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WHAT’S A RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY?
THE FLAW IN AUSTRALIA’S HUMAN RIGHTS CHARTERS
By Dr Louis Schetzer
The UK’s leading academic on public access to justice, Professor Dame Hazel Genn, has defined access to justice as:
‘... the ability to access public processes for resolving disputes and rights claims, that lead to enforceable remedies reflecting the merits of cases according to law by means of procedures that are conspicuously fair and perceived to be so ... It requires the ability to engage, to participate, to be dealt with by fair procedures and to receive a substantively just outcome.’[1]
In international human rights law, the ability to be dealt with by fair procedures and to receive a substantively just outcome is articulated in several international human rights conventions as a right to an effective remedy.[2] This is considered to be an essential component of human rights protection.
Over the last 15 years three Australian jurisdictions – Victoria, the ACT and Queensland – have sought to provide domestic recognition and protection of these international human rights standards by enacting legislative human rights charters. The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (the Victorian Charter), the ACT Human Rights Act 2004 (the ACT HRA) and the Queensland Human Rights Act 2019 (the Queensland HRA) provide significant additional protections for human rights and accountability. However, major concerns arise as to whether these legislative instruments provide fair, accessible remedies to resolve complaints regarding human rights violations perpetrated by public authorities against individuals. This article critically evaluates the remedy provisions of these three human rights statutes and assesses whether they deliver access to justice for those individuals who allege that their rights have been breached.
LEGISLATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS CHARTERS IN AUSTRALIA
The legislative human rights charters that have been enacted in Victoria, the ACT and Queensland all share similar features with the legislative models of human rights Acts in the UK (Human Rights Act 1998) and New Zealand (Bill Of Rights Act 1990). These key features include:
• All new legislation is to be accompanied by a statement indicating whether the Bill is compatible with the rights protected in the legislation. Also, a designated parliamentary committee must examine whether a Bill is incompatible with the protected human rights.[3]
• Public authorities must act in a way that is compatible with the protected human rights.[4]
• Courts and tribunals are required to interpret legislation and regulations in a manner that is compatible with human rights so far as it is possible to do so in accordance with the legislation’s purpose.[5]
• The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to declare that a statutory provision cannot be interpreted consistently with a human right and requires the relevant minister to respond to that declaration.[6]
These Acts legislate what has been described as a ‘dialogue’ model of human rights protection that preserves parliamentary sovereignty and does not focus on enforcement by the courts.[7] The human rights protected by these instruments are predominantly civil and political rights, based on the rights contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In both the ACT HRA and the Queensland HRA there is also some protection provided for a limited number of economic, social and cultural rights (that is, the right to education, specific protection of cultural rights for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and the right to health services).[8]
Each of the Acts states that a human right may be subject to such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and outlines the relevant factors to consider whether such limits can be justified.[9]
The remainder of this article will focus on the respective remedy provisions in each of these Acts.
REMEDIES UNDER THE VICTORIAN CHARTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES ACT 2006
The obligation on public authorities
Under s38(1) of the Victorian Charter it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way that is incompatible with a human right or, in making a decision, to fail to give proper consideration to a relevant human right. The Charter provides some express qualifications and exemptions in s38(2)–(4) to the obligation under s38(1). Specifically, s38(1) does not apply if the public authority is acting to give effect to a statutory provision that is incompatible with a human right, or if as a result of a Commonwealth statutory provision it could not reasonably have acted differently or made a different decision. In addition, s38(1) does not apply to an act or decision of a private nature.
Section 38(4) provides an exemption to religious organisations from being obliged to act in a way or to make a decision that has the effect of impeding or preventing that organisation from acting in conformity with its religious doctrines, beliefs or principles. This exemption provides a significant limitation on the ability of affected individuals to seek a remedy for a breach of human rights that has been committed by a religious organisation. Given that many religious bodies perform functions of a public nature that have been outsourced by government, particularly key welfare and homelessness services, s38(4) may result in those services not being subject to human rights obligations, even though the same services provided by government bodies or non-religious non-government bodies would be subject to those obligations. Such an exemption for religious organisations does not appear in either the UK or NZ human rights acts. Nor does it appear in the ACT HRA.
