AustLII Home | Databases | WorldLII | Search | Feedback

Australian Indigenous Law Reporter

Australian Indigenous Law Reporter (AILR)
You are here:  AustLII >> Databases >> Australian Indigenous Law Reporter >> 2006 >> [2006] AUIndigLawRpr 85

Database Search | Name Search | Recent Articles | Noteup | LawCite | Author Info | Download | Help

Cunneen, Chris --- "Evaluation of the Queensland Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Justice Agreement - Digest" [2006] AUIndigLawRpr 85; (2006) 10(4) Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 96


Evaluation of the Queensland Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Justice Agreement

Professor Chris Cunneen

Institute of Criminology, Sydney

21 November 2006

Executive Summary

The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Justice Agreement was developed by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Advisory Board (ATSIAB) and the Queensland Government. It was signed by the Premier, four Ministers and the Chair and members of ATSIAB on 19 December 2000. The Agreement lasts until 2011.

In December 2004 the Queensland Government invited tenders for an independent evaluation of the Queensland Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Justice Agreement in terms of its outcomes and possible future directions. The consultant (Professor Chris Cunneen) was contracted to undertake the evaluation. The governance arrangements for the consultancy were a Steering Committee, a Reference Group and a Project Manager.[1]

The evaluation is designed to meet strategic requirements which provide for:

Assessment of Government Effectiveness in Reducing Incarceration

Juvenile Detention

By national standards Queensland has relatively low Indigenous and non-Indigenous rates of detention. Quarterly detention rates fluctuate, however the lowest rate for Indigenous detention over the 18 quarterly periods from 31 March 1999 to 30 June 2003 was in December 2000 at the time the Justice Agreement was signed. Since then quarterly rates of Indigenous detention have been consistently higher.

However, average annual detention rates (based on four days of the year) do show a decline over the period. Thus despite fluctuations, based on this measure, there has been a reduction in the rate of Indigenous youth incarceration, with the 2003 rate some 39% lower than the 1999 rate. (4.2.1 National Comparisons)

The juvenile admissions data shows there has been neither a drop in the rate of Indigenous detention nor a reduction in the level of over-representation of Indigenous young people in detention during the first four years of the Justice Agreement. In fact, based on admissions data, the Indigenous detention rate and level of overrepresentation was higher in 2003-04 than in 2000-01 when the Justice Agreement was signed (4.2.2 Queensland Admissions Data on Juvenile Detention).

Juvenile Remand and Custodial Sentences

The most significant impact on Indigenous detention rates will be achieved through programs and policies aimed at reducing the remand population. Specific further research needs to be done on the reasons for remand for Indigenous young people, so that programs can be developed to target these causes. Preliminary data suggest that only a small proportion of those who are remanded in custody actually receive a custodial sentence.

In terms of the Justice Agreement measures of success, there has been a reduction in Indigenous young people sentenced to detention between 2000-01 and 2003-04. However, this is overshadowed by the growing numbers in the remand population. (4.2.3 The Impact of Remand on Indigenous Young People)

Adult Imprisonment

Queensland has a rate of Indigenous over-representation in adult prison which is among the lowest in the nation. In terms of the Justice Agreement, there are positive signs that a steady increase in the rate of Indigenous imprisonment in Queensland has been halted and there has been a decline in the rate since 2002 until the most recent prison census data (2004).

Admission data also reflects a decline in Indigenous numbers from a high point in 1999-2000. However, there has been an upward spike in 2004-05 over the previous three years. (4.3.1 National Comparisons)

Assessment of Government Effectiveness in Meeting Commitments: Some Strategies are in Place

Each of the relevant Departments have made progress in some areas and are limited in others in their response to the Justice Agreement.

Some of the key strategies which will reduce over-representation are already in place, but need substantial and immediate resourcing for any hope of achieving the outcome of reducing Indigenous incarceration rates by 50% by 2011. These strategies include:

To say that these strategies are in place is not to say that the current level of support is adequate. For example, we do not know whether the expansion of Youth Justice Service Centres will go anyway near what is needed to provide a proper set of community-based sentencing alternatives for the Childrens Court.

Additional and Alternative Strategies Need Serious Consideration

Other areas need serious consideration if the goal of reducing incarceration rates it to be met, including

Some Strategies are Important for Reasons other than their Impact on Over-Representation

Some strategies are important to ensure that the criminal justice system is fair, equitable and just in its application to Indigenous people in Queensland. These strategies may not have the largest impact on over-representation, but they are intrinsically important for societies guided by the rule of law. These include:

What Have Been the Greatest Failing of Each Department?

In terms of meeting the outcomes of the Justice Agreement the most significant failures can be identified as following.

Some of the most important initiatives like CJGs and Murri Court began as local initiatives. While on the one hand they can be seen as successes, they also represent a failure of government response.

Realism, Urgency and Resources

Perhaps the greatest failure of implementation in relation to the Justice Agreement is the least tangible: there appears to be little sense of urgency in meeting the primary goal set by the Justice Agreement.

The failure to resource justice initiatives means that it is unlikely that the target of reducing Indigenous incarceration rates will be met by 2011. However, the target should not be abandoned.

Perhaps the example of the Murri Court shows the missed opportunity in resourcing, expanding and developing an alternative to traditional courts. Although very approximate, we can estimate that currently the Murri Courts deal with about 0.2% of adult Indigenous court matters, and about 1.5% of juvenile Indigenous matters. Not every matter involving an Indigenous offender should go before the Murri Court, nor should it over-ride other initiatives involving CJGs and JPs (Magistrate Courts).However, we can gauge the level of expansion needed if the courts are to impact on Indigenous offenders.

A similar example might be drawn with the lack of funding to the CJGs comparative to their responsibilities. Some $3.4 million was allocated to all the CJGs in the 2004/05 financial year. That is only slightly more expensive than, for example, the cost of building one PCYC in a remote community.

Providing for proper supervision of orders in Indigenous communities will also require resources. However the longer term savings in reducing the costs of imprisonment are likely to be significant. For Department of Corrective Services, the daily cost of offenders in the community is $8.73 per offender compared to $167.24 per prisoner.

Finally it should be noted that not all strategies require significant resources. For example the greater use of diversionary options and alternatives to arrest by police is likely to be cost neutral in terms of decision-making, and have longer term savings in relation to fewer court appearances.

The full text of this Evaluation, together with the response of the Queensland Government, is available online at <http://www.cjrn.unsw.edu.au/news_and_events/index.asp#evaluation> .


[1] The Steering Committee was the CEO Sub-Committee on the implementation of the Justice Agreement chaired by Ms Rachel Hunter, Director General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General. The Reference Group comprised the Senior Officers’ Group of the CEO Sub-Committee, chaired by Mr David Schultz, and later, Mr Terry Ryan, the Executive Director, Research and Executive Services, DJAG. The Project Manager was Mr Kevin Childs, Manager, Policy Directorate, DATSIP.


AustLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback
URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AUIndigLawRpr/2006/85.html