Forbes, Andrew --- "RAN Constabulary Operations" [2002] MarStudies 8; (2002) 123 Maritime Studies 17

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In an earlier edition of Maritime Studies,^[3] Derek Woolner examined the policy issues surrounding Australia’s coastal surveillance program and briefly considered the RAN contribution to that activity. This article provides the context for the Navy’s involvement in the coastal surveillance program. It outlines the relevant Government policies on protecting the national interest; naval strategy and Navy’s force element groups, RAN involvement in constabulary operations and an assessment of the Patrol Boat Force’s capacity to continue its contribution to these activities.

Government Policy

In 1997 Australia’s Strategic Policy was released outlining four scenarios for defence planning. The priority for defence planning was for defeating attacks on Australia, where Australia must have the military capability to prevent an enemy attack in the maritime approaches, gaining a foothold on Australian territory (including the offshore territories) or extracting concessions through the use of military force. While the likelihood of an attack on Australia was considered very low, it forms the basis for defence planning and development of the ADF force structure.

Australia’s security from attack depends on the regional strategic situation, so under defending Australia’s regional interests, the defence posture must also include the means to influence strategic affairs in the region. This includes extensive dialogue, military-to-military talks, visits, exchanges and ship visits. Australia also has global interests under its foreign policy objective of being a good international citizen. The major defence contribution to supporting global interests is a contribution to humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

The final planning scenario was activities that assisted the Australian community. It was noted that it was rare for defence capabilities to be more effective than civilian alternatives, and that such support diverted Defence from its core business with two exceptions: counter-terrorist operations and civil surveillance and response. Civil surveillance also had a strategic defence purpose in that it provided a continuous defence presence in the Australian northern maritime approaches.^[4]

These planning scenarios were brought together under the classified Australian Military Strategy (AMS), which is an over-arching plan with five subsidiary plans: defeating attacks on Australia, defending regional interests, defence of global interests, protection of national interests and shaping the strategic environment.^[5] The aim of the AMS is to shape the strategic environment, conduct military support operations and provide combat ready forces to meet the range of contingencies that might threaten Australia or its national interests.^[6]

Australia’s Oceans Policy, released in December 1998 by Environment Australia, is a multi-Government, multi-agency policy for the management and conservation of Australia’s oceans and marine life, based on ecologically sustainable development of the oceans. The broad goals of Australia’s Oceans Policy are:

• To exercise and protect Australia’s rights and jurisdiction over offshore areas, including offshore resources.

• To meet Australia’s international obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other international treaties.

• To understand and protect Australia’s marine biological diversity, the ocean environment and its resources, and ensure ocean uses are ecologically sustainable.

• To improve our expertise and capabilities in ocean-related management, science, tech-nology and engineering.

It is the first goal of Australia’s Oceans Policy that has the major impact on Navy, as there are a range of measures relating to surveillance and enforcement:

Two challenges in surveillance and enforcement are noted: ensuring there is an effective and efficient surveillance capacity and effective enforcement of national legislation throughout Australia’s marine jurisdictions. With respect to the Navy, it is to contribute fully to the National Surveillance Program managed within the Australian Customs Service by Coastwatch. Furthermore, the Navy is also to contribute fully to fisheries law enforcement activities, particularly in Australia’s north and northwest but also within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Australia’s offshore territories.^[9]

The latest Defence White Paper, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force was released in December 2000. It noted that armed force is still a part of international affairs but recognised that there is an increase in operations other than war that will impact on the structure and operations of the ADF (particularly those tasks that fit under protecting national interests in the AMS).^[10]

Defence 2000 appears to have contracted the AMS to four major tasks: defending Australia, contributing to the security of the immediate neighbourhood, supporting wider interests, and peacetime national tasks. The principles relevant to defending Australia include the notion of self-reliance, the control of the air and sea approaches to Australia through a maritime strategy, and the use of pro-active operations against a hostile force as far from Australian shores as possible. Contributing to the security of the immediate neighbourhood involves the ability to work with regional neighbours in the unlikely event they are attacked, and also to participate in UN-sanctioned operations. Supporting wider interests involves the ability to contribute to international coalitions that might operate across the conflict spectrum (high intensity conflict to disaster relief). Peacetime national tasks are those regular or occasional tasks in support of wider national interests. They include counter-terrorism response; training, coordination and assistance for civil emergencies; search and rescue, navigational and hydrographic work, fisheries management and border protection.^[11]

Maritime forces are amongst the most active and effective capabilities available to protect national interests. The Fleet provides patrol, surveillance and response forces to ensure that Australian sovereignty, resource zones and other environmental and economic interests are protected, while the RAN Hydrographer ensures safe navigation through hydrographic surveys and the production of charts.^[12]

Naval Strategy

Peter Haydon has explained that sea power has two dimensions: the first is largely a function of trade and its protection, while the second concerns the use of naval force to acquire and defend territory, and as a means of increasing a state’s influence. He goes on to note that