The relief/remedies provision in the Victorian Charter
Section 39 of the Charter sets out the circumstances in which a person may seek relief or remedy in situations where a public authority has acted unlawfully under s38(1):
‘If, otherwise than because of this Charter, a person may seek any relief or remedy in respect of an act or decision of a public authority on the ground that the act or decision was unlawful, that person may seek that relief or remedy on a ground of unlawfulness arising because of this Charter.’
Under s39(1) the Charter does not provide any new cause of action for an individual against a public authority in respect of human rights infringements. However, it does allow an individual with an existing cause of action against a public authority to also claim a relief or remedy on the basis that the public authority did not comply with s38(1).
This complicated and confusing section has been the subject of considerable criticism by human rights advocates and legal professional bodies. The requirement that a person must have a pre-existing non-Charter claim for relief or remedy in respect of an act or decision of a public authority on the ground that the act or decision was unlawful, to enable a claim for relief or remedy on the basis of Charter unlawfulness (often referred to as the ‘piggy-back’ cause of action) has been seen as a significant barrier for people bringing claims for human rights breaches. In the 2015 statutory eight-year review of the Charter, the Law Institute of Victoria (LIV) stated that the requirement for a piggy-back cause of action can lead to significant resources being expended on resolving preliminary jurisdictional issues, ‘bringing judicial review proceedings in the Supreme Court’, and ‘arguing potentially “weaker” claims of non-Charter unlawful conduct, when the “stronger” claim arises from a breach of the Charter’.[10] Both the LIV and the Victorian Bar Council noted that the absence of a direct cause of action for a breach of human rights under the Charter is a barrier to accessible, just and timely remedies for infringements of people’s basic human rights. Both organisations strongly argued for a stand-alone cause of action.[11]
The other provision that has attracted criticism is s39(3), which states that a person is not entitled to be awarded any damages because of a breach of the Charter. According to the LIV, while practical outcomes are important, damages are sometimes the only way to fairly compensate a person for a breach of their human rights.[12]
Despite the problematic wording of s39, several applications under s38 were brought before the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) between 2008 and 2011 to consider whether a public authority had failed to comply with its Charter obligations. In several instances VCAT concluded that there was unlawful conduct and directed the offending party to cease such conduct, which provided a satisfactory remedy for the individual involved.
In 2011 the jurisdiction of VCAT to consider Charter issues was itself considered by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Director of Housing v Sudi [2011] VSCA 666 (Sudi). Warfa Sudi, a Somalian refugee, and his three-year-old son were living in public housing. The tenancy agreement for the home was originally made with Mr Sudi’s mother, but Mr Sudi and his son continued to occupy the premises after his mother died from cancer. The Director of Housing subsequently made application under the Residential Tenancies Act for a possession order to evict Mr Sudi. Mr Sudi argued that the Director’s decision to seek to evict him breached his human rights under the Charter and that because of this unlawfulness, the Director was not entitled to seek to evict him. The Director of Housing submitted that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider the lawfulness of his actions under the Charter, that being a matter reserved to the Supreme Court.
The Court determined that VCAT’s original jurisdiction did not encompass a judicial review jurisdiction. Where the question of validity or lawfulness of a decision arises incidentally as part of a defence to the application, the Court determined that VCAT would not have jurisdiction to consider the Charter lawfulness of the decision or action. The Court concluded that under s39(1) of the Charter there was no collateral review power conferred on VCAT and that the right to argue that an administrative action is unlawful because of non-compliance with the Charter can be asserted only when there would be a right to seek review of the action on grounds that are independent of the Charter.[13] The Chief Justice stated that any person wishing to resist an eviction on Charter grounds cannot do so in VCAT, but must bring an application in the Supreme Court, which she acknowledged was a less accessible and more expensive forum.[14]
The effect of the Court of Appeal’s decision is that while VCAT retains jurisdiction to consider Charter issues in other ways, it does not have jurisdiction under s39 of the Charter to conduct a collateral review of a decision of a public authority.[15] The Court found that these matters should be referred to the Supreme Court through judicial review proceedings.[16]
In 2014 the Supreme Court further narrowed the opportunity for social housing tenants to commence judicial review proceedings in relation to Charter unlawfulness in respect of a notice to vacate issued by the Director of Housing. It concluded that once VCAT has made a possession order, the Director’s decision to issue a notice to vacate cannot be set aside by the Supreme Court on the basis of Charter unlawfulness (see Burgess and Another v Director of Housing and Another[17]). The basis for this decision was that once VCAT had made a possession order, the notice to vacate issued by the Director of Housing ceased to have ongoing legal effect and therefore was not amenable to the remedy of certiorari even if the Director had failed to consider human rights in making the decision.[18] This means that a social housing tenant facing eviction who wishes to challenge an eviction notice on Charter grounds must commence judicial review proceedings in the Supreme Court in the window-period after the Director has made a decision to issue the notice to vacate, but before VCAT has made the possession order.[19]
The Supreme Court has confirmed that VCAT retains some jurisdiction to consider matters in which Charter unlawfulness is alleged[20] (namely, in circumstances where a person could also seek relief or remedy in VCAT upon a non-Charter ground of unlawfulness, such as prohibited discrimination under the Equal Opportunity Act 2010). However, the decisions in Sudi and Burgess have significantly limited the jurisdiction of VCAT to consider allegations of Charter unlawfulness.
