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Vijay Sakhuja[1]
In the wake of the tragic events of 11 September 2001 in the United States, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) called for a review of measures to combat violence and crime at sea.[2] A resolution calling for the review of existing international legal and technical measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism that threaten the security of ships at sea and ports was also adopted. It was agreed to adopt new regulations and mandatory statutory instruments to enhance maritime security by preventing and suppressing acts of terrorism against shipping and make sea-lanes safe for international commerce.
Meanwhile, the UNCTAD report ‘Review of Maritime Transport 2001’ had noted that the worldwide merchant fleet continued to expand at 1.2% and at the beginning of 2001 was pegged at 808.4 million deadweight tonnage (dwt.).[3]
During 2000, 44.4 million dwt. (up 9.6% from 1999) of new ships were delivered, 22.2 million dwt. (down 27.7%) was broken up and 12.8 million dwt. was taken off inventories due to vessel losses or decommissioning, resulting in a net gain of 9.4 million dwt. Also, world sea-based trade recorded its fourteenth consecutive annual increase while Asia’s share of imports and exports were 26.1 and 18.8 per cent respectively. Given these trends, sea-based commerce has offered a mood of great optimism.
While this optimism is a welcome sign, sea-lanes continue to be vulnerable to disruption. Piracy, terrorism, drug trafficking, gun-running, human smuggling and pollution are threatening these routes. None of these activities is independent of the other and failure in one often leads to failure in others. In this regard, this paper examines various threats to sea-lane security in the Indian Ocean and argues for greater cooperation among littoral countries to enhance security and safety of maritime enterprise.
The Indian Ocean is home to important sea-lanes. A large volume of international long-haul maritime cargo from the Persian Gulf, Africa, Asia Pacific and Europe transits through its waters. It is home to important straits: Hormuz, Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Suez. Hormuz lies between Oman and Iran. It is strategically important to most countries of the world. The primary cargo through the strait is oil or gas, which affects virtually every aspect of the daily lives of most people of the world. The strait is fairly deep and vessels of 160,000 dwt. can pass through the waterway, nearly 15.5 million barrels of oil flow through it daily.[4]
From the Persian Gulf, the sea-lane transits through the Indian Ocean almost hugging the Indian coast towards the Strait of Malacca. Malacca is the busiest maritime strait with over 600 vessels transitting through it everyday. Each day, about 10.3 million barrels of petroleum products are carried through the Strait of Malacca.[5] Virtually all ships destined for East Asia carrying LNG and LPG pass through Malacca and the issue of safety is likely to grow in importance as East and South East Asia’s energy imports grow. It is estimated that the number of tankers transitting through the strait of Malacca will increase to 59 per day in 2010 from 45 in 2000. Similarly, the LPG tanker traffic is expected to increase to seven per day in 2010 from five in 2000 and LNG tankers are expected to rise to 12 per day from eight in 2000.[6]
The sea-lane also runs towards the west to pass through the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean Sea. The Suez Canal transported around 820,000 bbl/d of petroleum in 2000, and in 2001 about 360 oil tankers passed through the canal. Currently, VLCCs and ULCCs cannot pass through it but the Egyptian government plans to widen and deepen it by 2010 to allow these large vessels to transit. The SUMED pipeline, linking the Ain Sukhna terminal on the Gulf of Suez with Sidi Kerir on the Mediterranean has the capacity to transport 3.1 million bbl/d. Closure of the Suez Canal and/or the SUMED Pipeline would divert tankers around the Cape of Good Hope, at the southern tip of Africa, adding to transit time and tanker capacity.[7] Therefore the Straits of Hormuz, Malacca and Suez are strategically important to the Indian Ocean sea-lane security.
