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Sabina Lauber[*]
Is there anyone who is in favour of rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy or sterilization? Does anyone support their use as weapons of war? If not, why should there still be brackets round these paragraphs on the last day of these negotiations? … Excuse me if I am naïve — but I am frankly baffled by the inability to reach agreement on this language among countries which I know support all these measures and proposals — countries which are themselves taking action to implement them.[1]
These words, delivered by Dr Nafis Sadik, Executive Director of the United Nations Population Fund on the last day of the Beijing Plus Five Special Session, sum up the frustrations of over 4000 government and non-government delegates attending the event. On the last afternoon, when the United Nations General Assembly should have been adopting the outcomes of the Special Session, delegates were still entrenched in the difficult and protracted negotiations that had marked the Beijing Plus Five review process.
In 1995, the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women known as the ‘Beijing Conference’ took place amongst a flurry of media attention. It was one of the largest global conferences ever held with 17,000 participants including 6000 delegates from 189 countries, over 4000 representatives of accredited non-governmental organisations, a host of national civil servants and 4000 media representatives. More than 30,000 people also participated in the Non-government Organisation (NGO) Forum that was run simultaneously.
There is no doubt that this extraordinary presence at the Beijing Conference played a significant role in bringing about the gains for women in the final document negotiated. By contrast, the Beijing Plus Five Conference occurred quietly, with little media coverage around the world. Negotiations were difficult and often struggled to maintain the gains made at Beijing.
This article seeks to evaluate the Beijing Plus Five conference and the new standards that were negotiated and adopted by the General Assembly on the last day of the conference. As part of the international human rights standard setting process, the conference itself and its outcomes have the potential to initiate improvements to the lives of women around the globe. However, as an international process it suffers from the inevitable limitations born of vast differences between governments, political systems and cultural priorities.
As women, as global citizens and as Australians, how should we view the outcomes of Beijing Plus Five? How should we use the outcomes to advance the equality of women in Australia? How should we prepare for the Fifth World Conference on Women to be held in 2005?
These questions are particularly pertinent at a time when the Australian government has taken a step back from its involvement with the United Nations Treaty Committee system, including a refusal to sign the new Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.[2] The announcement of this retreat on 29 August 2000 followed criticism of Australia’s policies regarding mandatory sentencing, treatment of refugees and Indigenous issues by United Nations treaty committees. Seen by government as an opportunity to force reform on under-resourced and often poorly administered organisations, women’s groups and human rights commentators have been vocal in showing their anger about the inclusion of the Optional Protocol as a casualty in the process.[3]
The Australian government’s decision not to sign the Optional Protocol stands oddly with its professed commitment to United Nations reform. The government has stated that it will take a lead role in bringing about United Nations reform.[4] However, by disengaging with the United Nations system and failing to adopt international operational mechanisms, Australia limits its involvement in United Nations processes and undermines the importance of these mechanisms. Such moves merely serve to further erode the strength of the United Nations system.
As a global citizen and elected government, the Australian government is able to choose the level of its interaction with the United Nations. But we as individuals are also citizens of the world and are therefore also able to choose our level of interaction with the United Nations. An international statement of human rights refers to our own individual rights. We as individuals should develop a greater awareness and understanding of what these rights are and how best to access, use and enforce them. The aim of this article is to begin this process in relation to Beijing Plus Five.
The United Nations General Assembly Special Session Beijing Plus Five was formally called Women 2000: Gender, Equality, Development and Peace in the 21st Century. The primary aim of Beijing Plus Five was to review and accelerate the implementation of the Platform for Action adopted in Beijing in 1995 (BPFA), hence the unofficial, yet widely used title ‘Beijing Plus Five’. From 5 to 9 June 2000, 180 Nation States and Observers[5] gathered to negotiate and adopt a Political Declaration[6] to reaffirm the responsibility of governments to implement the BPFA and an Outcomes Document[7] to review and strengthen the BPFA.
Negotiations started in March 2000 when the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)[8] met in New York as the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the upcoming Special Session.[9] The draft Political Declaration and draft Outcomes Document prepared by the United Nations Secretariat were opened to negotiation by governments.
