboriginal community. A comprehensive range of responses have been identified by the IAAC in addition to the establishment of a Working Group charged with developing a comprehensive response engaging State, Commonwealth and Aboriginal agencies, ATSIC and the Aboriginal community.

A notable aspect of the process established under the Statement of Commitment is that it appears, through the new IAAC structure, to be based upon pre-existing State Government structures. The intended role of the body as an ‘important lobby group’ for negotiations with government may be difficult to effect given that it is made up of government departments. At this stage though it is unclear what if any negotiating role this new committee will eventually have. Such matters are likely to be considered in the proposed Scoping studies associated with the identified priority projects.

The national ATSIC treaty awareness raising process has been keen to inform people that ‘ATSIC is not negotiating a treaty; it is promoting discussions about a treaty — its benefits, its difficulties, its form and its content’.[26] A comprehensive regional treaty making process in Western Australia may need to consider the establishment of a specialised treaty body or commission. This issue has been raised by Patrick Dodson in the Wentworth Lecture 2000 in which he urged the establishment of a Treaty Commission, independent of the government and the bureaucracy.[27]

The importance of Aboriginal empowerment by way of regional governance processes has been identified by Peter Yu in the Kimberley context, because of the possibility of a regional authority mechanism to empower Aboriginal people allowing Aboriginals ‘to negotiate our inclusion and participation’.[28] Yu has also highlighted the difficulty of an overly bureaucratic response to outstanding settlement issues arguing that:

Reconciliation cannot happen when one party is subordinate to, or subject to assimilation into, the other party. The legacy of our ongoing colonisation means there must be an investment in Indigenous people before a partnership is possible.

What should be understood is that the bureaucratic welfare structures, constructed for so-called Indigenous benefit since the 1970s, have overwhelmed communities and entrenched powerlessness with too many of our people.[29]

The international models established for the purpose of effecting settlement agreements between nation states and Indigenous peoples are of course relevant to the Australian treaty context. We should heed recent concerns being voiced about the BC Treaty Commission.

According to Professor James Tully, the BC treaty process is fundamentally flawed by the attitude of the Federal and Provincial Governments entering into negotiations. First Nations and Aboriginal peoples of Canada are viewed as minorities ‘in a relation of subordination’ to the Crown.[30] The First Nations engaging in the BC treaty process envisaged these negotiations would be conducted on a ‘nation to nation’ basis, one that works out a new relationship through the treaty negotiation process. It appears that the BC Treaty Commission is now being criticised for evading the process of decolonisation rather than addressing it outright.

The Canadian Federal Comprehensive Claims Policy of 1986, which encourages modern day treaty making negotiations and settlement, seeks to address the ‘undefined Aboriginal rights’ at common law protected by s 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 (CA). However Tully points out that many First Nations see this process as a surrender of Aboriginal rights which in effect amounts to a modified form of extinguishment policy.[31] The treaty process should instead be focusing on ‘fair and honourable partnerships that respect the co-existence of the partners’.[32]

Paul McHugh has made a number of important observations about the nature of relationships between Indigenous peoples and the state. He assesses claims centred approaches such as the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 1971 (USA) (‘ANCSA’) passed by the USA in 1971 and granting to the Indigenous people of Alaska 40 million acres of land and one billion in compensation in exchange for the extinguishment of Aboriginal title in the State. The ANCSA is now criticised for the absence of implementation mechanisms and failure to address the fundamental questions of State/Indigenous relations.[33] The Federal Government chose a corporate model that is said to have avoided ‘the question of tribal self-government and authority’ and the Alaskan settlement was instead ‘approached largely as an issue about access to and ownership of resources’.[34] Indigenous claims in Alaska are now resurfacing because of the unsatisfactory nature of the 1971 settlement — it was seriously flawed because it focused on ‘the achievement of a result rather than the framework for a relationship’.[35]

McHugh argues that these shortcomings of the ANCSA hold true for the Native Title Act in Australia.

The Act is geared towards establishing and extinguishing Aboriginal title over Crown land and makes scant provision for the establishment of a comprehensive framework of relationships between the Crown and the owner-group.[36]

The process adopted in Australia can be sharply contrasted with that of our neighbouring Commonwealth country, New Zealand. The establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975 coupled with a series of decisions of New Zealand superior courts has resulted in a number of significant claims settlements between 1994 and 1996. Mason Durie provides the following useful table of these settlements, Tainui, Whakatahea and Ngai Tahu.[37] The notion of a partnership between Maori Indigenous people and the Crown or Government in New Zealand has been recognised by the legal system — treaty partners are to act reasonably towards each other with the utmost good faith.[38]

The processes adopted by the Waitangi Tribunal have been bicultural drawing from Maori concepts of justice, fairness and ownership.[39] The Tribunal of Waitangi Act 1975 (NZ) require Tribunal Members to be appointed in recognition of the partnership and there is generally a fair representation of Maori and non-Indigenous pakeha members. In Australia the body established to facilitate native title claims, the National Native Title Tribunal, engages in a mediation process that is required to take into account the cultural and customary concerns of Aboriginal people but not so as to unduly prejudice any person.[40] The effectiveness of its ability in this respect however is questionable. It has been noted by Pat Lane, a member of the NNTT, that ‘parties will judge the Tribunal by the conduct of the members and staff and the way its institutional face appears in public. The absence of Aboriginal staff or Members can send a message to Aboriginal people that the Tribunal is another white bureaucracy.’[41] Issues concerning bi-culturalism must be better addressed in the context of any future treaty negotiations and settlement processes.