Threats to sea-lanes arise from several sources. Some of these can be attributed to external factors and some to internal, while there are other factors (storms, cyclones, typhoons, fog, rain) over which the maritime community has limited control. It is therefore important that threats to sea-lanes be classified into two distinct groups: external and internal. This classification of threats helps the maritime community to develop sophisticated strategies to ensure the safety and security of sea-lanes. External factors include piracy and terrorism, while internal factors are partly the making of the maritime community itself e.g. Flag of Convenience (FOC) shipping, incompetent crews, poor seamanship and illegal activities like gun-running, drug smuggling and illegal transportation of humans by ships.
Piracy at sea continues to top the list of external threats to sea-lanes. According to the Inter-national Chamber of Commerce Annual Report on Piracy at Sea, 2001, there were 335 attacks on ships in 2001. Pirates killed 21 crew members or passengers, and 210 seafarers were taken hostage during the attacks.[8]
A new trend of ‘kidnap and ransom’ piracy was also observed in the Malacca Straits (waters around Aceh, Indonesia), a phenomenon earlier restricted to Somali waters. During 2000, piracy attacks showed an alarming rise, with armed robbery in the waters around Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Malacca Straits, India and the Red Sea. Similar trends continued during 2001, with Indonesia, India and Bangladesh occupying the top three positions with 91, 27 and 25 attacks respectively.[9]
The Malacca Strait and the Singapore Strait appear to be popular among pirates. This is due to geographical and operational reasons. The area around the straits attracts the heaviest maritime traffic concentration. As noted earlier, over 600 vessels of different types transit the Malacca Strait every day and the traffic density is very high. Although there is a traffic separation scheme, transiting vessels reduce speed to negotiate the strait. Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) transit the strait at safe speeds with only a meter or two of clearance under the keel. Besides, the strait is home to several shipwrecks and shallow areas. These navigational and operational conditions provide the right type of environment for pirates to undertake attacks and also manage a quick getaway. The number of attacks is fast increasing and is alarming.
In the recent past, the waters off Sri Lanka have witnessed frequent acts of piracy. In one incident, a merchant vessel M V Cordiality, was captured and five Chinese crew were allegedly killed by Sri Lankan terrorists near the port of Trincomalee.[10] LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) rebel forces are also reported to have hijacked ships and boats of all sizes, and kidnapping and killing crew members is a common practice. In August 1998, a Belize-flagged general cargo vessel M V Princess Kash was hijacked by LTTE rebels.[11] While on its way to Mullaitivu, a LTTE stronghold, the Sri Lankan Air Force bombed the vessel to prevent the ship’s cargo falling into the hands of the LTTE. The status of the 22 crew members is still not known.
The International Maritime Bureau has warned commercial shipping transiting along the east coast of Africa not to come within 50 nautical miles of the coastline because of pirates. Most of the ports in the Horn of Africa are piracy prone and dangerous. Attacks occur in port, at anchor or during slow steaming off the coast. Somali waters in particular have been notorious for acts of piracy. This is primarily due to political instability. Somali militias operate speedboats and are reported to pose as coastguard. Their activities include kidnappings, vessel seizures and ransom demands. The most dangerous aspect of these activities is the frequent use of infantry weapons like mortars, grenades and small arms.
In January 2002, a Lebanese vessel Princess Sarah, was attacked and hijacked twice off the coast of Somalia.[12]
In the first instance, the vessel was fired at while underway. In the process it sustained some damage and was forced to stop after 20 miles to make repairs to the engine. Two days later a second attack took place and the pirates managed to take over the vessel. The initial ransom demand was for $60,000, but later this was changed to $200,000. An agreement was reached on an undisclosed amount and the crew was released. A French navy vessel was sent to oversee the release. The troubles of the vessel did not end because another attack took place and this time the pirates were scared away by a helicopter that was sent by the nearby French warship Floreal.
In June 2002, the Cyprus-flagged Panagia Tinou, a bulk carrier, was hijacked while it was at anchor off the north coast of Somalia.[13] The crew was taken hostage and the ship was moved to an unknown destination along the Somali coast. The United Nations entered into negotiations with the pirates on behalf of the Philippines since Somalia has no bilateral relations. After 16 days of captivity the crewmen were released in return for a ransom of $400,000, paid by an international ship insurance agency through the Protection and Indemnity Club. According to the commander of the German Naval Air Wing Detachment in Mombasa, the presence of three German vessels near where the hijacked vessel was anchored helped free it.
