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2002-2003
THE PARLIAMENT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
CIVIL AVIATION LEGISLATION
AMENDMENT (MUTUAL RECOGNITION WITH NEW ZEALAND AND OTHER MATTERS) BILL
2003
EXPLANATORY
MEMORANDUM
(Circulated
by authority of the Minister for Transport and Regional Services,
the
Honourable John Anderson, MP)
OUTLINE 2
Financial Impact
Statement 2
REGULATION IMPACT STATEMENT –
3
Background 3
1.
Problem 4
2. Objective 5
3. Options
Considered 6
4. Impact Analysis 7
5.
Consultation Process 10
6. Conclusions and recommended
option 13
7. Implementation and
review 13
NOTES ON CLAUSES 14
Schedule 1
– Amendments relating to mutual recognition with New
Zealand 14
Civil Aviation Act 1988 16
Civil
Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959 30
Schedule 2
– Other Amendments 30
Part 1 – References to Foreign
Aircraft 30
Civil Aviation Act 1988 30
Part 2
– Ongoing licence conditions 31
Civil Aviation Act
1988 31
(Mutual Recognition with New Zealand and Other Matters) Bill 2003
This Bill amends the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (the Act) to permit
the mutual recognition of certain aviation-related safety certification between
Australia and New Zealand. Initially, this will be restricted to Air
Operator’s Certificates (AOCs) for operation of aircraft of more than
30 seats or 15,000 kgs, as issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
(CASA) in Australia and the Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand (CAANZ).
Mutual recognition is based on an acceptance by both countries that
their safety regulations result in the safe operation of large capacity aircraft
within their jurisdiction. Under current provisions of the Civil Aviation Act,
aircraft operators need to hold and comply with two AOCs, from both Australia
and New Zealand, if they wish to conduct operations in both countries. This
results in duplication, complexity and added administrative and financial
burdens on operators. The proposed amendments will mean that an operator
holding an AOC issued by CAANZ will be able to conduct operations in Australia
without having to obtain an equivalent AOC issued by CASA, and vice versa.
Mutual recognition was anticipated by the ‘Open Skies’ Air
Services Agreement[1] between
Australia and New Zealand, which is intended to promote competition among
Australian and New Zealand operators, including on domestic routes. The
Agreement builds upon the 1996 Australia-New Zealand Single Aviation Market
(SAM) Arrangements. The principle underlying mutual recognition is the same as
that for the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Act 1997 and the Mutual
Recognition Act 1992.
The Bill also makes several minor amendments
to:
§ ensure
consistency of terminology of aircraft registered overseas;
and
§ provide for certain conditions for grant
of AOCs to also have effect as ongoing conditions on the AOCs.
It is not anticipated that budget allocations will be affected by this Bill.
CASA may incur additional costs in oversighting operations in New Zealand, however these should be offset by a reduction in costs of oversight of New Zealand operators in Australia.
This is a Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) for the proposed amendment of
the Civil Aviation Act 1988 to provide for the mutual recognition of
aviation-related (safety) certification between Australia and New Zealand
(mutual recognition). The amendments form the bulk of the Civil Aviation
Legislation Amendment (Mutual Recognition with New Zealand and Other Matters)
Bill 2003.
Mutual recognition will permit an eligible aircraft operator
to carry out an aviation activity in either Australia or New Zealand, whether
international or domestic, passenger or cargo, based on an Air Operator’s
Certificate (AOC) issued by the regulator of their home country. This follows
from an acceptance that, while some systems and processes may vary, Australia
and New Zealand have safety standards that produce equivalent safety outcomes in
high capacity airline operations. The relevant aviation safety regulatory
authorities for mutual recognition are the Civil Aviation Authority of New
Zealand (CAANZ) and, in Australia, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
(CASA).
Background
The
principle underlying mutual recognition is the same as the principle behind the
Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Act 1997 and the Mutual Recognition
Act 1992. The Australian and New Zealand Governments reaffirmed their
commitment to adopt mutual recognition of aviation-related certification in a
Memorandum of Understanding dated 20 November 2000 made in conjunction with
the new ‘open skies’ Air Services Agreement between our two
countries. The target date for achieving mutual recognition in this context is
December 2003.
The Australian Minister for Transport and Regional
Services and the New Zealand Minister of Transport signed the Air Services
Agreement[2] on 8 August 2002.
The Agreement is intended to promote competition and closer economic relations
between the two countries and to build upon the principles contained in the 1996
Australia-New Zealand Single Aviation Market (SAM) Arrangements, while ensuring
the highest degree of safety and security in air transport.
In March
2002, Australian and New Zealand Ministers for Transport agreed to implement the
‘highest form’ of mutual recognition, namely that an operator
that is the holder of an air operator certificate (AOC), and other associated
certificates and permissions, issued in one country will not be required to hold
an AOC, or other certificate or permission, to conduct air transport operations
in that country.
In addition, a new, overarching, inter-governmental
agreement on aviation mutual recognition is under development which, when
completed, will set out the principles, objectives and joint understandings
between Australia and New Zealand in relation to the mutual recognition of
aviation-related safety certification. An annex to the new agreement will be an
operational agreement between the two aviation safety regulators, CASA and
CAANZ, which will establish working arrangements between the two.
Only
those Australian and New Zealand operators covered by the Air Services Agreement
will be eligible for mutual recognition.
Mutual recognition will be
introduced in a phased approach. AOCs held by eligible operators will be the
first aviation-related safety certificates to be mutually recognised.
Consideration will then be given to including other certificates not already
covered by other recognition arrangements. Ministers have also agreed that the
first priority should be acceptance of AOCs for operations involving aircraft
with more than 30 seats or equivalent (15,000 kg maximum take-off
weight).
Notwithstanding mutual recognition, aircraft operators
will still have to comply with rules of the air and certain laws of the country
they are operating in, unless otherwise provided. Examples include laws
relating to aviation security, curfew, air traffic control, airport slot
management, noise and the environment, occupational health and safety and
anti-discrimination legislation and all related business laws.
The principle of mutual recognition plays an important role in the operation
of single markets by allowing the free movement of goods and services. This has
been recognised by the European Union, where the principle of mutual recognition
has become the cornerstone of its single market. Mutual recognition relies,
however, on both parties having full confidence that the certification process
of the other party can wholly satisfy its requirements.
In line with
this, mutual recognition of aviation-related safety certification is an
important element of the SAM Arrangement between Australia and New Zealand and
is possible because each country enjoys aviation safety regulatory regimes that
result in a safe aviation environment for aircraft of greater than 30 seats or
equivalent. On that basis, and in the light of joint Government policy, an AOC
issued by one safety regulatory authority (eg CASA) should be capable of being
accepted by the other (eg. CAANZ).
Under current legislation this
isn’t possible, which means that aircraft operators wishing to operate in
both countries need to hold two AOCs, one issued by each authority, and need to
comply with both. This results in duplication, complexity and added
administrative and financial burdens on operators which may in turn deter
operators from establishing air services in the other country. This is
inconsistent with the intention of the ‘open skies’ Air Services
Agreement to promote competition among Australian and New Zealand operators,
including on domestic routes. Mutual recognition is therefore designed to
decrease the amount of regulation placed on eligible aircraft operators in this
respect.
Stakeholders generally acknowledged mutual recognition as
beneficial, however suggested that the financial benefit to them will be
administrative rather than operational. This said, mutual recognition
arrangements have been shown to bring other benefits, both immediate and long
term, tangible and intangible, including promoting efficient transportation and
compatible regulatory systems[3]. In
this context, mutual recognition will permit greater flexibility in airline
operations, thereby improving aircraft utilisation and return on assets. This
is important in an industry where the capital outlay is very high.
The
consequence of taking no action would not be immediately felt by the aviation
industry, however it would forestall the mutual recognition of aviation-related
certificates as a whole, not just AOCs, which is important for maximising
benefits from the SAM Arrangement. The benefits of mutual recognition, as
described overpage, would also be lost.
The key objective is the full recognition of one country’s operational
certification system by the other country. The amendments are designed to
promote aviation and competition in Australia and New Zealand by reducing the
regulatory burden on aviation operators from having to hold dual AOCs.