The World Conferences on Women are non-treaty processes; they do not create an international convention of rights that Nation States sign and ratify. Instead, they are world conferences where governments meet to discuss obstacles, progress and strategies for the equality of women. A statement documenting the views of the conference is negotiated by government delegations under the auspices of CSW, and presented to a Special Session of the General Assembly for adoption.
The notion of consensus negotiation brings an interesting element to the process and the outcomes. Effectively, an objection by a single delegation can exclude text that the remainder of the world has agreed to. With observer states such as the Holy See (the Vatican) having full negotiation rights, more controversial issues around the rights of women are often unlikely to become part of the final documents emerging from such conferences.
The element of consensus gives a final negotiated Document increased strength. Although the document adopted does not have the force of an international treaty, it does carry the weight of a General Assembly resolution that was negotiated by consensus between all General Assembly members. This document can be skilfully used by international lawyers, women’s groups and NGOs to fight for the full implementation of the rights enunciated.
There are several ways of assessing the Beijing Plus Five process. It is inevitable that many will focus purely on the Outcomes Document to establish the advances made, or the ground lost. Throughout the PrepCom and the Special Session it became evident that the value of this process extends beyond just the negotiated text.
This discussion reviews the gains and losses made in three areas: first in the Outcomes Document, second, in the role of non-government actors and third, the value of the Plenary session at which the General Assembly met to hear members report on their progress since Beijing in 1995. These three distinct parts of the Beijing Plus Five process bring into play three distinct tools of international law. Properly understood, these tools and the gains they bring can continue to be used to effectively implement and advance current standards of women’s rights.
The Political Declaration, negotiated at the PrepCom in March 2000 and adopted by the Special Session in June 2000, strongly reaffirms that governments have the responsibility to implement the BPFA. The BPFA to this day remains the crucial reference point for governments, with respect to their obligations to the rights of women.
The Outcomes Document builds on this reaffirmation and strengthens the BPFA in many areas. Designed essentially as a review document, the Outcomes Document has four parts:
I.
Introduction
II.
Achievements and obstacles in the implementation of the twelve critical areas of the Platform for Action
III.
Current challenges affecting the full implementation of the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action
IV.
Actions and Initiatives to overcome obstacles and to achieve the full and accelerated implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action
It was agreed at the PrepCom that the Special Session would be undertaken on the basis of the BPFA and that its minimum standards would not be renegotiated. This agreement became a crucial element during the later stages of negotiations when several countries attempted to reject gains that had been made in 1995. In such instances, usually accompanied by tense disagreement on contentious issues, the Chair of the negotiations adopted the exact language contained in the BPFA.
As is traditional at United Nations negotiations, nation states negotiated in blocs. At the PrepCom there were three main negotiating blocs — the European Union, the G-77 (including China) and JUSCANZ. Australia, along with Japan, the USA, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and the recently joined Republic of Korea form the negotiating bloc JUSCANZ. JUSCANZ members spent many days together, negotiating the Outcomes Document draft text before a common JUSCANZ voice could be presented to the PrepCom. Difficult battles ensued over issues of strategic national interest, with the views of particular countries clearly in conflict with the interests of other JUSCANZ members.
Outside of the negotiation blocs, the strong association between several Islamic countries and the Holy See was publicly noted by experienced diplomats, several of whom commented that they had never before seen such a close alliance between these groups. The presence of the Holy See, exercising full negotiation rights, had been criticised by many NGOs at the Beijing Conference.[10] While the Holy See’s status as an observer rather than an NGO is legally uncontentious[11] it again drew significant criticism from many participants at Beijing Plus Five. No other independent seat of religious power enjoys such privilege at United Nations negotiations.
Sexual orientation: By far the most contentious issue at the negotiations was the attempt to include text using the term ‘sexual orientation’. Hard fought but lost at the 1995 Beijing conference,[12] the issue was put back on the agenda by JUSCANZ, the EU, Southern Africa and several Latin American countries. Acknowledging that any gains in this area were unlikely, these Nation States at least wanted recognition in Part II of the document that some governments had, since Beijing, enacted legislation to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Attempts were also made to include text and strategies to combat violence against lesbians. A tense stand off in the small hours of the morning on the final day evidenced just how far away nation states were from having ‘sexual orientation’ on the agenda. In fact, conservative nation states made it clear that if a reference to sexual orientation found its way into the Outcomes Document, they would refuse to adopt the document in its entirety. All references were ultimately dropped and the status quo of the BPFA maintained.