Pirates are like sharks. They breed and show up more often in some regions than others. They can strike anywhere but some areas are popular with them. Unfortunately, the Indian Ocean is home to the top three piracy infested regions. South East Asia, South Asia and the east African coast are hotspots of piracy and account for more than half of the worldwide reported attacks. It appears that piracy moves around and its centre of gravity keeps shifting, but pirate-plagued areas remain active. It may simply happen that one area may record more attacks than the others, but no area can claim itself to be free from pirates. The number of incidents including violent attacks continues to rise. The maritime community is growing pessimistic about the ability of States to counter piracy. They also appear to doubt the intention of States to take the matter seriously.
Threat of terrorism to sea-lane security is not a new phenomenon. In the past there have been several instances when ships have been taken over by insurgents or attacked by terrorists.[14] The takeover of a Portuguese passenger liner Santa Maria in 1961 ushered in the modern age of maritime terrorism.[15] In 1988, City of Poros, a Greek cruise ferry carrying 500 tourists, was attacked by terrorists.[16] But it was the Achille Lauro incident that caught the attention of the international community with regard to the menace of terrorism at sea and the formulation of an international convention under the United Nations.[17] Similarly, on 3 November 1988, two trawlers carrying 150 PLOTE (People’s Liberation Tamil Tigers Eelam) mercenaries landed in the Maldives.[18]
An Indian Navy maritime reconnaissance aircraft detected the ship and Indian navy vessels later captured it.[19]
In recent times, the USS Cole, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, was attacked by terrorists. In October 2000, during its refuelling halt in Aden, Yemen, a small craft packed with explosives crashed into the warship and exploded, leaving it with a 40-foot hole in its side and several crew members dead. The bombers had links with Al-Qaeda and America’s No. 1 terror suspect, Osama bin Laden.[20] As part of campaign against terrorism, the Singapore authorities arrested 15 suspected Islamic militants with links to Al-Qaeda who were allegedly planning to blow up US naval vessels and a bus that was to transport American military personnel.[21]
These incidents have exposed the vulnerability of warships too.
The recent terrorist attack off Yemen on the French oil tanker Limburg, is indeed a chilling reminder of the vulnerability of maritime enterprise to asymmetric threats.[22]
The owners of the French-flagged tanker believe that a speedboat packed with explosives rammed into the ship leaving it disabled and leaking oil. It suits terrorist requirements of low technology war against a superior force. Therefore the threat of terrorism to commercial maritime enterprise is far from rare and is increasingly becoming a reality. Unfortunately, maritime shipping is the soft underbelly of states and offers the best form of vehicle to carry out illegal activities.
It is now increasingly accepted that shipping containers are an efficient delivery system for nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction. Large container vessels dock at ports almost everyday. These vessels are subjected to routine crew and container manifest inspections. The container itself is rarely subjected to a thorough inspection. Although the introduction of shipping containers in 1956 was a revolution in the process of shipping vast amounts of goods across the oceans, these boxes, which can be easily shifted to railroad cars or trucks, have emerged as an important tool for terrorists. Today we have container vessels like the Regina Maersk capable of transporting as many as 6600 TEU containers.[23]
After the container door is closed and sealed (under varying degrees and seriousness of inspection), these boxes move into seaport terminals, aboard container ships, trains, trucks and even aircraft, with little or no information about their true contents. As regards containers, only a few are examined for their content. According to maritime security experts, containers are the most suitable means of transporting men and materials for terrorist activities including weapons of mass destruction.
In 2002, the Palermo Senator, a freighter, was ordered to remain six miles off the coast of New Jersey. The vessel was scheduled to offload 655 containers in Port Elizabeth. The US Coast Guard agents detected traces of low radiation[24]
while the ship was being checked for stowaways. The vessel was registered under the Liberian flag and owned by a German company. Its last port of call was Valencia, Spain. Earlier, the ship had called at various ports in Southeast Asia and transitted through the Suez Canal.