In legislative terms, the mutual recognition obligation requires
Australia to enact provisions that achieve two distinct purposes:
• to
provide for recognition by Australia of an ANZA AOC issued by CAANZ for
the purpose of authorising operations in Australia by the holders of those
documents; and
• to provide for CASA to authorise an eligible
Australian AOC holder to conduct operations in New Zealand in accordance with an
Australian ANZA AOC that will be recognised by the CAANZ.
Under the Civil Aviation Act an aircraft must not, except in certain
circumstances, fly into, out of or within, Australian territory unless it is
authorised by an AOC. For a foreign registered aircraft to be operated on a
flight within Australia as part of an international flight, a “foreign
aircraft AOC” would be required. An Australian aircraft must not operate
outside Australian territory unless it is authorised by an Australian
AOC.
An AOC is a document provided to an organisation that defines its
approval to operate aircraft. As such it is a document that requires aviation
regulatory authorities (such as CASA and CAANZ) to consider a number of factors
in assessing an operator’s ability to conduct its operations safely.
These factors include its facilities and operational bases, management
structure, communication networks, financial viability, training procedures,
operational manuals and maintenance procedures. It also covers the
qualifications of its key personnel, the types of aircraft it operates and the
routes on which it operates those aircraft. When an operator wishes to change
key personnel, aircraft or routes, for example because it wishes to add
additional routes and/or aircraft types to its operations, it needs to apply to
its home authority to have its AOC amended or reissued.
In 2002, Ministers considered four basic options for the implementation
of mutual recognition, as described below.
• Option 1: An operator that is the holder of an Air Operator’s Certificate (AOC) issued in one country will not be required to hold an AOC in the second country in order to conduct air transport operations in that country.
• Option 2: A variation of Option 1. This option would involve the issue of a recognition or registration certificate that enabled airlines to operate within the second country on the basis of certification issued in the home country.
• Option 3: An AOC issued in one country would be accepted by the second country as evidence of acceptable standards, and a local AOC would subsequently be issued.
• Option 4: An AOC issued in one country would be accepted by the
second country, only if certain preconditions were satisfied.
Ministers
chose Option 1 as their preferred approach on the basis that this was the purest
and highest form of mutual recognition. (The only other possibility would be to
retain the status quo, in which case mutual recognition could not be implemented
and expected benefits would not be achieved.)
Who is affected by the problem and who is likely to
be affected by its proposed solutions?
The liberalisation
of air services arrangements is part of the Government’s wider
micro-economic reforms of the transport sector. The benefits of liberalising
air services arrangements was noted by the Minister for Transport and Regional
Services, the Hon John Anderson MP, in his policy statement of June 2000,
International Air Services.
When the ‘open skies’
Air Services Agreement with New Zealand was negotiated in November 2000, the
overall value of the Australia-New Zealand Single Aviation Market was estimated
at $6.8 billion (NZ$8.7 billion). Mutual recognition will help to ensure that
the benefits of integration continue, making it easier for Australian and New
Zealand airlines to operate services in both countries, to integrate their
fleets and achieve operating efficiencies. Efficiency, in turn, contributes to
economic growth and rising incomes. For example, in 1999 the
OECD[4] estimated that, in the case of
Australia, unilateral trade liberalisation has, in effect, put A$1,000 per year
in the hands of the average Australian family.
Mutual recognition may,
however, result in a period of structural adjustment in the industry in the
medium term. This is because variations in some operational requirements
between Australia and New Zealand may be perceived as conferring commercial
advantages on operators from one or other of the countries. By way of example,
as noted by one stakeholder, there is the potential for considerable disparity
between the salaries of Australian and New Zealand pilots operating the same
type of aircraft but under different AOCs. This, in turn, may have implications
for industrial relations even though there is no intention for mutual
recognition to impact on the existing employment arrangements of operations on
either side of the Tasman.
Structural pressures are often accepted as
being in the long-term national interest in order to ensure that Australian
operators remain competitive internationally. However, with regard to mutual
recognition, no commercial consideration will be permitted to override safety
standards. For example, mutual recognition will not provide an opportunity for
aircraft operators to ‘shop around’ for the safety regulator they
regard as the most commercially advantageous if, by doing so, effective safety
oversight could not be maintained.
For purely safety reasons, the
amendments will therefore ensure that the safety regulatory authority best
placed to provide effective safety oversight of an operator will be the one to
issue that operator’s AOC. This will be effected by a range of criteria
to be considered by CASA before issuing an ANZA AOC such as where the
company’s safety management systems are based. Minimal administrative
costs are expected from this process.
It is important to recognise that
savings obtained by aircraft operators may, to some extent, be offset by any
future CASA charge to cover the cost of safety surveillance inspections and
other regulatory activity associated with Australian AOC holders operating in
New Zealand. Currently, CASA does not recover the cost of undertaking overseas
audits.
How will each proposed option affect
existing regulations and the roles of existing regulatory
authorities?
Provision for mutual recognition requires
amendment of the Civil Aviation Act 1988. Australian rules of the air
(contained in a number of regulations made under the Civil Aviation Act) will
continue to apply to New Zealand operators in Australian airspace.
It
is possible that consequential amendment of other legislation may be necessary
as a result of mutual recognition to ensure operators are not double charged;
this is currently being assessed. By way of background, under the new
arrangements a New Zealand operator scheduling domestic services in Australia
would, appropriately, have to pay customs duties and GST. They would, however,
also pay the aviation fuels levy that includes a component to fund CASA, even
though CASA will not be the agency actually regulating the New Zealand operator.
Additionally, the operator will also be liable to pay fees and charges imposed
by its own regulator, CAANZ, resulting in a double charge for safety regulation
services. If CASA imposes charges for its overseas audits in the future,
Australian operators in New Zealand are likely to be in a similar position in
terms of the New Zealand passenger levy unless a solution can be found that is
acceptable to both countries.
In deciding upon a solution to this
problem, it will be important to ensure that both regulators do not
inadvertently lose revenue. Possible changes to the funding arrangements will
be explored with the Departments of Treasury, Finance and Administration, the
Australian Taxation Office and, possibly, the Australian Customs Service, given
that any change will be likely to require amendment of their portfolio
legislation.
Identify and categorise the
expected impacts of the proposed options as likely benefits or likely
costs
For more information on some of these issues, please
see information given above.
Consumer
|
Business
|
Government/ Economy
|
• Lower fares if cost savings passed on by
airlines.
• Greater choice of airline operators and improved and more innovative service. |
• Administrative savings from not having to hold and comply with dual
AOCs.
• Increased operating efficiencies and capital utilisation from greater opportunity for fleet integration and return on assets. |
• Long-term efficiencies from the promotion of competition.
• Benefits to related industry sectors, such as domestic tourism. |
Consumer
|
Business
|
Government/ Economy
|
• Inconvenience in the event of industry unrest.
|
• Australian AOC holders may be placed at a competitive disadvantage
in the short to medium term.
|
• The administrative costs of the scheme.
• Loss of revenue to fund CASA if a fee for overseas inspections is not imposed. |
|
• Costs of CASA audits of Australian operators in New Zealand if fees
are introduced.
• Costs in the event of industry unrest, particularly to the tourism industry. |
• Costs in the medium to longer term arising from industry adjustment
and rationalisation as a result of competition from New Zealand
operators.
• Potential industrial unrest from a perceived loss of employment and employment conditions, with spill-over disruption to other sectors such as the tourism industry and the economy generally. |
Consumer
|
Business
|
Government/ Economy
|
• N/A
|
• Short to medium term benefits from protection from competition.
|
• Cost savings from not having to implement or administer the scheme
(though substantial outlays already incurred).
• Avoidance of any potential for industrial disharmony. |
Consumer
|
Business
|
Government/ Economy
|
• No potential for fare reduction or greater choice.
. |
• Loss of potential administrative savings and return on assets.
• Loss of potential gains from operating efficiencies as a result of fleet integration. • Loss of future savings from a broadening of the scheme to include other certificates. |
• Loss of resources already invested in implementing the
proposal.