Health: Several gains were made in the area of health, reflecting the strong commitment of nation states such as the USA, Canada and a number of European and African countries. The concept of women’s health throughout the life cycle became a major focus of the Outcomes Document. Provisions relating to health now go beyond the BPFA by focusing on the gender aspects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic as well as other diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis. The situation of the girl child affected by HIV/AIDS is specifically addressed, as an infected person, care provider and orphan.
Women’s right to control their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health was included in the document, despite staunch opposition from several conservative nation states and the Holy See. In addition, strategies for women’s and men’s access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning, including information and services are included. Vigorous debates around the issue of abortion took place, with several Nation States attempting to incorporate the language of the 1999 International Conference on Population and Development Plus Five (Cairo Plus Five) into the Outcomes Document. This more progressive text was ultimately over-ruled and only the BPFA language was retained.
In line with the life cycle approach, the Outcomes Document specifically addresses aging, stressing the need for programs for healthy, active aging, aimed at ensuring the independence, equality, participation and security for older women. The need to promote women’s and girl’s mental health is also recognised, as is its integration into health care services and programs. The Outcomes Document also acknowledged the need for gender-sensitive training of health workers in order to recognise and properly address gender-based violence.
Globalisation: Gains included the recognition of the gendered impact of globalisation and a commitment to ensure equal access to social protection. Equal participation of women in macro economic decision making was also included. However, some ‘developed’ Nation States were accused of showing little support for eliminating the identified negative effects of globalisation on women. This issue impacted on the free trade agenda of many nations and there was little support for text that could impact on progressing international trade negotiations. Predictable reluctance to support firm commitment to increasing overseas development aid was also shown. References to this issue inevitably became shrouded in words of vague commitment.
Violence: Considerable progress was made in strengthening standards in the area of violence against women and girls. The framework for discussion has been expanded to focus on the need to promote an environment that does not tolerate violence against women and girls. Governments have now committed to undertake research into the root causes of violence against women and girls and to establish legislation to handle criminal matters relating to this violence. A disappointingly narrow understanding was adopted on government accountability for violence against women and girls perpetrated by non-state actors.
More specific provisions were introduced to address issues not directly mentioned in the BPFA, such as marital rape, crimes committed in the name of honour and passion, racism and racially motivated violence against women and girls. New measures were created to mainstream gender into national immigration policies in order to recognise gender-related persecution and violence when assessing grounds for granting refugee status and asylum.
Trafficking in women and girls was viewed in a holistic manner, addressing the root causes of the phenomenon and developing a comprehensive anti-trafficking strategy including legislative and preventative measures, exchange of information, assistance, protection and reintegration of victims, plus the prosecution of offenders. The document also introduced the idea of not prosecuting women and girl victims of trafficking for illegal entry or residence in the country, into which they were trafficked. Such prosecution is currently common in many countries.
CEDAW: Unfortunately there was significant reluctance to link the Outcomes Document with the standards of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Some of the debates even failed to acknowledge existing obligations that most nation states currently have under CEDAW. Despite this reluctance, the Outcomes Document encourages nation states to sign and ratify the Optional Protocol to CEDAW adopted in 1999 as well as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
The NGOs fought hard for stronger rights on inheritance and property rights, which was accepted as part of the document, including language on access to housing. However, language on labour rights was disappointingly weak and there is little reference to existing standards already developed by the International Labour Organisation in the Outcomes Document. This was a disappointing conclusion for the USA and the European Union, which had fought hard to win strong text on labour rights.
There is no doubt that several gains were made in many areas. But important battles remain for future negotiations. The challenge now is to use the gains that have been made and bring about their implementation. There is no doubt that the Beijing Plus Five Outcomes Document can be used as a valuable statement of international and domestic commitment. Unfortunately women and NGOs often favour the more well known but less detailed CEDAW, as their main lobbying tool.