Earlier, a suspected Al-Qaeda operative smuggled himself halfway around the world locked inside a shipping container with his own bed and toilet.[25]
Apparently he was carrying security passes and maps of some airports in Canada, Thailand and Egypt. A laptop computer, two mobile phones, cameras, a Canadian passport, other identity documents and his certification as an aircraft mechanic were found on his person. According to US customs authorities, only two per cent of the cargo containers that enter seaports each day are inspected. Similarly, in New Orleans, a container labelled as empty held oil exploration tools that were radioactive. When customs officials opened the container in the port, the beeper-sized radiation alarms on their belts screamed a warning. The inspectors had to summon a decontamination team.[26]
As part of maritime security initiatives, the United States has sought cooperation from several countries to improve security at ten ‘mega-ports’ that account for nearly half of all containers that are landed on US seaports.[27] Among other issues, this includes placing US custom inspectors to identify high-risk containers and screen them at the port of origin. According to bilateral agreements with Canada, US customs inspectors have now been stationed at three Canadian seaports and also in Singapore and Hong Kong.
At present there are no indications to suggest that choke points are likely to be threatened by States astride these waterways, but such eventualities cannot be ruled out. Similarly the threat of mining by regional terrorist organisations to draw international attention remains a potent threat. There are distinct possibilities of disruption of sea-lanes due to interstate conflicts. States are bound to declare maritime exclusion zones or areas dangerous to shipping due to conflict at sea. Although countries have been pursuing an aggressive maritime cooperation strategy both bilaterally and on a multilateral basis to prevent scuttling in sea-lanes, conflicts have continued to threaten shipping.
The world’s ‘most wanted terrorist’ Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda operatives are known to own or have chartered at least 20 merchant vessels capable of undertaking ocean passage. These vessels are suspected to possess ‘flag of convenience’ (FOC) registration in Liberia, Panama and the Isle of Man.[28] Recent reports suggest that Osama’s secret shipping fleet, flying a variety of flags of convenience, allows him to hide the ownership of vessels, and transport goods, arms, drugs and recruits with little official scrutiny.[29] A shipbroker in Germany has admitted acting as a translator when Wahid al Hage, an Al-Qaeda operative, sought to buy a merchant vessel. Wahid is sought in connection with the 1998 bombings of two US embassies in East Africa.[30] Reportedly, one of bin Laden’s cargo freighters unloaded supplies in Kenya for the suicide bombers who weeks later destroyed the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.[31]
The presence of FOC (Flag of Convenience) vessels has indeed exposed chinks in the armour of security and posed new challenges for the maritime forces.[32] Several terrorist organisations are known to possess merchant ships. For instance, the LTTE have a flotilla of ships that are engaged in maritime trade. Most of these are registered in FOC countries known as ‘pan-ho-lib’ i.e. Panama, Honduras and Liberia.[33]
Operating under flags of convenience and staffed with a Tamil crew, these cargo ships carry out their activities between Asia and Europe. They are also known to regularly transport illegal immigrants or undertake any kind of traffic on behalf of the LTTE. For instance, LTTE vessels ship narcotics from Myanmar to Turkey. In order to give legitimacy to their fleet, and also to generate revenue, LTTE ships move general cargo such as fertilizer, timber, rice, paddy, cement and other dry cargo.[34]
The capture by the Israeli Navy of Karine –A, a Palestinian Authority ship, carrying 50 tons of lethal ammunition, offers a classical example of a change of name. According to Lloyd’s of London, the vessel was owned by the Beirut-based Diana K Shipping Company and registered in Lebanon. Its original name was Rim K and was purchased by Ali Mohammed Abbas, an Iraqi national for $400,000. It was re-registered in Tonga as the Karine –A.[35]
According to the International Transport Worker’s Federation (ITF) Fair Practices Committee, a union of seafarers and dockers campaigning against FOC, there are 30 countries that are known to offer FOC registry.[36] These are essentially developing or small island states. The ITF believes that there should be a genuine link between the vessel and its flag, which would increase accountability and force ship-owners to maintain international shipping standards, a practice that does not commonly occur with FOC ships. According to industry experts, flag-hopping is a common practice and ship-owners tend to switch registry at the first sign of a crackdown by authorities or when engaging in activities involving gun-running, drug smuggling, or transporting illegal cargo or human beings.[37]
FOC vessels have the capability to challenge sea-lane security. Their presence clearly highlights the dangers involved when strategic cargo like oil is transported. It is also a reminder that countries need to revitalize national fleets and challenge FOC vessels. If the maritime community is serious about challenging the forces of terrorism, then it must establish a framework for a genuine link between the flag a vessel flies and the State to which it belongs.