• Loss of spin-off benefits to other sectors, such as tourism. • Loss of potential gains from the promotion of competition. |
Distributional
effects
From a safety perspective, mutual recognition will
have no adverse impact. This is because, ultimately, it rests on the acceptance
by both Governments that the safety regulatory regimes in place in Australia and
New Zealand produce skies that are equally safe for most operations. Although
there may be different means of achieving safety standards, these are accepted
as providing equivalent safety outcomes.
Eligible aircraft operators will
be the first to realise savings. Consumers will benefit to the extent that
airlines pass on savings through reduced fares, and to the extent that they
benefit from increased competition in the industry. Savings made by consumers
may in turn confer benefits on the domestic tourism industry.
As noted
above, New Zealand AOC holders operating in Australia may benefit from
commercial advantage in some areas due to different operational requirements
and, possibly, employment conditions. Where this occurs, there could be flow on
effects to the Australian economy generally arising from structural adjustment
in the industry and, as noted by some stakeholders, the impact on industrial
relations.
Invitations to comment on mutual recognition were made through the media
and direct invitation to representatives of business (and their umbrella
groups), unions, consumer and Commonwealth and State Government agencies. Of
individual aircraft operators, only those identified as operating aircraft of
greater than 30 seats or equivalent were directly invited to participate, since
these will be the parties most affected. A list of stakeholders consulted by
mail is attached. A call for submissions was also placed in the Weekend
Australian of 15-16 February 2003. Invitations to a “roundtable”
with the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) were extended to
12 key stakeholders; the roundtable was held on 25 February 2003. Two airlines
attended, Qantas and Virgin Blue.
Other than the Department of
Transport and Urban Planning of South Australia, and the New South Wales Air
Transport Council, nil comment was received from Commonwealth or State agencies.
Stakeholder views
Over
half of the stakeholders who responded openly supported the initiative. The
following points were made:
• savings would mainly be administrative
but greater advantages will be realised when mutual recognition also encompasses
airworthiness and maintenance systems approvals;
• the economics of
mutual recognition could facilitate the ability of freight operators to extend
the current Australian domestic express freight network to New
Zealand;
• mutual recognition is welcome, mainly for the benefits in
reduction of administration of two AOC's held by the company;
• for
operators not already holding dual AOC's, benefits will be even greater;
and
• mutual recognition is necessary to give effect to aviation
policies already in place.
Queries and concerns raised by stakeholders
are given below, with DOTARS’ responses.
Query/ concern |
Response
|
---|---|
Mutual recognition should be extended as soon as possible to cover areas
such as dry leasing of Australian registered aircraft.
|
Amendments to the Civil Aviation Act are being drafted to permit
this.
|
CASA should not impose fees for its overseas inspections.
|
Consideration is, in fact, being given to allowing CASA the power to impose
fees for overseas inspections however this will involve a separate amendment of
the Civil Aviation (Fees) Regulations.
|
The overall economic benefit to Australia from the initiative is not
apparent, for example New Zealand operators will be able to operate using
aircraft that are more cost effective to obtain from New Zealand.
|
The liberal air services arrangements between Australia and New Zealand
were deliberately designed to give companies flexibility in making business
decisions, in keeping with the SAM Agreement. Consistent with other market
liberalisations, they will deliver better outcomes for Australian and New
Zealand consumers.
|
Differences in cost structures arising from the different safety
regulations may result in an eventual move by some airlines to transfer their
AOC, and jobs, to New Zealand.
|
Economically, there would be no restriction on doing so. However, for
safety reasons, operators will be required to hold an AOC issued by the safety
regulator best placed to provide effective safety oversight, in practice the
regulator of the country where the majority of their operations are located.
This will not prevent operators from choosing to hold dual AOC’s to cover
their separate operations in Australia and New Zealand, if they prefer, though
they will not be able to hold an ANZA AOC in combination with any other.
|
There should be no restriction placed on operators in terms of which AOC
they hold, to do so would be inconsistent with the Air Services Agreement and
the SAM Agreement.
|
For safety reasons, operators will be required to hold an AOC issued by the
safety regulator best placed to provide effective safety oversight, in practice
the regulator of the country where the majority of their operations are located.
Amendments to the Act to give effect to this will be valid and within the
Commonwealth’s law making power under the Constitution.
|
Mutual recognition will lead to Australia adopting lower, unsafe, standards
in the medium to long term.
|
There are no plans in terms of mutual recognition to amend
Australia’s aviation safety standards or to harmonise them with those of
New Zealand and there is no legislation to support such a proposal. Australia
considers world best practice when formulating its safety standards. Mutual
recognition is premised on the fact that both aviation safety systems provide an
equivalent safety outcome.
|
One stakeholder was opposed to mutual recognition, noting that it would
compound problems faced by the company of being unable to compete with New
Zealand companies overseas who operate to more lenient standards in some
areas.
|
As the stakeholder is not known to operate aircraft of more than 30 seats
they will not be directly affected by the proposed amendments at this time.
Nevertheless, their comment on their current situation has been noted.
|
With regard to the ‘red card’ rights that would be given to the
safety authorities, the two regulators should immediately consult upon one being
issued so that operators do not suffer from poor decision making.
|
The red card is a tool of last resort and regulators will be in close
communication at the time of issue. Officials from both Governments agree that
this should be the fairest process possible, and used only in instances of
imminent safety risk. An operational agreement will provide for consultation to
avoid uncoordinated decisions regarding red cards.
|
That the information supplied to stakeholders implied that there may the
means for determining eligibility of operators for mutual recognition might not
be equivalent.
|
This was not intended. Determination of eligibility by both countries will
be equitable. Only those Australian and New Zealand operators covered by the
Air Services Agreement will be eligible for mutual recognition.
|
One stakeholder had the following queries:
• On what basis has Australia determined that Australia and New Zealand have safety systems that can be accepted as equivalent in terms of safety outcome? • How does New Zealand compare in terms of accident and incident statistics and is the New Zealand regulatory regime a factor in the perception that New Zealand statistics are higher? |
In summary:
• CASA has advised that a detailed analysis of the safety systems has been conducted and both sides are confident that aviation can inter-operate safely in the form being considered. As signatories to the Chicago Convention, Australia and New Zealand are both subject to ICAO audits; the publicly available audit findings indicate both have equivalent safety regimes. • There has been no detailed analysis, however as noted above, the two countries are considered to have comparable records, particularly in relation to larger capacity aircraft. |
• What happens if CASA believes a New Zealand AOC holder should be
grounded for safety reasons but this is not agreed or actioned by
CAANZ?
|
• It is highly unlikely that the regulators would take a
significantly different view however a dispute resolution mechanism is being
contemplated. If mutual recognition were significantly compromised by an event
of this kind, it would need to be brought to the attention of the responsible
Ministers of Australia and New Zealand.
|
• Have industrial issues been considered? For example, there is the
potential for considerable disparity between the salaries of Australian and New
Zealand pilots operating the same type of aircraft in this country or in New
Zealand. The operating cost structures, taxes and employment conditions of each
community have to be considered in this context. Industrial disharmony bought
about by misguided policy is not in the public interest for either
country.
|
• Mutual recognition deals with safety and the acceptance that both
jurisdictions have comparable safety standards. The initiative is not intended
to impact on existing employment arrangements on either side of the Tasman or to
have industrial implications, however with different systems some industrial
matters have been brought into focus. Ultimately, companies will need to manage
their own industrial issues.
|
• One stakeholder queried why the 30 seat cut off was chosen.
|
• The requirement for mutual recognition to apply to aircraft of
greater than 30 seats was chosen because it is consistent with corresponding New
Zealand and Australian rules and regulations. Safety standards for this sector
of the industry are considered equivalent in both jurisdictions. Consideration
may be given to extending mutual recognition to below 30 seats in the
future.
|
The Government is committed to mutual recognition, which requires
legislative amendment to be implemented. This is therefore the preferred
option.
Retaining the status quo would not be consistent with Government
policy and its obligations arising from the bilateral Air Services Agreement
between Australia and New Zealand.