The commitment that has been made in Western Australia to a new and just relationship has opened the door to a new chapter in the State’s history. The promise of a partnership has been made representing a fundamental shift in the nature of State and Indigenous relations. The framework or process through which this partnership shall be achieved has not yet been settled. We can learn from international observations that the process of relationship building is just as significant if not more so, than the finalisation of settlements or claims. In the Australian context the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation have confirmed that reconciliation requires recognition that this land was settled without treaty or consent and that processes must be negotiated through which agreements or treaties may be achieved.[42]

In charting this future path we may find that there are limitations under the current legislative scheme, the Native Title Act, and the ILUA process. It must always be remembered that native title means our culture and customs and laws and these must be incorporated within agreement making processes. The Statement of Commitment recognises our continuing rights and responsibilities as the first people of Western Australia and calls for these rights to be ‘respected and accommodated within the legal, political and economic system’. The State and ATSIC have identified important priority projects — how the promise of partnership will be affected remains to be seen.

It is a misconception to divorce the extensive agreement making that is taking place in Australia and that is proposed to take place under the ATSIC priority projects, from the national treaty debate. A recalcitrant Federal Government has opposed a national treaty but States such as Western Australia have shown a willingness to negotiate to resolve native title and other outstanding issues and the statement of commitment priority projects now offer an important opportunity to put treaty making into practice. ?




[1]Western Australia Indigenous Affairs Advisory Committee, 20/12/2001, Minutes of Meeting.

[2]ATSIC, Building a New Relationship Between Aboriginal People and the State of Western Australia Canberra 2001.

[3]Mabo v Queensland [No 2] [1992] HCA 23; (1992) 175 CLR 1.

[4]Western Australia v Commonwealth [1995] HCA 47; (1994-1995) 183 CLR 373.

[5]Nettheim Garth et al (eds) Indigenous Legal Issues LBC Sydney 1997 p 198.

[6]Western Australian Aboriginal Native Title Working Group Reaching Agreement April 2002 Issue No 3.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ngalpil v Sate of Western Australia [2001] FCA 1140.

[9]Sunday Times 10 June 2002.

[10]NNTT No WF0 2/3.

[11]Native Title Act (1993) (Cth) ss 24BB, 24CB, 24DB.

[12]Peter Yu as cited in Kee Sue ‘Indigenous Land Use Agreements: Which Why and Where?’ in Keon-Cohen (ed) Native Title in the New Millennium AIATSIS Canberra 2000 p 341.

[13]Kee Sue ‘Indigenous Land Use Agreements: Which Why and Where?’ in Keon-Cohen (ed) Native Title in the New Millennium AIATSIS Canberra 2000 p 348.

[14]Ibid p 346.

[15]Native Title Act (1993) (Cth) s 24EA (2).

[16]Above note 13 p 348.

[17]Indigenous Affairs Advisory Committee, 20/12/2001, Minutes of Meeting.

[18]Above note 13 p 342.

[19]Nisga’a Final Agreement 1998, British Columbia Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs.

[20]See <www.gov.bc.ca>.

[21]Above note 19.

[22]Above note 19 Chapters 11-12.

[23]Minutes of IAAC Inaugural Meeting December 2001.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Native Title Act (1993) (Cth) Part 2 Division 6.

[26]ATSIC Treaty Issues and Frequently Asked Questions Canberra 2001 p 24.

[27]Dodson Patrick The Wentworth Lecture AIATSIS Canberra 2000 p 29.

[28]Yu Peter ‘Unfinished Business — National Responsibilities and Local Actions’ in Garkawe Kelly and Fisher (eds) Indigenous Human Rights The Institute of Criminology NSW 2001 p 251.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Tully James ‘Reconsidering the BC Treaty Process’ paper presented at Speaking Truth to Power: A Treaty Forum BC Treaty Commission 2000 p 8.

[31]Ibid p 9.

[32]Ibid p 10.

[33]McHugh P J ‘Aboriginal Identity and Relations in North America and Australasia’ in Living Relationships Victoria University Press New Zealand 1998 p 117.

[34]Ibid p 119.

[35]Ibid p 199.

[36]Ibid p 119.

[37]Durie Mason Te Mana Te Kawanatanaga: The Politics of Maori Self-Determination OUP New Zealand 1998 p 203.

[38]Ibid p 184.

[39]Ibid p 186.

[40]Native Title Act (1993) (Cth) s 209.

[41]Lane Patricia ‘A Quick Guide to ILUAs?’ in Keon-Cohen (ed), Native Title in the New Millennium, Aboriginal Studies Press 2000 p 49.

[42]Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Final Report December 2000 p 106.


AustLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback
URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AUIndigLawRpr/2002/52.html