A high number of delegations, particularly JUSCANZ delegations, included representatives from NGOs. These NGO representatives used their delegation membership to transmit the views of civil society from their own countries to the delegations. The Australian delegation had delegates from three NGOs — Soroptimists International, the Australian Federation of Business and Professional Women, and the YWCA. This presence was in addition to the involvement of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) as independent advisers. The genuine involvement and participation of the NGOs on the Australian delegation and many other delegations clearly demonstrated the entrenched role of civil society in the United Nations system today.
NGO participation in the Special Session was determined at the March 2000 PrepCom where it was decided that NGOs with ECOSOC consultative status, NGOs that had participated at the 1995 Beijing conference, as well as other NGOs, could all participate. Initially at the PrepCom, NGOs had access to the negotiation floor. Significant difficulties arose when a large number of representatives from right-to-life groups flooded and aggressively lobbied negotiation rooms. Many delegates consequently made complaints of harassment to United Nations officials. The result of this unprecedented behaviour was that all NGOs not included in government delegations were denied access to the negotiation floor; their access allowed from the viewing gallery only. No NGO access was allowed to the small negotiation groups that had been assigned the more controversial provisions.
NGOs held meetings throughout the PrepCom and the Special Session. Australian NGOs met daily for briefings facilitated by a government-funded NGO coordinator. The presence of this coordinator allowed for a much better flow of information and interaction with government delegates than would have otherwise been possible. In addition, alternative NGO reports were made available by regional representatives and NGO caucuses on the 12 critical areas of the BPFA negotiated their own additions to the Outcomes Document. Comprehensive lobbying by NGOs ensured that several NGO initiatives found their way into the final Outcomes Document.
Intense NGO lobbying regarding issues of early and forced marriage and honour crimes took place prior to and during the PrepCom, and the Special Session. This strategic lobbying undoubtedly contributed to these issues becoming a strong part of the final Outcomes Document.
The powerful, albeit often invisible role of NGOs in negotiating human rights standards at the international level, caused some controversy during negotiations. Several Nation States passionately opposed language that strengthened and ensured the place of NGOs within the human rights system. Despite this opposition, many provisions of the Outcomes Document acknowledge the important complementary and autonomous role of NGOs in progressing women’s human rights.
NGOs have clearly found a valuable and effective place in systems of international governance. They have access to and a willingness to use the valuable tools of lobbying, information exchange and ‘shaming’[13] to bring about consistent future growth in women’s rights.
Another group of organisations that are slowly emerging as players in the field of international human rights law are National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs). As independent authorities established by national law to protect the human rights of people within their countries, these organisations bring both expertise and independence to the international forum. The Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) plays an important role at regular international human rights events at the international level.
At a United Nations sponsored meeting in 1991, a detailed set of principles on the status of national institutions was developed — the ‘Paris Principles’. Subsequently endorsed by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly, these principles establish the key features, role and functions of NHRIs. In particular, the principles require a national institution to have as broad a mandate as possible, be independent, pluralistic, accessible, characterised by regular, effective functioning, have a representative composition and adequate funding. There are currently over 30 Paris Principles compliant NHRIs in the world.
The status of NHRIs at international meetings remains controversial and inconsistent. NHRIs are not part of government as they are an independent organisation, nor are they strictly an NGO. Several proposals and resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly have attempted to clarify this role.
At the 52nd session of the Commission on Human Rights, the Chair decided to introduce an interim arrangement whereby national institutions could speak from the seat of their government’s delegation, but in their own right and with separate speaking time, during consideration of the agenda item relating to national institutions. This arrangement was maintained at the 53rd session of the Commission.
At the 54th session of the Commission[14] the Chair decided that, in addition, national institutions addressing the Commission could do so from a special section of the floor, set aside specifically for this purpose under the name plate ‘National Institutions’. Each national institution was allocated seven minutes speaking time during consideration of the relevant agenda item. In Resolution 1999/72 at the 56th session, it was decided this arrangement should be continued.