Legislative change will be effected primarily through amendment of the
Civil Aviation Act 1988. The effectiveness of the amendments will be
constantly tested as the safety regulatory authorities in both countries apply
the legislation. There is no sunset clause built into the amendments, therefore
termination of mutual recognition will need to be by legislative amendment.
CIVIL AVIATION LEGISLATION AMENDMENT
(MUTUAL RECOGNITION WITH NEW ZEALAND AND OTHER MATTERS) BILL 2003
This clause provides that the bill will be called the Civil Aviation
Legislation Amendment (Mutual Recognition with New Zealand and Other Matters)
Act 2003 once enacted.
This clause provides that provisions relating to mutual recognition will
commence on a day to be fixed by proclamation. This is to enable the
finalisation of the inter governmental agreement/arrangement on mutual
recognition by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand and completion of
the operational arrangements between regulating agencies. Amongst other things
these agreements will set the scope of the mutual recognition
commitment.
The minor amendments to the Act to ensure consistency of
terminology will commence on Royal Assent.
This provision provides that the amendments to the Acts (Civil Aviation
Act 1988 and the Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959)
set out in the Schedule will be made by the Bill.
For the remainder of
this Explanatory Memorandum the term ‘the Act’ will be sued to refer
to the Civil Aviation Act 1988.
This Schedule contains the new provisions that will implement the mutual
recognition arrangements with New Zealand.
These provisions will give
effect to the Australia New Zealand Aviation Mutual Recognition Principle,
namely:
An entity that is authorised in its Home country to carry out an
aviation activity in that country through an aviation safety certificate is
entitled to carry out that aviation activity in the Host country without an
equivalent certificate from the Host country, provided the following conditions
are met:
(a) the Home Authority permits that aviation activity to be
carried out in the other (Host) country under this principle; and
(b)
that person meets the regulatory requirements of the Home Jurisdiction at all
times while the person is carrying out that aviation activity; and
(c)
the person has notified the Host Authority.
This principle will not apply
to occupational certificates such as pilot licences, which are eligible to be
recognised under the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Act
1997.
Subject to the conditions of this Bill, mutual recognition of
aviation-related safety certification will permit an eligible aircraft operator
to conduct aviation activities in both Australia and New Zealand using an Air
Operator’s Certificate (AOC) issued by the safety regulator of their home
country. This is because the AOC will be recognised as valid by the safety
regulator in the host country. AOCs mutually recognised in this way will be
called Australian or New Zealand AOCs with ANZA privileges, depending on which
country is the country of issue.
At this stage only AOCs will be mutually
recognised, however the provisions of the Act do permit more certificates to be
mutually recognised in the future, if considered appropriate by the Australian
and New Zealand Governments. In Australia this would be by amendment of the
Regulations to this Act.
International, domestic, passenger and cargo
services will all be covered by mutual recognition however it will be restricted
to larger aircraft of more than 30 seats or greater than 15,000 kilograms
in weight (maximum take off weight) at this stage. This more or less limits the
scheme to airlines for now.
Mutual recognition is based on an acceptance
that, while some systems and processes may vary, Australia and New Zealand have
safety standards that produce equivalent safety outcomes. This said, there is
still a need for the safety regulators to consult and cooperate together, and
this is prescribed throughout the Act with regard to a number of matters,
including the issue of AOCs and the variation of conditions under which they are
issued.
CASA’s function is to implement mutual recognition, as
prescribed in the Act, the Regulations, and other documents agreed between the
Government’s of Australia and New Zealand from time to time. Its
counterpart in New Zealand is the Civil Aviation Safety Authority of New Zealand
(CAANZ).
There will be occasions when it will be practical for CASA to
delegate its powers to CAANZ (and vice versa). A good example of this is in
relation to surveillance, investigations, and enforcement powers. However the
power to issue a temporary stop notice will not be delegated since it makes no
sense to do so given that a home authority already has to power to take
immediate action against one of its own operators. Delegation of powers will be
a matter of discretion between the two regulators, subject to the provisions of
our respective legislation.
It is important that, when using delegated
powers, material and information collected by the host regulator on behalf of
the home regulator be available for evidentiary use under the laws of the home
country. The power to do so is provided under this Act. Similarly, the Act
provides that the two regulators may exchange information in order to carry out
their statutory powers and functions.
On rare occasions it may be
necessary for the safety regulator in the host country to act swiftly because of
a serious safety concern posed by an operator holding an AOC with ANZA
privileges issued by the other country. In these rare circumstances the host
regulator has the power to issue a temporary stop notice that prevents the
operator from carrying out the aviation activity until the home authority can
take any appropriate action to address the safety concern. Such notices can
only last for a maximum of seven days. The intention behind this provision is
to maintain safety at all times but to take only such action as is considered
necessary for that purpose.
Strong communication and cooperation
between CASA and the CAANZ will underpin mutual recognition and are given the
force of law by the provisions of this Act. Indeed mutual recognition has only
been possible because of the joint understanding and commitment of the two
regulatory agencies to continued safe practice.
The objective of the
mutual recognition provisions is to promote and foster aviation activity between
Australia and New Zealand but with no diminution of safety.
These clauses insert new definitions for certain terms used in the Bill
into section 3(1) of the principal Act. In particular:
ANZA
stands for Australia and New Zealand Aviation. This is the name or term used
for the aviation mutual recognition scheme and has been used to distinguish this
scheme from other Australia-New Zealand mutual recognition schemes, such as that
established under the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Act
1997.
ANZA activities in Australian territory are those
aviation activities undertaken in Australia by operators holding a valid New
Zealand AOC with ANZA privileges issued by the Civil Aviation Authority of New
Zealand (CAANZ). Paragraph (b) of this definition allows mutually recognised
ANZA activities to extend to other certificates in the future, subject to
agreement between Australia and New Zealand and the required changes to
respective regulations and rules.
ANZA activities in New Zealand
are those aviation activities undertaken in New Zealand by operators holding a
valid Australian AOC with ANZA privileges issued by the Civil Aviation Safety
Authority (CASA). Paragraph (b) of this definition allows mutually recognised
ANZA activities to extend to other certificates in the future, subject to
agreement between Australia and New Zealand and the required changes to
respective regulations and rules.
ANZA mutual recognition
agreements will be defined in Regulations. The agreement or arrangement
will set out joint understandings on the application of mutual recognition
between the respective Governments. It will cover such key issues as the key
mutual recognition principle; set out the scope of the mutual recognition
commitment; identify procedures to be followed in relation to temporary stop
notices; provide for delegation of powers; allow for mutual assistance with
enforcement; and cover future extension of mutual recognition arrangements. At
this stage the Governments have agreed that ANZA mutual recognition should only
apply to aircraft with greater than 30 seats or more than 15,000kgs.
It
will also provide for an operational agreement between CASA and CAANZ which will
outline procedures for the implementation of mutual recognition between the two
regulatory authorities.
The content of these agreements is currently
being finalised. It should be noted that under Clause 2, the mutual recognition
amendments in this Schedule will not commence until these agreements or
arrangements have been concluded.
The note at the end of the
definition of AOCs, simply states that some AOCs issued by CASA will have
ANZA privileges, that is they will authorise operations in New Zealand under the
mutual recognition provisions.
Australian ANZA safety
certification includes both AOCs as well as other certificates that may be
covered by the mutual recognition provisions in the future, subject to agreement
between Australia and New Zealand and amendment of respective regulations and
rules.
Australian AOC with ANZA privileges is an AOC issued by
CASA to an operator pursuant to the mutual recognition provisions of the
Civil Aviation Act 1988. Such an AOC authorises the holder to carry out
the aviation activities specified in the document for both New Zealand and
Australia and will be recognised as valid by CAANZ if the requirements of New
Zealand’s Civil Aviation Act 1990 are met. Under subsections
27(2AA) to (2AC), the document must specify aviation activities in relation to
both countries, though they need not be the same activities. That is, an
Australian AOC with ANZA privileges cannot specify aviation activities for New
Zealand alone.
CAA New Zealand (Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand) is the
name of the current aviation safety regulator in New Zealand. CAANZ is
CASA’s New Zealand counterpart.