Though merchant ship crews are trained to handle emergencies on board ships, they have been found wanting in professional competence. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), it is virtually impossible to verify the authenticity of the identity of the crew.[38] Besides, there is a major problem of counterfeit and improperly issued mariner documentation. IMB has issued a warning to ship-operators about the thousands of unqualified crew and masters working illegally with false papers, and has called for tighter security by authorities issuing certificates.
The alert follows the release of statistics showing that of 54 maritime administrations surveyed, more than 12,000 cases of forged certificates of competency were reported.[39] These figures highlight the gravity of the situation. Ships are sailed by crewmen with false passports and competency certificates. The IMB also believes that at times the issuing authorities themselves are to blame. For instance, the Coast Guard office in Puerto Rico was reported to have issued nearly 500 suspicious certificates of competency.[40] Such cases usually escape detection by the port authorities.
The ships’ crews themselves can act as a potential threat. Both the Philippines and Indonesia are the largest suppliers of merchant ships’ crews. These states are home to radical groups like the Abu Sayyaf and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).[41]
Under the circumstances it is virtually impossible to detect potentially undesirable crew members. The situation gets more complicated in case of vessels that fly ‘flags of convenience’ and employ multinational crews. It is difficult to verify the authenticity of the identity of the crew.
Interestingly, the ship itself is a safe den for undesirable elements. There are several hidden spaces, holds and compartments in the ship that are difficult to inspect. Some spaces are so unfamiliar that it may be difficult to locate them without the help of the ship’s compartment drawings. Modern day tankers, bulk carriers and cargo vessels are very large and can easily carry dangerous devices, substances and stowaways within spaces internal to the ship.
Shipping companies often purchase old ships, hire crew for low wages and of low competence. Besides, shipping companies do not meet international ship safety standards. Adding to this woe is the desire on the part of shipping agents to transport cargo by the cheapest means, which ultimately encourages poor standards of maritime transportation. The maritime transport committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) whose members include 30 of the world’s leading nations, has warned that substandard ships present risks of losses of life and environmental damage and urged governments, ship-owners, shippers and the maritime industry to take immediate steps to stop unscrupulous operators from offering substandard ships for transporting cargo.[42]
It would be unfair to entirely blame only shipping companies in this regard. Ships’ crews have frequently engaged in activities such as drug smuggling, gun-running and transporting human cargo. They also transport cargo that is not part of the legitimate consignment. For instance, on 25 June 1999, a North Korean vessel MV Kuwolsan was impounded by Indian customs authorities at Kandla Port for carrying equipment for production of tactical surface to surface missiles. The cargo comprising of 148 boxes also included special materials and parts for guidance systems, blue prints, drawings and instruction manuals. Reportedly the owners of the vessel admitted that the consignment was to be offloaded at Karachi Port in Pakistan.[43]
Then there is the nexus between corrupt port/customs officials and the crew that further threatens safety of maritime transport. Shipping agents have been advised to beware of criminal ‘scams’ to move large numbers of illegal immigrants around the world under the guise of being seafarers. The International Transport Intermediaries Club (ITIC) says it has received information on more than 30 cases where migrant smugglers approached shipping agents seeking to involve them in such activities.[44]
In the recent past, piracy-related incidents, which were more common in the Malacca Strait and South China Sea, have tended to spill over into the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal and Horn of Africa. Similarly, the phenomenon of terrorism has been gathering momentum and among the two dozen-odd terrorist groups identified as having been engaged in maritime terrorism, at least nine are currently active and two of these operate in the Indian Ocean littoral.