Several community legal and human rights organisations have expressed concern that the Sudi decision limits the ability of the most disadvantaged people in the community to seek quick resolution of disputes in which Charter non-compliance is alleged, through VCAT.[21] The Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission (VEOHRC) said that the ‘chilling effect of Sudi’ may have generated a mistaken belief in some advocates and public authorities that VCAT had no jurisdiction at all to consider human rights and deterred people from relying on the Charter in legal proceedings. [22]
In response to these concerns, the statutory eight-year review of the Victorian Charter concluded that VCAT should be given original jurisdiction to hear and determine claims that a public authority has acted incompatibly with human rights protected under the Charter. The review noted that VCAT is a more accessible and less costly forum than the Supreme Court, and has more experience than any other Victorian court or tribunal in dealing with Charter arguments.[23] In its 2016 response to the review’s recommendations, the Victorian Government indicated that this recommendation was still being considered.[24] Since that time the Government has not provided any further update regarding its position on this recommendation.
The absence of an accessible complaints mechanism under the Charter
Following the decision in Sudi, one of the most common criticisms of the Victorian Charter is the absence of an accessible complaints mechanism for alleged contraventions by a public entity. The statutory eight-year review of the Victorian Charter recommended that the Charter be amended to give VEOHRC a statutory function and resources to offer dispute resolution for disputes under the Charter.[25] The Review accepted the statement from the VEOHRC that the confusing and limited availability of remedies under the Charter has inhibited the development of a human rights culture, and creates a disincentive for compliance as there are no obvious consequences of a breach.[26] In its response the Victorian Government indicated that this recommendation was also under further consideration. To date there has been no further update on whether the Government will accept this recommendation.
REMEDIES UNDER THE ACT HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 2004
The ACT HRA preceded the Victorian Charter, coming into operation in 2004. However, in 2008, after the Victorian Charter had come into operation, the ACT HRA was amended to make it unlawful for a public authority in the ACT to act in a manner that is incompatible with a human right, or in making a decision, to fail to give proper consideration to a relevant human right.[27] Following the amendments, the ACT HRA included many of the features of the Victorian Charter.
The relief/remedies provision in the ACT HRA
However, one significant difference between the two Acts is that following the 2008 amendments, the ACT HRA provides a person who claims that a public authority has acted unlawfully under the Act with a freestanding cause of action in the ACT Supreme Court. Section 40C(2) states:
‘The person may—
(a) start a proceeding in the Supreme Court against the public authority; or
(b) rely on the person’s rights under this Act in other legal proceedings.’
The ACT HRA allows a person either to start a proceeding against a public authority in respect of an alleged violation of her/his rights, or to rely on her/his rights in any other legal proceeding. In such a proceeding initiated in the Supreme Court, the Court may grant any relief other than damages that it considers appropriate.[28]
Section 40C(2) therefore addresses one of the most criticised aspects of the Victorian Charter; namely, the requirement for a person to have a pre-existing non-Charter claim for relief or remedy in respect of an unlawful act or decision of a public authority, to enable a claim for relief or remedy on the basis of Charter unlawfulness (that is, the ‘piggy-back’ cause of action). However, similar to the Charter, s40C(4) prevents a person from claiming any damages where there has been a breach of the protected human rights (apart from the exception stated in s40C(5)).