Director of CAA New
Zealand is a statutory office holder under the Civil Aviation Act
1990 of New Zealand. As CEO of CAANZ, he/she is the counterpart to
Australia’s Director of Aviation Safety, CASA’s CEO.
In
force for Australia – this is defined in a new section 3AA – see
Item 16.
New Zealand includes New Zealand and all its
territories. It has the same meaning as in the Interpretation Act 1999
of New Zealand.
New Zealand ANZA safety certification covers both
AOCs as well as other certificates that may be covered by the mutual recognition
provisions in the future, subject to agreement between Australia and New Zealand
and amendment of respective regulations and rules.
New Zealand temporary stop notice means the same as the definition
in Civil Aviation Act 1990 New Zealand. It refers to the notice given by
CAANZ to the holder of an Australian AOC with ANZA privileges requiring the
holder to cease operations, in whole or part, due to a serious concern regarding
aviation safety. It will work in a similar way to that of an Australian
temporary stop notice (see the notes to Item 31 for more information on the
temporary stop notice).
This item inserts a new section 3AA into the principal Act, which
clarifies when a New Zealand AOC with ANZA privileges is in force for Australia.
Subsection 1 gives effect to the jointly agreed principle that a New Zealand
issued AOC which has been issued for the purposes of mutual recognition (ie with
ANZA privileges) may be used in Australia once the Civil Aviation Safety
Authority (CASA) has been notified under subsection 28C(1) (see Item 31).
Subsection 2 provides that a New Zealand issued AOC with ANZA privileges will
cease to have effect when a temporary stop notice is in force under section 28D
(Item 31). In this case an operator would be committing an offence under
section 29 of the Act if they continued to operate in contravention of the stop
notice. If the stop notice is lifted under section 28E (Item 31), then the
affected New Zealand issued AOC (with ANZA privileges) would come back into
force.
The Act has limited extra-territorial operation. In accordance with
Australia’s international obligations, it does not, for example, extend to
operation of foreign registered aircraft operating outside Australian territory.
However, under mutual recognition, it will be possible for the holder of an
Australian AOC with ANZA privileges to operate a New Zealand registered aircraft
in New Zealand. The amendment to section 7 of the Act in Item 17 ensures that
the Act has sufficient extra-territorial effect to regulate such
activities.
CASA has a list of defined functions, which are set out in section 9 of
the Act. In particular section 9(1)(a) and (b) provide that:
“CASA has the function of conducting the safety regulation of the following, in accordance with this Act and the regulations:
(a) civil air operations in Australian territory;
(b) the operation of Australian aircraft outside Australian
territory;...”
To permit the free deployment of aircraft in the
Australia New Zealand single aviation market (SAM), operators using ANZA
privileges will be able to use both Australian and New Zealand registered
aircraft in both countries. This item inserts a new function into that list to
permit CASA to regulate ANZA activities in New Zealand that have been authorised
under Australian issued safety certifications. It clarifies that CASA can
regulate any aircraft (including those on the New Zealand register) used by an
Australian AOC holder (with ANZA privileges) when they are being used in New
Zealand.
In addition to its main function under subsection 9(1), CASA also has
some subsidiary functions set out in subsection 9(3) of the principal Act. This
item inserts the function of implementing the ANZA mutual recognition
agreements. This provision is not intended to give CASA the responsibility for
mutual recognition matters generally. The responsibility for the mutual
recognition agreements will remain with the Minister and his or her Department.
The function has been assigned to ensure that CASA has authority to carry out
the terms of the agreements using its resources and thus does not exceed its
statutory mandate.
Section 26 provides that aircraft on international flights to and from
Australia must have permission from CASA. Item 20 inserts a new form of
permission to the existing list in subsection 26(2) that contemplates that
aircraft will arrive in, and depart from, Australia as part of ANZA activities.
It provides for a new paragraph (e) that grants permission as authorised by a
New Zealand issued AOC with ANZA privileges that is in force for Australia. It
only does so to the extent to which it authorises ANZA activities in Australia,
as opposed to other international activities.
Section 26A inserts an overview of mutual recognition to assist readers
of the legislation.
Section 26B permits CASA to disclose information to
CAANZ for purposes relating to the ANZA mutual recognition agreements. Such
information may include personal information such as pilots personal details,
qualifications etc., and may be disclosed to CAANZ, for example, for purposes of
CAANZ’s routine surveillance to ensure compliance with relevant New
Zealand civil aviation legislative provisions by operators conducting ANZA
activities in Australia. This section expressly authorises CASA to disclose
personal information for the purpose specified in the provision and ensures CASA
would not be in breach of the Privacy Act 1988.
Section 26C
requires CASA to consult with the Director of CAA NZ before taking any action
which would or might affect an operator’s right to conduct ANZA activities
in New Zealand under an Australian ANZA safety certification, such as an
Australian AOC with ANZA privileges. Such action could, for example, be the
revocation or variation of the AOC or safety certification to remove or vary the
ANZA privileges. However, the obligation to consult would only arise in
circumstances specified in the ANZA mutual recognition agreements (see paragraph
26C(a)). Any consultation required under this section must follow the
procedures provided in the agreements (see paragraph 26C(b)).
Section 26D
permits the Director of CASA, if necessary, to delegate any of CASA’s
powers, other than those in Part IIIA (the investigation powers), to CAANZ to
enable CAANZ to perform certain functions in New Zealand on behalf of CASA for
purposes of the ANZA mutual recognition agreements. Consistent with Commonwealth
legal policy, and to provide appropriate checks and balances in relation to any
exercise of power conferred under Commonwealth law, employees of CAA NZ, in
their exercise of CASA’s powers, will be subject to the directions of the
Director of CASA.
Section 26E makes it clear that CASA officers may
exercise powers or perform functions delegated by the Director of CAA under
section 23B(2A) of the Civil Aviation Act 1990 of New Zealand (‘the
NZ Act’). These powers may only be exercised only in relation to ANZA
safety certifications. For example, under the NZ Act, the Director of CAANZ may
impose conditions on an aviation document. Such power may be delegated to CASA
if CAANZ requires CASA’s assistance with its routine surveillance within
Australian territory in respect of holders of NZ AOCs with ANZA privileges. CASA
officers will not be able to be delegated powers or functions under section 15
(which covers safety & security inspections and monitoring), section 21
(power to detain aircraft, seize products and impose conditions and
prohibitions) or section 24 (general power of entry to place) of the NZ
Act.
The ‘cross-delegation’ of powers in the new Sections 26D
and 26E will only be used for the exercise of domestic administrative powers
under the law of the country whose authority delegated the power. Where, for
example, the CAANZ wishes to exercise enforcement powers, it would need to ask
an authorised CASA investigator to exercise his or her powers under Part IIIA
(see Items 32-34). Alternatively for investigations into possible offences,
CAANZ would need to make a request through the Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters Act 1987. CASA would be in a similar position in relation to their
monitoring and investigations in New Zealand.
Item 22 inserts a reference to ‘New Zealand AOC with ANZA
privileges that is current in Australia’, so that the operation of any
aircraft within, into or out of Australia, or the operation of any Australian
aircraft outside Australia, would also be permitted as long as such operation is
authorised under a current New Zealand AOC with ANZA privileges. It only does
so to the extent to which it authorises ANZA activities in Australia, as opposed
to other aviation activities. This is one of the key provisions that give
effect to mutual recognition so that those AOCs issued by CAA NZ within the
mutual recognition scheme would be treated as if they were AOCs issued by CASA.
Item 23 inserts a note to draw attention to the fact that the phrase
‘New Zealand AOC with ANZA privileges that is current in Australia’
has a specific meaning for purposes of the Act.
Item 24 sets out the threshold conditions under which CASA may issue an
Australian AOC with ANZA privileges.
As a matter of basic requirement
under the new subsection (2AA), CASA may issue an AOC to authorise operations
within, into or out of New Zealand (‘New Zealand operations’) only
if the same AOC also authorises operations within, into or out of Australia
(‘Australian operations’). This provision prevents CASA from
issuing an AOC which authorises only New Zealand operations. However, the type
of New Zealand operations authorised under the AOC do not need to be the same as
the Australian operations authorised under that AOC. For example, CASA may
issue an Australian AOC with ANZA privileges to authorise only regular public
transport passenger operations in Australia but only charter freight operations
in New Zealand.