According to military experts, future conflicts will take place in the littorals i.e. where sea meets the land.[45] A large proportion of the world’s population is located in the littoral. Besides, much of the industrial infrastructure and wealth are concentrated in these areas. Coastal regions serve as the nodes for transport of trade, culture, as also the hub of illegal activity, be it contraband trade, drug smuggling, gun-running or even human smuggling. The sea serves as an easy highway and acts as a catalyst for promoting such activities. A quick look at the geography of the Indian Ocean region indicates that terrorist hubs are located in the littoral: LTTE in Jaffna, Sri Lanka, Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia. These hubs are also home to pirates. It can be argued that the centre of gravity of piracy and terrorism at sea is currently located in the Indian Ocean region. This is further flavoured with the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle, hubs for drug smuggling and gun-running.
With the passage of time, pirates and terrorists have sharpened their skills and also their tactics. These involve attacking ships both in harbour and at sea. They are known to use a variety of weapons from knives to improvised explosive devices, submersibles, mini-submarines and high-speed boats. Dual-use technologies such as GPS, satellite communication systems, and water sports and scuba-diving equipment are part of their inventories. At sea, terrorist groups have used rocket-propelled grenades, explosive-laden speedboats and even armour-piercing weapons. Their networks have kept pace with changing technologies and have adapted themselves to counter the strategies of maritime forces.
As noted, maritime order in the Indian Ocean is being challenged from several directions. Piracy, terrorism and illegal activities at sea have the potential to disrupt sea-lanes. Efforts have been made by several countries to address the problem but only in terms of bilateral and at best trilateral arrangements. There is a near total absence of a multilateral approach to safeguard sea-lanes in the Indian Ocean. Although multilateral Track II arrangements like the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) have been actively engaged in hosting seminars and discussions, States are yet to incorporate the agenda in national policy-making. This calls for greater cooperation among States to build upon the recommendations of Track II arrangements.
[1] Commander Vijay Sakhuja IN is a maritime security analyst attached to the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi.
[2] See ‘Maritime Security Measures Take Shape at IMO’ <http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=583 & doc_id=2435> .
[3] See ‘Review of Maritime Transport 2001’ at <http://www.unctad.org/en/press/ms0105en.htm> .
[4] See ‘Worries Grow Over Tankers’ Vulnerability to Attack’ at <http://www.planetark.org>. According to Tatsuo Masuda, President of the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East and Strait of Malacca in South East Asia, are heavily used by tankers.
[5] ibid.
[6] ibid.
[7] For more details see <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ cabs/choke.html#SUEZ> .
[8] See ‘Organized Crime Takes to the High Seas, ICC Piracy Report’ at <http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_ archives/2002/piracy_report.asp> . Also see ‘Excerpt From ICC Piracy Report, 2001’ at <http://www. iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2002/excerpt_trends.asp> .
[9] ibid.
[10] Xinhua (Beijing), ‘Report on Ship attack in Sri Lanka’, FBIS, 11 September 1997.
[11] R Gunaratna, ‘Trends in Maritime Terrorism – The Sri Lanka Case’, Lanka Outlook, Autumn 1998, p. 13.
[12] See quarterly reports at <http://home.wanadoo.nl/ tortuga/archive/modern/modern.htm> .
[13] ibid.
[14] S P Menefee, ‘Piracy, Terrorism and Insurgent Passengers’ in N Ronzitte, Maritime Terrorism and International Law, London: Martinus Nijoff, 1991, pp. 43-55. Between 1957 and 1976, there were at least eight recorded cases of acts of terrorism committed on board ships.