Section 40C is similar to ss7-8 of the UK Human Rights Act 1998 (UK HRA), in that it enables a person who claims that a public authority has acted unlawfully under the human rights legislation to bring an action against that public authority. However, whereas under the UK HRA proceedings may be brought in an appropriate court or tribunal, under s40C of the ACT HRA a person can initiate such proceedings only in the ACT Supreme Court. The other key area of difference is that under s8(1) of the UK HRA, a court or tribunal may grant such relief or remedy or make such order within its powers as it considers just and appropriate (including an order for damages). These two key differences raise the question as to whether the provision in the ACT HRA serves as an inhibitor for disadvantaged people bringing a claim for human rights breaches by a public authority, given that proceedings can only be initiated in the ACT’s most superior court, and (apart from the specified exceptions in s40C(5)), there can be no claim for damages. The ACT Human Rights Commission stated in 2009 that the option of instigating proceedings in the Supreme Court for human rights infringements is not an accessible remedy and that many individuals would be deterred by the prospect of Supreme Court litigation, particularly those who do not have legal representation.[29]
The ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider ACT HRA disputes
The ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACTCAT) has considered the extent of its jurisdiction to consider questions of human rights compliance by a public authority under the ACT HRA. The Tribunal has followed a similar approach to that determined for VCAT by the Victorian Court of Appeal in 2011 in Director of Housing v Sudi.[30] In Commissioner for Social Housing in the ACT & Massey,[31] the ACTCAT concluded that s40C(2)(b) of the ACT HRA allows rights to be considered and relied upon where those rights, or a finding of unlawfulness in relation to those rights, can be incorporated into the existing legal framework for the proceedings. However, that section does not confer an ACT HRA review jurisdiction, nor a collateral review jurisdiction, on the Tribunal.[32]
The Massey decision will have the effect of limiting the jurisdiction of the ACTCAT to consider allegations of ACT HRA unlawfulness in much the same way as the Sudi decision limited the VCAT jurisdiction.
The absence of an accessible complaints mechanism under the ACT HRA
There is no provision in the ACT HRA that gives the ACT Human Rights Commission a statutory function to provide dispute resolution services for complaints of unlawful conduct or decisions by public authorities under the Act. As in Victoria, the lack of access to an affordable forum to consider human rights complaints undermines the access to effective human rights complaints resolution processes for the most disadvantaged people in the ACT.
REMEDIES UNDER THE QUEENSLAND HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 2019
In March 2019 Queensland became the third jurisdiction in Australia to enact a legislative human rights charter. The Queensland HRA is closely modelled on the Victorian Charter and the ACT HRA. Section 58(1) states that it is unlawful for a public authority in Queensland to act in a manner that is incompatible with a human right, or to fail to give proper consideration to a relevant human right in making a decision.[33] However, the Queensland HRA is a significant improvement on the other two Acts in that it provides for an accessible complaints mechanism for alleged contraventions by a public entity.
The relief/remedies provision in the Queensland HRA
The Queensland HRA repeats some of the most criticised aspects of the Victorian Charter with respect to the circumstances in which a person may seek relief or remedy in situations where a public authority has acted unlawfully under s58(1). Section 59 states:
‘
(1) Subsection (2) applies if a person may seek any relief or remedy in relation to an act or decision of a public entity on the ground that the act or decision was, other than because of section 58, unlawful.
(2) The person may seek the relief or remedy mentioned in subsection (1) on the ground of unlawfulness arising under section 58, even if the person may not be successful in
obtaining the relief or remedy on the ground mentioned in subsection (1).’
Sections 58–59 have a similar effect to the much criticised ss38–39 of the Victorian Charter in that s59(1) limits legal proceedings to instances where there is a separate claim of unlawfulness to a claim under s58 of the Act. Like the Charter, s59(1) effectively legislates a ‘piggy-back’ cause of action (there is no provision for a stand-alone cause of action). In addition, s59(3) makes it explicit that a person is not entitled to be awarded damages on the ground of s58(1) unlawfulness. The Queensland HRA also grants an exemption to religious organisations.[34] As noted above with respect to the Victorian Charter, this exemption means that there is a significant limitation on the ability of affected individuals to seek a remedy for a breach of human rights committed by a religious organisation.
The Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider Queensland HRA disputes
Like the Victorian Charter and the ACT HRA, there is no provision in the Queensland HRA for the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) to have jurisdiction to hear applications for relief or remedy in relation to alleged unlawful conduct under s58. It is therefore almost inevitable that QCAT will follow the approaches to that determined for VCAT by the Victorian Court of Appeal decision in Sudi[35] and for ACTCAT by the 2013 decision in Massey.[36] As in Victoria and the ACT, people who allege that their human rights have been breached and who wish to take action against a public authority for that unlawfulness will have to initiate complex and costly judicial review proceedings in the Supreme Court, rather than QCAT, which would have been a more accessible, quick and inexpensive forum.[37]
Perhaps even more disturbing is an additional limitation provided in s58(6), which states that an act or decision of a public entity is not invalid merely because by doing the act or making the decision the entity contravenes s58(1), and that a person does not commit an offence merely because she/he acts or makes a decision in contravention of s58(1). This effectively prevents any application to review a decision or action of a public authority on the basis that it is unlawful under s58(1). Whereas in Victoria and the ACT there is a limited opportunity to review such decisions (albeit in the Supreme Court) on the basis that they may be unlawful under the respective human rights acts, in Queensland such a cause of action has been expressly denied.
Human rights complaints to the Queensland Human Rights Commission
While the above provisions significantly undermine the effectiveness of the human rights protections provided in the Queensland HRA, one area in which the Queensland Act represents a significant advancement on the Victorian Charter and the ACT HRA is the inclusion of an accessible complaints mechanism for alleged contraventions by a public entity. Section 64(1) provides for an individual who has been the subject of an alleged contravention of protected human rights to make a complaint to the Queensland Human Rights Commission (the Commission). Under s79, if such a human rights complaint is accepted by the Commissioner it can be referred to a conciliation conference. The purpose of conciliation of a human rights complaint is to promote the resolution of the complaint in an informal, quick and efficient manner (s80).
The inclusion of such an accessible and convenient mechanism for making a complaint about a human rights breach recognises that such a process is essential in facilitating the development of a human rights culture across government and the community. However, even with this significant improvement on the Victorian and ACT models, the process of conciliation as provided in the Queensland HRA is deficient as there is no binding or clear outcome from a complaint being brought to the Commission. Even if the outcome of the conciliation is an acknowledgment by the respondent public entity that it has acted unlawfully under s58(1), there is no provision in the legislation that obliges the public entity, or gives powers to the Commission to compel the entity, to remedy the breach or provide some redress to the complainant.
Under s88, if the conciliation fails to resolve the complaint, the Commissioner must prepare a report about the complaint for the complainant and the respondent, which sets out the substance of the complaint and the actions taken to attempt to resolve it. The Act does not provide the Commissioner with any power to direct a public entity to address the issues raised in the complaint that have been acknowledged by the respondent or which the Commissioner considers to have been substantiated.
Of concern is that a complaints and conciliation process that does not provide for a clear or binding outcome, or for enforcement of the protected rights, will result in a loss of confidence in the process and ultimately in the Commission itself. This will undermine the role of the Commission and the ability of the Act to fulfil its main object as outlined in s3: to protect and promote human rights and to help build a culture in the Queensland public sector that respects and promotes human rights.
CONCLUSION
While each of the legislative human rights charters in Victoria, the ACT and Queensland has the laudatory objectives of improving human rights compliance across government and the community in those three jurisdictions, each of them falls short in providing effective, accessible remedies and causes of action for individuals who allege that their rights have been violated. The UN General Assembly has endorsed basic principles that recognise the importance of investigative measures to ensure that breaches of human rights and those responsible are identified, and that remedies should include compensation, other remedial measures, apologies (where appropriate) and preventive measures (for example, changes in laws, policies and practices).[38]
Governments need to employ a suite of tools, both legislative and non-legislative, in order to achieve the objective of improving human rights compliance across government and the community. Ultimately, however, the provision of timely, accessible remedies for the individuals most affected by human rights violations is a vital element in this framework and is essential in holding public authorities to account for human rights violations.