HREOC has, since its attendance at the Vienna World Conference in June 1993, participated independently as a national institution in meetings of the Commission on Human Rights. HREOC requested this same arrangement before the Beijing Plus Five meetings, but was denied permission to appear in its own right on the basis that it would increase the number of organisations present and make the forum unmanageable. As a result, HREOC attended the meetings as a member of the Australian delegation. This gave HREOC access to the meetings but not the ability to speak or negotiate independently from the Australian government.
NHRIs form a bridge between governments and NGOs. They often hold considerable power within domestic borders. For example, HREOC administers and promotes Australian human rights legislation, including the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), which is based on CEDAW. It is unfortunate that NHRIs, as an independent source of expertise and information, have the ability to inform international fora in the human rights jurisdiction but not within the jurisdiction of women’s rights.
The Plenary Session held in the General Assembly Chamber allowed governments to make short presentations on their achievements, challenges and obstacles over the past five years of implementation of the BPFA.
The quality of the presentations was mixed with some governments presenting hollow self-congratulations, while others delivered inspirational messages of genuine change. African nations focused on the tragedy of HIV/AIDS as a barrier and immense challenge to the achievement of human rights for women. United Nations agencies reported frankly and honestly on what they saw to be achievements and obstacles, often amidst much cheering and applause. A small number of NGOs were also invited to give oral statements to the General Assembly.
The value of these Plenary Sessions lies not so much in the actual words spoken, but in the fact that governments from across the globe are called upon to report on human rights progress. The process requires governments to account for their action, or inaction, by exposing them to the judgment and criticism of other governments, the United Nations and NGOs.
Armed with the tools of diplomacy, strategic questioning and ‘shaming’, the Plenary Session can provide a useful mechanism for advancing the rights of women. Plenary Sessions are inevitably shadowed by a number of diplomatic functions, cocktail parties and valuable lobbying opportunities in the cafeteria and toilet waiting queues. Governments attending Plenary Sessions often seek a positive response from their domestic NGOs and the media. It is a valuable time for encouraging commitment and change from participating delegates.
While women should continue to engage in the international system to fight for the advancement and implementation of women’s human rights, there is also a need to question and expose the structural barriers and mindsets that marginalise the real experiences of women and hence, real advancements for women around the globe.
With only 11 female ambassadors to the United Nations in New York, out of over 160 countries, and few women in senior positions at the United Nations itself, it is evident the Beijing Plus Five conference was underpinned by a structure that overwhelmingly thrives on the experiences of men. Can the mere presence of women at such a conference, or the mere subject matter of women’s rights, ensure a genuine advancement for women around the world?
It is reflections such as these that caused Diane Otto to comment on the results of the Beijing Conference in 1995:
Extending to women the rights that men currently enjoy is not enough. It is not enough because it does not challenge the underlying social, political and economic institutions that reproduce gender hierarchies. It is also not enough because it does not redress the inequitable access to rights that differently situated women (and men) have ... Challenging that power is not simply a matter of cajoling more women into participating in the existing systems. There remains a long haul before us while we learn, through our resistance, how to challenge power on terms other than those prescribed, and therefore controlled, by the dominant regimes.[15]
May Lamont, an NGO adviser to the Australian government Beijing Plus Five delegation raised similar challenges on her return, expressing the dispossession she felt as a woman at the meeting:
As a member of the female sex, it was my body that was under the most minute scrutiny; my body that was the subject of claim, ownership and control. I went from anger to despair, especially as the negotiators from some of the more conservative and repressive forces were women.[16]
The limitation that must be accepted about the international system is that international law in its many forms can only offer a partial response to women’s perspectives.[17] A thorough understanding of this limitation, as well as an understanding of the diverse tools available to effectively exploit international law, is the key to effectively using these processes. Often couched in the language and systems familiar to governments and dominant structures, international law is a valuable mechanism when seeking change in these areas.
Other strategies must be used outside the international law system to examine women’s experiences and, in turn, challenge the mindsets that deny their recognition. These should include activities at the grass roots of women’s lives acknowledging the diversity and reality of their experiences, activities targeting domestic laws and governments, and academic analysis and discussion. The role of NGOs and national human rights institutions, such as the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, in these other strategies are crucial. Over time, these strategies will create real and systematic change at the domestic level and gradually also at the international level.