[15] ibid., pp. 56-58. Santa Maria was taken over by 71 Portuguese political insurgents who embarked on the vessel as passengers. In the ensuing scuffle, one officer was killed and eight crewmembers were wounded. On a request by the Portuguese government, the vessel was intercepted, escorted to Brazil and the insurgents were granted asylum. The vessel was returned to the Portuguese authorities.
[16] ‘Danish Newspaper Explains City of Poros Slaughter’ at <http://google.yahoo.com/bin/query?p=city+of+ poros & w=dir & fr=op & o=a & h & g=0 & n=20 & hc=0 & hs=0> .
[17] S P Menefee, op. cit, p. vii. On 8 October 1988, a group of Palestinian Guerillas hijacked the Italian cruise vessel Achille Lauro. They threatened to kill American and British citizens and demanded release of a group of Palestinian prisoners detained in Israeli prisons. Meanwhile the ship sailed into international waters and anchored off Port Said. After two days of negotiations, the hijackers surrendered for a guarantee of safe passage out of Egypt. An Egyptian aircraft was chartered and the Palestinian guerrillas left Egypt. Meanwhile it was learnt that the guerrillas had killed an American citizen on board the cruise vessel. The aircraft was intercepted by American fighter aircraft when it was flying over the Mediterranean Sea and escorted to a US airbase in Sicily.
[18] ‘Operation Cactus’, at <http://www.bharat-rakshak. com/CONFLICTS/Operationcactus.html> . The mercenaries quickly overpowered the Maldivian Militia using rockets and machine guns and attacked the President’s residence. A ‘panicked’ Maldivian Government sent out calls asking for assistance and India responded. Operation Cactus was launched and a large contingent of paratroopers made an unopposed landing at Male. The island was secured within 30 minutes after the arrival of forces. Fighter aircraft of the Indian Airforce were also deployed to the island in a show of force and helicopters landed commandoes to the outlying islands to search for any mercenaries. Shortly afterwards, a vessel was seen fleeing Male with mercenaries and hostages including the Maldives Minister of Education.
[19] ibid.
[20] See ‘Those Responsible Caught’, at <http://www. cargolaw.com/2000nightmare_cole.html.>
[21] The tape, released by the Singapore government, features a man describing how explosives could be carried on a bicycle without arousing suspicion. One plot involved bombing US Navy vessels in a special ‘kill zone’ along the northeastern shores of Singapore and the bus that was targeted carries US military personnel between a naval base used by visiting warships and a train station. The US Navy has a logistics unit in Singapore and warships going to and from Afghanistan have docked for replenishment in the new naval facility specially designed to accommodate US aircraft carriers. See <http://www.pilotonline.com/ military/ml0112sing.html> for details.
[22] See ‘Terrorists wanted to hit US Frigate’ at <http://maritime.com/> . The Yemeni-based terrorists wanted to attack a US naval vessel but could not reach the ship. So they sailed a dinghy packed with explosives into the tanker. The tactic was the same as that used in the suicide attack on the USS Cole in Aden Harbour in October 2000.
[23] See ‘Containerisation’ at <http://www.choicegroup.co. in/html/cntrzation.htm> . From vessels that used to carry 226 TEUs in 1957 there are today vessels that can carry 6600 TEUs. Maersk Sealand alone has around 21 vessels that can carry over 6000 TEUs. Their ‘S’-Class Post Panamax vessels can carry 6600 TEUs. Other lines having over 6000 TEU vessels in their fleet are MSC, P&ONL Hanjin, Hyundai Merchant Marine, and CMA-CGM. The world fleet at present contains 32 vessels of 6000 TEUs and above, with another 40 in the order books and many more to follow.
[24] See ‘Stowaway Terrorists Steal into America by Sea Container’ at DEBKA-Net-Weekly Intelligence Report, 18 June 2002 at <http://www.debka.com/LADEN/ body_laden.html .>
[25] See ‘Terrorist In A Box : Business-class Suspect Caught In Container’ at <http://hypocrisytoday.com/ stowaway.html> .