Subsection (2AB) clarifies that CASA may continue to
issue AOCs that authorise operations into or out of New Zealand, separate from
the mutual recognition system. Such AOCs will not be subject to the provisions
that apply solely in relation to AOCs with ANZA privileges.
Subsection
(2AC) requires that every Australian AOC with ANZA privileges must indicate that
it is such an AOC. This is to ensure that AOCs issued by CASA to authorise
operations into or out of New Zealand but which were issued outside the mutual
recognition scheme would not be confused with Australian AOCs with ANZA
privileges.
Subsection 27(2A) of the Act requires that foreign registered aircraft
being used on regulated domestic flights must be specified individually on an
AOC. Under the amendment to the Act in item 25 New Zealand registered aircraft
being used on regulated domestic flights are able to be specified on an
Australian AOC with ANZA privileges by reference to a class of aircraft, i.e. as
if they were Australian aircraft.
Item 26 amends the definition of ‘foreign aircraft AOC’ so
that New Zealand aircraft operating under AOCs with ANZA privileges would not be
treated as foreign aircraft for purposes of section 27AE. Aircraft registered
in countries other than Australia and New Zealand, eg. the UK, (‘non-ANZA
aircraft’) would continue to require a foreign aircraft AOC before they
may be operated on flights that are not regulated domestic flights. Note that
an Australian AOC with ANZA privileges may be partly ‘foreign AOC’
for purposes of section 27AE to the extent that the AOC authorises operation of
non-ANZA aircraft on flights that are not regulated domestic flights. In other
words, section 27AE applies to any AOC application in respect of operations on
flights that are not regulated domestic flights using non-ANZA aircraft,
notwithstanding that the same application also seeks authorisation to carry out
ANZA activities in New Zealand. To the extent that the application is seeking
authorisation to carry out ANZA activities in New Zealand, the additional
conditions under section 28B would apply.
Paragraph 28(1)(c) of the Act requires that an applicant for an AOC
authorising the operation of foreign registered aircraft on regulated domestic
flights must satisfy CASA of the matters set out in section 28A. However, under
the mutual recognition scheme CASA will not be required to be satisfied of the
matters set out in section 28A in relation to New Zealand registered aircraft
engaged in regulated domestic flights.
Item 27 amends Paragraph
28(1)(c) so that the entry conditions generally applicable to certain AOCs do
not apply to Australian AOCs with ANZA privileges. Those certain AOCs
are:
§ Australian AOCs without ANZA privileges;
and
§ Australian AOCs with ANZA privileges that
cover aircraft not registered in either Australia or New Zealand.
Item 28 introduces two new criteria that must be satisfied before CASA is
obliged to issue an AOC.
The new paragraph 28(1)(d) is intended to
prevent any operator from holding two separate AOCs that authorise the same air
operations. In other words, an operator who already holds a New Zealand AOC
with ANZA privileges cannot obtain an Australian AOC which permits the same
operations as those permitted under their New Zealand AOC. Where an operator
holds a NZ AOC, CASA would need to be satisfied that this AOC is surrendered
before issuing an Australian AOC with ANZA privileges.
The new paragraph
28(1)(e) provides that where the AOC sought is an Australian AOC with ANZA
privileges, then the additional conditions set out in section 28B must also be
met.
Item 29 inserts the new section 28B, which provides a list of the
additional conditions that must be met before CASA is obliged to issue an
Australian AOC with ANZA privileges.
Paragraph (1)(a) prevents any
operator from holding two separate AOCs that authorise the same air operations.
More precisely, an operator who holds a New Zealand AOC cannot obtain an
Australian AOC with ANZA privileges which permits the same operations as those
already permitted under their New Zealand AOC.
Paragraph (1)(b) is about
the eligibility criteria that must be satisfied before an operator may enjoy
ANZA privileges. Such criteria are set out in the ANZA mutual recognition
agreement/s negotiated between the Australian and New Zealand governments,
having regard to a range of economic as well as safety considerations. CASA is
not able to issue an Australian AOC with ANZA privileges unless and until it has
been advised by the Secretary to the Department of Transport and Regional
Services that the operator meets the eligibility criteria provided in the mutual
recognition agreement/s.
Paragraph (1)(c) provides another entry
condition concerning the compliance with New Zealand civil aviation safety laws.
Before CASA is obliged to issue an Australian AOC with ANZA privileges, it must
be satisfied that the applicant is capable of complying with New Zealand safety
rules that are applicable to the operator in relation to their ANZA activities
in New Zealand. Note that this entry condition, like most other entry
conditions on AOCs, are also on-going conditions by virtue of the new section
28BAA (Item 10 Schedule 2). In other words, paragraph (1)(c) operates in two
ways: (1) it requires CASA to be satisfied that the applicant is capable of
complying with the relevant New Zealand laws, before CASA is obliged to issue an
Australian AOC with ANZA privileges; and (2) once the AOC with ANZA privileges
has been issued, the fact that the holder has not actually complied with the
relevant New Zealand laws would allow CASA to remove the ANZA privileges from
the AOC.
Paragraph (1)(d) is to ensure that CASA would only issue an
Australian AOC with ANZA privileges when it is satisfied that it has the ability
to adequately oversee the operations of the holder of the AOC. Sub-paragraphs
(i) to (iv) provide the relevant considerations that must be taken into account
by CASA in determining whether it would have the ability to provide sufficient
safety oversight in respect of a particular operator. Note that the conditions
set out in sub-paragraphs (d)(i) to (iv) are cumulative, which means all those
conditions must be met before CASA may come to the conclusion that it is capable
of effectively regulating all the operations covered by the application. Since
this entry condition will be an on going condition, the mutual recognition
agreements will provide for transfer of country of certification to New Zealand
where an AOC holder can no longer be overseen by CASA.
Paragraph (1)(e)
allows further conditions on AOCs to be provided in the regulations.
CASA
is obliged to consult the Director of CAA New Zealand in relation to the matters
set out in paragraphs (1)(a), (c), (d), and (e).
Item 30 inserts a new subsection 28BD(2) to impose an on-going obligation
on the holder of an Australian AOC with ANZA privileges to comply with
applicable New Zealand civil aviation safety laws. Generally speaking holders
of Australian AOCs with ANZA privileges will only have to comply with the New
Zealand rules of the air applicable to flight and operation of the aircraft.
This requirement is effectively the same as the condition imposed by the
proposed paragraph 28B(1)(c) to comply with relevant New Zealand law, which will
also be an on-going requirement by virtue of the proposed section 28BAA (Item 10
Schedule 2). Subsection 28BD(2) is inserted merely because there is already an
existing requirement under section 28BD to comply with the Australian Civil
Aviation Act, Regulations and Orders. For completeness, it is appropriate to
also have a subsection referring to the applicable provisions in the New Zealand
Civil Aviation Act, Regulations and Rules, as far as the holders of Australian
AOCs with ANZA privileges are concerned.
Item 31 inserts a number of sections generally relating to Australian and
New Zealand AOCs with ANZA privileges.
Subsection 28C(1) explains that a New Zealand AOC with ANZA privileges
comes into force for purposes of mutual recognition upon the provision of
certain information, including a copy of the AOC, to CASA by the holder of the
New Zealand AOC with ANZA privileges. Note that operations into, out of or
within Australia pursuant to a New Zealand AOC with ANZA privileges are only
allowed under subsection 27(2) if the New Zealand AOC concerned is in force (see
items 22 and 23). Also note that a New Zealand AOC with ANZA privileges is not
considered in force when it is subject to a temporary stop notice issued by CASA
under section 28D.
Subsection 28C(2) requires the holder of the New
Zealand AOC with ANZA privileges to notify CASA of any changes to the AOC within
the specified timeframe of 7 days.
Under subsection 28C(3), the holder
is also required to notify CASA of any changes to its ANZA activities in
Australia or any information previously provided to CASA under section
28C.