References
[*] Sabina Lauer attended the United Nations Beijing Plus Five PrepCom (March 2000) and the Special Session (June 2000) as an independent adviser to the Australian Delegation on behalf of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. The views expressed in this article are the views of the author and do not express the views of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission or the Australian government.
[1] Statement by Dr Nafis Sadik, Executive Director of the United Nations Population Fund to the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the Fourth World Conference on Women, United Nations, New York, 9 June 2000. Available on www.un.org/ga/webcast/statements
[2] ‘Improving the Effectiveness of United Nations Committees’ Joint News Release from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Attorney-General and the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 29 August 2000.
[3] See for example, HREOC News Release 29 August 2000 ‘Human Rights Commission Responds to Un Committees Reform Announcement; ‘Backtrack on rights tragic, says UN’ The Sydney Morning Herald 30 August 2000, 1; ‘Canberra Snubs UN Protocol for Women’ The Courier Mail 30 August 2000, 8; Statement by Elizabeth Evatt in response to Government Press Release, 4 September 2000; ‘Howard denying women’ The Canberra Times 30 September 2000, 5; Michelle Gilchrist ‘Outrage at snub to UN’ The Australian 4 October 2000, 1; Brendan Nicholson ‘Women pressure PM on treaty’ The Sunday Age 8 October 2000, 6. See also www.nwjc.org.au/current/ optional protocol.htm
[4] See ‘Improving the Effectiveness of United Nations Committees’ Joint News Release from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Attorney- General and the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 29 August 2000.
[5] The phrase ‘Nation States and Observers’ makes the distinction between Nations that are members of the United Nations with a seat in the General Assembly and those that are not members. Observers include recognised Nations that are not members of the United Nations, such as Switzerland. Observers do not have a seat in the General Assembly and hence do not have United Nations voting rights. At World Conferences such as Beijing Plus Five, Observers may be granted full negotiation rights.
[6] UN Doc A/S-23/2, paragraph 56.
[7] Review and appraisal of progress made in the implementation of the 12 critical areas of concern in the Beijing Platform for Action, and Further actions and initiatives for overcoming obstacles to the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action, UN Docs A/S-23/2/Add.2 as amended by A/S-23/AC.1/L.1/Add. 1-42. Full text is at www.un.org/ womenwatch/daw/followup/beijing+5.htm
[8] For information on the Commission on the Status of Women, see www.un.org.womenwatch/daw/csw/index.html
[9] Committee on the Status of Women, 44th Session (2000). The PrepCom was chaired by Christine Kapalata (Tanzania) and adopted several resolutions that set out the framework for review: CSW draft resolution E/CN.6/1999/L.2/Rev.1, Preparations for the Special Session of the General Assembly, http://www.un.org/events/ref39.htm
[10] Otto ‘Holding up Half the Sky, but for Whose Benefit?: A Critical Analysis of the Fourth World Conference on Women’ (1996) 6 Australian Feminist Law Journal 7.
[11] Kuntz ‘The Status of the Holy See in International Law’ (1952) 46 American Journal of International Law 308.
[12] Otto ‘Lesbians?: Not in My Country’ [1995] AltLawJl 120; (1995) 20(6) Alternative Law Journal 288.
[13] The tool of ‘shaming’ refers to the process of embarrassing governments about their human rights breaches or their failure to implement required standards. This is an effective tool used to enforce international human rights and is regularly used by NGOs, governments and the UN.
[14] ‘Effective functioning of human rights mechanisms: National institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights’, Report of the Secretary-General submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/55 (E/CN.4/1999/95)
[15] Otto ‘Holding Up Half the Sky, but for Whose Benefit?: A Critical Analysis of the Fourth World Conference on Women’ (1996) 6 AFLJ 7, 28.
[16] Women’s News, Newsletter of the Commonwealth Office of the Status of Women, Issue 14, August 2000, 6
[17] Mathew, Otto & Walker ‘ Feminist Interventions in International Law: Reflections on the Past and Strategies for the Future’ [1997] AdelLawRw 1; (1997) 19 Adel LR 1, quoting a presentation by Hillary Charlesworth at p 4.
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