In the context of naval strategy, there has been a move away from the concept of command of the sea (where the predominant naval power could conduct any operations it wished while at the same time denying that ability to an adversary), as such command could not be absolute. The concepts of naval strategy were further defined to consider sea control and sea denial (localised or temporary command of the sea), which would allow a state to control the sea at the time and location most important to meet its strategic needs and deny its use to an adversary. Sea control has been the traditional mission of navies and can be considered as actions to ensure that a specific ocean area can be used freely for whatever purpose the State desires. The importance of the concept of sea control is that it applies to sovereignty enforcement and many constabulary tasks. As Peter Haydon emphasises, to be sovereign at sea, a State must be able to control what happens in its seas, whether alone or in conjunction with allies (as part of a coalition).^[14]

Trinity of Naval Roles

In the 1970s Ken Booth developed the concept of the trinity of naval functions, which outlined the inter-relationship between navies and foreign policy through the use of the sea. The three elements of the trinity are the Military, Diplomatic and Policing roles. Booth noted that States use the sea for three purposes – passage of people and goods, passage of military force for diplomatic purposes or for targets on land or sea, and the exploitation of resources in or under the sea – navies exist as a means to further these ends. The Military Role is the base of the triangle as the essence of all navies is their military character; moreover, it is the ability to threaten or use force that enables the other two roles to occur. The Diplomatic Role is the management of foreign policy short of employing force, while the Policing Role is mainly concerned with extending sovereignty over the state’s own maritime frontiers.^[15] The important issue is that it is the Military Role that is paramount in enabling the other two roles to occur.

It goes on to outline the possible constabulary roles that might face the Navy in the course of its activities:

• prevention of illegal immigration, drug interdiction and quarantine operations;

Navy Force Element Groups

The concept of a balanced fleet is important when considering the structure, equipment and roles that can be undertaken by the Navy. A balanced fleet is a naval force that can be generated and sustained with a wide range of capabilities, which provide the Government a number of possible options to meet the strategic goals required to meet national security interests. By adopting a balanced fleet approach, the Navy is able to deliver options for the Government in all three roles outlined by Booth and to operate over much of the conflict spectrum. In March 2000, the Navy was reorganised into a Force Element Group structure to ensure that its combat capability is delivered in the most efficient and effective manner possible. What, then, is the background to Navy involvement in constabulary operations?

The Surface Combatant Force comprises the six Adelaide class guided missile frigates (FFG), and three Anzac class frigates (FFH) with another five to be delivered by 2005. Three FFGs and four FFHs will be based on each coast, at Fleet Base East (FBE) in Sydney and Fleet Base West (FBW) in Rockingham south of Perth. The Surface Combatant Force provides the capability to assert sea control, conduct surveillance, maritime patrol and response operations, intelligence collection, counter-insurgency operations, the protection of shipping, offshore territories and assets and operations other than war in support of the Government.^[18] The frigates provide the capability for undersea, surface warfare and naval gunfire support; provide a visible and effective patrol and response capability as well as a good long range surveillance capability through embarked helicopters. Both the FFG and FFH are undergoing capability upgrades to improve their warfighting abilities. The FFGs have a range of 4500nm at 20 knots, and the FFHs have range of 6000nm at 18 knots.

The Naval Aviation Force comprises three types of helicopter to support fleet operations and is based at NAS Nowra near Sydney. There are 12 Seahawk helicopters (with another four being brought out of reserve) that are embarked on the FFGs (and will be embarked on two of the FFHs). They are an integral component of the ship’s weapons systems and provide a surface surveillance and undersea warfare capability (through the use of sonabouys and can carry two torpedoes) and have an operational speed of 250kph and a range of 690nm. Eleven Super SeaSprite helicopters are being purchased for the FFH, where they will provide a longer range undersea warfare and surface warfare capability; they can carry two torpedoes and Penguin anti-ship missiles, and will have an expected operational speed of 240kph and a range of 625nm. There are seven Sea King helicopters that operate with the amphibious lift and afloat support forces in a utility transport role (they are not armed); they have an operational speed of 230kph and a range of 730nm. The Naval Aviation Force is also used extensively for search and rescue both at sea and ashore, and for assistance with natural disasters.

The Patrol Boat Force comprises the 15 Fremantle class patrol boats and provides the capability to conduct peacetime surveillance, and maritime patrol and response operations within coastal waters and operations other than war in support of the Government. The patrol boats are Navy’s principle contribution to the national task of fisheries protection and immigration, customs and drug law enforcement operations, but they also meet maritime roles in hostile operations. The patrol boats have a range of 1450nm at 30 knots. The Fremantle class patrol boats are at the end of their operational lives and are in the process of being replaced with a larger and more capable ship, built to a civilian specification and due to come into service from 2004.^[19]

The Submarine Force comprises three Collins class submarines with three more Collins class submarines being progressively delivered. The submarines are based at FBW but there is the capacity to have two operate from FBE when required. The Submarine Force provides the capability to conduct covert surveillance and reconnaissance, offensive operations against warships, submarines and merchant shipping, and mining and support to special operations.^[20] Surfaced the submarines have a range of 11,500nm at 10 knots, and submerged their range is 400nm at 4 knots.