Dr Louis Schetzer is a casual academic at the University of NSW and Manager of Policy and Advocacy at the Australian Lawyers Alliance. His area of doctoral research was a comparative critical analysis of legislative human rights and their application to non-state actors performing contracted-out government services. EMAIL louis@lawyersalliance.com.au.
[1] Professor Dame H Genn, ‘Online Courts and the Future of Justice’, Birkenhead Lecture 2017, Gray’s Inn, 16 October 2017.
[2] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 2; Convention Against Torture, Article 14; Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Article 2; International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 6; Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, Article 4.
[3] Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (Victorian Charter), ss28, 30; Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) (ACT HRA), ss37–38; Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (Queensland HRA), ss38–39.
[4] Victorian Charter, s38; ACT HRA, s40B; Queensland HRA, s58(1).
[5] Victorian Charter, s32; ACT HRA, s30; Queensland HRA, s48.
[6] Victorian Charter, ss36–37; ACT HRA, ss32–33; Queensland HRA, ss53–56.
[7] G Williams, ‘The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities: Origins and Scope’, Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 30, 2006, 880 at 893.
[8] ACT HRA, ss27–27A, 28, 36–37; Queensland HRA, ss28, 36–37.
[9] Victorian Charter, s7(2); ACT HRA, s28; Queensland HRA, s13.
[10] Law Institute of Victoria, 2015 Review of the Charter of Human Rights Submission (2015) 19, <https://s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/hdp.au.prod.app.vic-engage.files/2914/8609/7801/Submission_78_Law_Institute_of_Victoria.pdf>.
[11] Ibid, 20; Victorian Bar Council, Victorian Bar Submission to the Charter Review 2015 (2015) 12–15, <https://s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/hdp.au.prod.app.vic-engage.files/7414/8609/7790/Submission_54_Victorian_Bar.pdf>.
[12] Law Institute of Victoria, above note 10, 21.
[13] Director of Housing v Sudi [2011] VSCA 266 (Sudi), per Weinberg J, para 282.
[14] Ibid, per Warren CJ, para 56.
[15] Ibid, per Warren CJ, paras 34–45.
[16] Ibid, per Weinberg J, para 281.
[17] Burgess and Another v Director of Housing and Another [2014] VSC 648, per Macaulay J, paras 126–129, 222.
[18] Ibid, per Macaulay J, paras 73–83.
[19] Human Rights Law Centre, Rights Agenda, Monthly Bulletin of the Human Rights Law Centre, Edition 102, January 2015, Melbourne, 30.
[20] Goode v Common Equity Housing [2014] VSC 585.
[21] See for example: Victoria Legal Aid, Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 eight-year review, Submission, June 2015, 7; Victorian Council of Social Service (VCOSS), 2015 Review of Charter of Human Rights, Submission, June 2015, 23; Justice Connect, Charting a stronger course – Submission to the Eight Year Charter Review, June 2015, 24–25; Federation of Community Legal Centres (Vic), 2015 Review of Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, June 2015, 14.
[22] Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission, Submission to the Eight-Year Review of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (2015) 12, 66–67, <https://www.humanrightscommission.vic.gov.au/home/submissions/item/download/7814_1d1e6210214903849020b077750f0fc4>.
[23] M Brett Young, From Commitment to Culture – The 2015 Review of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, State of Victoria, September 2015, 128–129.
[24] Victorian State Government, Government response to the 2015 review of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act, <https://www.justice.vic.gov.au/justice-system/laws-and-regulation/human-rights-legislation/government-response-to-the-2015-review>.
[25] Ibid, 105.
[26] Ibid, 124.
[27] ACT HRA, s40B(1).
[28] ACT HRA, s40C(4).
[29] ACT Human Rights Commission, Submission to the Five Year Review of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), November 2009, 38.
[30] Sudi, above note 13.
[31] Commissioner for Social Housing in the ACT & Massey (Residential Tenancies) [2013] ACAT 41.
[32] Ibid, paras 44, 51, 53.
[33] Queensland HRA, s58(1).
[34] Queensland HRA, s58(3).
[35] Sudi, above note 13.
[36] Commissioner for Social Housing in the ACT & Massey (Residential Tenancies) [2013] ACAT 41.
[37] See <https://www.qcat.qld.gov.au/about-qcat>.
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