Subsection 28C(4) provides that failure to comply with subsection
(2) or (3) would be an offence of strict liability. This means that there is no
need to prove intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence in order to
establish that an offence under either of those subsections has been committed.
However, the alleged offender may still rely on a variety of defences available
under the Criminal Code Act 1995, eg. mistake of fact under section 9.2
of the Criminal Code provided in that Act.
A new section 28D will governing CASA’s power to issue a temporary
stop notice to a holder of a New Zealand AOC with ANZA privileges. A similar
provision has been made in the corresponding New Zealand legislation permitting
the CAANZ to issue such notices in respect of holders of Australian AOCs with
ANZA privileges. A chart explaining the application of Temporary Stop Notices is
on page 26.
Subsection 28D(1) provides the Director of CASA with a
non-delegable power to issue such a notice. This power is necessary because,
from time to time, CASA may become aware of a serious risk to aviation safety in
relation to a particular operator flying in its territory using a New Zealand
AOC with ANZA privileges issued by the CAANZ. At such times, the Director of
CASA must be able to act swiftly in the interests of safety, even though it is
not the regulator responsible for overseeing the operator and did not issue the
operator’s AOC.
Such a notice takes effect immediately and can
require the operator to cease conducting all or any of the ANZA activities that
the AOC authorises in Australian territory. Failure to comply with the notice
is an offence under section 29 of the Australian Act. It is important to note,
however, that the operator can keep operating in New Zealand if CAANZ permit it
to – it is only its Australian operations that are affected by the
temporary stop notice. In a similar way, if the CAANZ issues a temporary stop
notice to the holder of an Australian AOC with ANZA privileges and the holder
fails to comply with it, then the holder commits an offence under New Zealand
law.
In reality it is expected that the temporary stop notice would be
used only rarely, for example if CASA received information about an operator
that had to be acted upon swiftly to prevent aviation safety being compromised.
Under normal conditions, CASA would be expected to become aware of safety
concerns in enough time to discuss the matter with the CAANZ with effect that
any action to resolve the matter would usually be taken by CAANZ. Even when a
temporary stop notice is used, it is likely that there will be discussion
between the two regulators at the time it is issued.
A temporary stop
notice expires at the end of the period with or without action having been taken
by CAANZ. It is anticipated a temporary stop notice will be issued only once in
relation to the same circumstances. The provision was deliberately drafted in
this way as both safety regulators are capable of deciding quickly what is the
appropriate action to take to preserve safety without unnecessary hardship to
the operator concerned. The intention behind this provision is therefore to
maintain safety at all times but to take only such action as is considered
necessary for that purpose.
Subsection 28D(1) also stipulates that a
temporary stop notice must state the length of time the notice is in force; this
cannot be longer than seven calendar days (as opposed to seven working days).
Seven days is considered sufficient time for the matter to be referred to the
CAANZ for action and for that organisation to decide what action, if any, it
should take. This does not mean that the CAANZ has to have the safety concern
resolved within the seven-day period (or less, depending on the time of the
notice), only that it must take a decision on what should be done immediately,
that is before the
Definitions:
The home regulator is the aviation safety regulator
that issued/ granted the ANZA AOC and is responsible for regulating the
operator.
The host regulator is the aviation safety regulator of the host
country, that is the one that did not issue the ANZA AOC and is not responsible
for regulating the operator.
Chart Showing the Application of Temporary Stop Notices under
the
Mutual Recognition of Aviation-related Safety Certification Provisions
of the Australian and New Zealand Civil Aviation Legislation.
Host regulator can revoke the temporary stop notice at any time
Host regulator becomes aware of a serious risk to aviation
safety posed by an operator that requires immediate action
Operator can seek merits review of the home regulator’s
decision. Operator can also seek a statement of reasons under the ADJR Act
(or NZ equivalent) in relation to the home regulator’s decision on what
action to take and the host regulator’s decision to issue the notice in
the first instance
If consultations fail to produce agreement on a safety concern, matter
can move to dispute resolution.
If the host regulator is not satisfied with the decision, further consultations ensue however the decision of the home operator is applied and remains in force during consultations
Home regulator advises the operator of what action, if any, it proposes to take in relation to the matter. If no decision advised within the time period on the notice, operator may recommence activities by default
Home regulator advises host operator, within the period of the notice, regarding what action it proposes to take
Host regulator revokes the temporary stop notice immediately on receiving the decision of the home regulator
On receipt of a copy of the notice, the home regulator immediately considers what action, if any, should be taken as a result of the notice being given and consults the host regulator if the actions proposed will affect the operator’s ANZA activities in the host country
Host regulator gives a copy of the notice to the home regulator as soon as practicable after giving it to the operator and provides all other appropriate information it can.
Host regulator gives a temporary stop notice to the operator concerned, requiring them to cease operations for the period specified on the notice (not more than 7 days)
notice expires. This may include suspending the operator while further
investigations are undertaken. Or the matter may be one that can be easily
settled so that CASA feels confident in the operator recommencing its
activities.
It is open to the Director of CASA to give a period of less
than seven days on the notice, if it feels a lesser time is sufficient. This is
in recognition that the operator should not be disadvantaged beyond that
necessary to maintain safety. On the other hand, in setting a period of less
than seven days, the Director will need to be confident that it will be enough
time for CAANZ to consider the problem and come to a decision, particularly
given that an operator automatically has the right to recommence operations at
the end of the period.
Subsection 28D(2) restricts the Director’s
power to issue a temporary stop notice, stipulating that there must be a serious
risk to aviation safety, in its opinion, in order to exercise that power. The
nature of what constitutes a serious risk must remain within the discretion of
the Director. However it is expected that the matter would be regarded to be
important enough, and of enough concern, in terms of aviation safety to warrant
immediate action to ensure that the operations are halted without delay.
Subsection 28D(3) provides that the temporary stop notice comes into
effect at the time it is given to the operator in question and remains in force
for the period determined on the notice. This reflects the gravity of the
situation that required a temporary stop notice to be issued. Nonetheless, the
Director may revoke the temporary stop notice under section
28E.
Subsection 28D(4) requires the Director to state the facts
and circumstances, which, in his/her opinion, give rise to the serious risk to
civil aviation safety in Australian territory. This provision recognises that
in issuing a temporary stop notice, the safety authority has a responsibility to
the operator, by way of natural justice, to advise of the reasons for it. The
reasons for the notice also become available to the CAANZ when the Director
gives them a copy of the notice. Additionally, CASA is expected to provide any
further information to the CAANZ that it is appropriately able to provide in
relation to the matter, to assist CAANZ in deciding what action it should take.
Subsection 28D(5) requires the Director of CASA to provide the
Director of CAANZ with a copy of the temporary stop notice as soon as
practicable after it has been given to the operator. Given that the CAANZ only
has seven days (or possibly less) to consider what action, if any, to take in
relation to the safety concern, it is important for CASA to bring the matter to
the CAANZ’s attention as soon as practicable.
As soon as CAANZ
receives a copy of the Australian temporary stop notice, it must take certain
actions under its own Act. It must immediately consider the circumstances that
gave rise to the giving of the notice and decide whether to suspend, revoke,
impose conditions on, or take any other action in relation to the AOC with ANZA
privileges, whether in whole or part.
Subsection 28D(6) provides
that the notice is not invalidated even if the Director of CASA fails to state
the facts and circumstances in the notice, and/ or fails to provide a copy of
the notice as soon as practicable to CAANZ.
The Bill does not provide
the opportunity for merit review of the decision to issue a temporary stop
notice. This is because such a notice will only be issued in extreme and urgent
circumstances with the matter then being referred almost immediately to the home
regulator. Further, since the maximum time that a notice will be in force, is
or seven calender days, the opportunity for merits review would be pointless.
Decisions of the home regulator will, however, be open to review. Another
reason is that an appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal can only be made
under the Australian Civil Aviation Act in relation to AOCs issued under that
Act. New Zealand AOC’s with ANZA privileges don’t fall into this
category. New Zealand operators will, however, be able to make application to
the Australian Federal Court for a statement of reasons under the
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977.