[26] See ‘Port of Entry Now Means Point of Anxiety’ at <http://college4.nytimes.com/guests/articles/2001/12/23/892576.xml> .
[27] US Container Security Measures Take Shape, Internationally and Domestically <http://www.tdctrade. com/alert/us0213.htm> .
[28] See ‘Terrorism Probe Extends To Shipping’, American Maritime Officer’ at <http://www.amo-union.org/ Newspaper/Morgue/10-2001/Sections/News/foc.html> .
[29] See ‘Murky Flag-Of-Convenience Ship Registry System Could Hamper Effort To Uncover Terrorist Assets’ at <http://www.amo-union.org/Newspaper/ Morgue/11-2001/Sections/News/foc.html> .
[30] See K Rider, ‘Analyses Show US Ports Represent Weakness In Nation’s Defence’ at <http://www. military.com> .
[31] ibid.
[32] See ‘What are FOCs’, at <http://www.itf.org.uk/ seafarer/foc/Body_foc..html.> . A FOC ship is a vessel that flies the flag of a country other than the country of ownership. It enables owners to avoid high registration fees and taxes, and employ cheap labour under sub-standard conditions. In some cases, private companies rather than the administration may run the national ship registry. For instance, a US private company runs Liberia’s registry. In some cases the registration of vessels can even be done on-line clearly indicating absence of any regulations. Among the 30 FOC registries, Bahamas, Liberia and Panama are known to possess large merchant fleets accounting for about half the total percentage of global merchant shipping tonnage. There are several benefits for terrorists in owning ships with FOC registry. It is the safest way to smuggle personnel and equipment and perhaps even biological or nuclear weapons into any port.
[33] ‘Killing Of Sea Bird Not A Big Blow to LTTE Shipping Operations, The Sunday Times, February 1996. The LTTE ships are difficult to keep track of as they keep changing names and registry. Lloyds lists 11 merchant ships belonging to some Asian front companies but in fact managed by the elusive Kumaran Pathmanathan (a businessman who is wanted in Colombo for half a million dollars).
[34] R Gunaratna, ‘Illicit transfer of Conventional Weapons: The Role of State and Non-state Actors in South Asia’, in Jayantha Dhanapala, Ambasssador Mitsuro Donowaki, Swadesh Rana, Lora Lumpe, eds, Small Arms Control, Old Weapons, New Issues, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999, p. 266.
[35] See Arms seizures Backfires at 2120GMT,020108 <http://www.stratfor.com> .
[36] See What are FOCs, at <http://www.itf.org.uk/ seafarer/foc/Body_foc..html.> .
[37] ibid.
[38] See IMB Calls For Clamp-Down on Fake Maritime Documents at <http://www.iccwbo.org/index_ccs. asp> .
[39] ibid.
[40] ibid.
[41] See ‘The World’s Oceans Could Be The Next Target In The War On Terrorism’ at <http://www.emergency. com/cntrterr.htm> . The Philippines, which is home of the Abu Sayyaf militant group, is the world’s biggest crew supplier, while Indonesia is home to numerous radical Muslim groups and is the world’s second biggest crew supplier.
[42] See ‘Substandard Ships on Way Out’ at <http:// www.planetark.org>.[43] See ‘Pallone raises issue of North Korean missile help to Pakistan’ at <http://www.indiainnewyork.com/iny 0733099/chronicle/Pallone/html> .
[44] See ‘Crew Scam Alert’ at <http:// www.planetark.org> . According to ITIC, there are two main companies behind these scams. One is based in Piraeus, using a false name for both the company and the ship. The other company, which describes itself as a shipowner/ ship manager/crew manager, is based in Chittagong and often uses the name of a ship that has recently been sold or scrapped.
[45] E Hanlon Jr, ‘Taking the Long View: Littoral Warfare Challenges’ in R H Shultz Jr. & R L Pfaltzgraff Jr., eds, The Role of Naval Forces in 21st Century Operations, p. 156.
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