Even though a temporary stop notice is given for a set time period, the
Act does provide that it can be revoked. The Director of CASA must revoke the
notice upon receiving written advice from the home regulator that it has made a
decision regarding the matter, whether or not the decision is to take action.
The Director can, however, revoke the notice for any reason, for example if the
safety concern was resolved or was found not to exist after all. These powers
are also non-delegable.
Subsection 28F(1) requires that, upon receiving a copy of a temporary
stop notice issued by CAANZ to the holder of an Australian AOC with ANZA
privileges, CASA consider it immediately and decide as soon as practicable what
action it should take under the Act or Regulations. This provision reflects the
fact that the notice is only issued for a maximum of seven calendar days, so it
is important there be no delay in CASA’s consideration of the situation.
The clause mirrors that found in corresponding New Zealand mutual recognition
provisions. It has the secondary intention of ensuring that the seven day (or
less) period not be allowed to lapse without the matter being considered such
that an unsafe operator might, by default, be permitted to resume operations
without the original concern of CAANZ being addressed.
Subsection
28F(2) provides that CASA must comply with the provisions of the ANZA mutual
recognition agreements. It is anticipated that these agreements will set out
agreed procedures to be followed when a temporary stop notice is received.
Subsection 28F(3): this provision provides that CASA must advise the
Director of CAANZ of its decision in relation to the safety concern raised in
the New Zealand temporary stop notice and advise what action it intends to take,
if any. CASA is also obliged to consult the Director of CAANZ under the new
section 26C (see Item 21), before formally notifying its decision, if the action
would affect ANZA activities in New Zealand. Having considered there to have
been a safety concern serious enough to issue a temporary stop notice, CAANZ
will naturally wish to be advised of the decision and proposed action,
particularly given that it may result in the operator recommencing its
activities. This does not mean that CAANZ has a power of veto over the decision
or action; mutual recognition is built on an acceptance of each other’s
standards, and that includes decisions. This said, CAANZ must be consulted
before the decision is made if the action affects ANZA activities in NZ in
recognition of their knowledge of their jurisdiction.
Item 32 amends section 32AC so that a CASA investigator may exercise
monitoring powers (including inspection powers as defined under section 3) under
this section at the request of CAANZ to help CAANZ ensure that the New Zealand
Civil Aviation Act, Regulations or Rules are being complied with. Consequently,
under section 32AK, a CASA investigator may stop or detain an aircraft or ensure
the aircraft remain undisturbed for a reasonable period when conducting an
investigation on behalf of CAANZ. The cooperative arrangements between CASA and
CAANZ regarding mutual enforcement, including how a request may be made by the
requesting authority, and how the request should be dealt with by the requested
authority, will be provided in the ANZA mutual recognition agreements. Under
section 32AM, anything done by a CASA investigator under section 32AC on behalf
of CAANZ which constitutes acquisition of property from a person otherwise than
on just terms would require CASA to pay reasonable compensation.
Item 34 amends section 32AD so that a CASA investigator may apply for a
monitoring warrant under this section at the request of CAANZ in respect of
premises in Australia, to help CAANZ ensure that the New Zealand Civil Aviation
Act, Regulations or Rules are being complied with. The cooperative arrangements
between CASA and CAANZ regarding mutual enforcement, including how a request may
be made by the requesting authority, and how the request should be dealt with by
the requested authority, will be provided in the ANZA mutual recognition
agreement. Once on the premises, the CASA investigator may require a person to
answer questions or produce documents under section 32AJ for the purpose of an
investigation conducted on behalf of CAANZ. In addition, under section 32AK,
the CASA investigator may stop or detain an aircraft or ensure the aircraft
remain undisturbed for a reasonable period when conducting an investigation on
behalf of CAANZ. Under section 32AM, anything done by CASA investigators under
section 32AD on behalf of CAANZ which constitutes acquisition of property from a
person other than on just terms would require CASA to pay reasonable
compensation.
This item inserts another paragraph into the regulation making power in
section 98 of the Act to allow regulations to be made for the mutual recognition
of aviation safety certifications in accordance with the ANZA mutual recognition
agreements.
While AOCs, as the most significant civil aviation approval,
will be the first document to be recognised, the mutual recognition obligation
can be extended to all aviation documents that are not covered by the Trans
Tasman Mutual Recognition Act 1997 with the agreement of both Governments.
Such documents could include certificates for aircraft maintenance
organisations.
It is Australian government policy that all carriers that operate within
Australia are subject to the Australian rules that govern carrier’s
liability have mandatory non-voidable insurance to meet their obligations under
the Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959 (the Liability
Act). Carriage within Australia is governed by Part IV of the Liability Act.
Sections 28 and 29 impose liability under this Part on holders of international
licences and holders of AOCs issued by CASA. The following items amend the
Liability Act to ensure that airlines operating under an New Zealand issued AOC
with ANZA privileges are subject to this liability. The mandatory non-voidable
insurance provisions of Part IVA of the Liability Act will then apply to these
operations.
This item inserts a new paragraph to the definition of airline licence in
section 26 of the Liability Act. This means that any carrier operating with a
New Zealand issued AOC with ANZA privileges has the same liability and
requirement to carry insurance as a carrier operating under an AOC authorising
airline operations issued under the Civil Aviation Act 1988.
This item inserts a new paragraph to the definition of charter licence in
section 26 of the Liability Act. This means that any carrier operating with a
New Zealand issued AOC with ANZA privileges has the same liability and
requirement to carry insurance as a carrier operating under an AOC for
authorising charter operations issued under the Civil Aviation Act
1988.
The opportunity has been taken to correct errors and standardise
references in the Act to aircraft which are registered in countries other than
Australia. Subsection 3 (1) of the Act defines such aircraft as
“foreign registered aircraft”. However, in several provisions of
the act, the term “foreign aircraft” is used. In each of these
instances, the correct term should be “foreign registered
aircraft”.
Schedule 3 amends sections 7, 9 and 25 of the Act, and
the heading to Subdivision C of Division 2 of Part III of the Act to
replace “foreign aircraft” with the defined term “foreign
registered aircraft”.
Currently, it is a condition of all AOCs that holders of AOCs continue to
satisfy CASA of the matters set out in section 28 of the Act. Section 28 of the
Act provides for the matters which CASA must be satisfied for the issue of an
AOC – it is only natural that the holder of an AOC continue throughout the
life of the AOC to meet those requirements. This condition is currently imposed
by paragraph 4.4 of section 82.0 of the Civil Aviation Orders.
The
condition is a fundamental condition of all AOCs, akin to the conditions imposed
by sections 28BD to 28BI of the Act. The opportunity has been taken to lift
this fundamental condition from a relatively obscure piece of legislation
– that is, paragraph 4.4 of Civil Aviation Order 82.0 – into the Act
where it properly belongs.
Part 2 of Schedule 2 of the Bill has this
effect. Item 8 inserts a new paragraph 28BA(1)(aa) which imposes the condition
set out in new section 28BAA on all AOCs. Item 9 provides that, if the
condition set out in the new section 28BAA is breached, the AOC continues to
authorise operation of aircraft according to its terms. This reflects the
situation for breaches of other conditions imposed the Act (under paragraph
28BA(1)(a)).
Item 10 then inserts a new section 28BAA which imposes the
condition that CASA must remain satisfied of the matters set out in paragraphs
28(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. Further, Australian AOCs with ANZA privileges are
subject to the condition that CASA remain satisfied of the matters set out in
paragraphs 28B(1)(a), (c) and (d) of the Act, and that the Secretary of the
Department has not advised CASA that the holder of the AOC is no longer eligible
for ANZA privileges under the ANZA mutual recognition agreements.
[1] Agreement between the
Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand Relating to Air
Services done at Auckland, 8 August 2002
[2] Agreement between the
Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand Relating to Air
Services done at Auckland, 8 August
2002.
[3] Community External
Trade Policy in the Field of Standards and Conformity Assessment,
Communication of the (European) Commission, 4 April
2003.
[4] Open Markets Matter:
The Benefits of Trade and Investment Liberalisation, OECD Policy
Brief 8, October 1999.