The Afloat Support Force comprises the auxiliary oiler replenishment (AOR, based at FBE) and the auxiliary oiler (AO, based at FBW) and provides the capability for underway replenishment of fuel, water, stores and ammunition, and strategic bulk fuel transport.^[21] The Afloat Support Force is an enabler for the rest of the fleet (except for the submarines) because it increases the reach and endurance of the fleet. The AOR has a range of 8,600nm at 15 knots and the AO has a range of 7,260nm at 15 knots.

The Mine Warfare Force comprises four Huon class coastal minehunters (MHC) with the remaining two to be delivered in 2002, three auxiliary minesweepers (MSA) and two clearance diving teams; all based at HMAS Waterhen in Sydney. The Mine Warfare Force provides a capability to conduct mine clearance from beaches, shallow and deep water, route survey and lead-through operations, and pro-vision of the ADF capability for mining.^[22] The MHCs have a range 1600nm at 12 knots, while the MSAs have a range of 3000nm at 10 knots.

The Amphibious Lift Force comprises two amphibious transports (LPA), a landing ship heavy (LSH) and six landing craft heavy (LCH). The LPAs and LSH are based at FBE, while the LCHs operate from HMAS Cairns in Queensland. The Amphibious Lift Force provides a capability to conduct amphibious operations, and to support land operations from the sea, provide strategic, operation, tactical and administrative sea transport, and provide support to beach intelligence gathering.^[23]

The RAN Hydrographic Service comprises two Hydrographic Ships (which each carry three survey motor boats), four survey motor launches (SMLs) and the Laser Airborne Depth Sounder carried in a Fokker F27-500 aircraft, all operating out of HMAS Cairns. The Hydrographic Service not only provides essential military hydrographic information to the fleet but also meets Australia’s international obligations to provide safe navigation within Australian marine jurisdictional areas. The SMLs operate in pairs in shallow waters and have a range of 3500nm, while the Hydrographic Ships operate independently and have a range of about 8000nm.

Constabulary Operations

This section considers Navy’s current and historical involvement in what are now defined as constabulary operations. Importantly however, constabulary operations should not be thought of as strictly peacetime activities, as they can range across a considerable portion of the conflict spectrum.

Environmental and Resource Management and Protection

The major contribution of the Patrol Boat Force to the peacetime national tasks is assisting the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) with the fisheries compliance program. Under the program there are three considerations: domestic licensed vessels, foreign licensed vessels, and unlicensed vessels. Surveillance in the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ)^[24] is to monitor both licensed and unlicensed (illegal) fishing activity. Surveillance of licensed foreign vessels is relatively simple as they are known, are required to report their positions regularly and are subject to pre- and post-fishing inspections in port. However, what is also required is the ability to respond at sea to issues arising from the surveillance. Licensed foreign fishing vessels can be inspected at sea but the major concern is an adequate at-sea response for the problem of illegal fishing.^[25]

The current coastal surveillance program has its antecedents in the late 1960s, when under the Fisheries Act 1968, Australia declared a 12nm fishing zone (DFZ). However the Department of Primary Industry, which had responsibility for enforcing the DFZ, did not have the capacity to do so. On 29 May 1968 the Minister for Defence announced in Parliament that the RAN would assume the task of civil surveillance of the DFZ, with assistance from the RAAF. It was envisaged that both the Navy and Air Force would patrol the DFZ with the Navy’s patrol boats assisting with the surveillance and acting as the response force.^[26] During the early 1970s the Navy began relocating its patrol boats north, with three boats transferred from Sydney to Cairns in 1971 and a fourth boat moved to Darwin in 1974. The seven patrol boats based in the north were heavily committed to the protection of Australian territorial waters and the contiguous fishing and resource zones. In 1973 the Minister for Defence emphasised the importance of maritime surveillance and the role of the Navy in coping with intrusions into territorial waters and fishing and resource zones.^[27] Aspects of the 1976 Defence White Paper Australian Defence were influenced by the implications of the Law of the Sea negotiations and there was recognition of an increased requirement for surveillance, patrol and policing of national waters and the maritime resources zone, and to demonstrate sovereignty. Seven of the 12 patrol boats were based in Darwin and Cairns for defence and civil surveillance and patrol and the decision was taken that the Government would acquire 15 new patrol boats to enter service between 1979-84.^[28] To better meet the surveillance and apprehension commitments in northern areas of Australia, in late 2001 the patrol boats based in Sydney and Perth were relocated to Darwin. This removes the long transit times to their patrol areas, meaning more time is available on task. Ten patrol boats are now based in Darwin and five in Cairns.

In 1974 a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between Australia and Indonesia allowing artisanal Indonesian fishing in designated areas of Australia’s northern AFZ. Notwithstanding the MOU, the majority of incursions into the AFZ continue to be fishers from Indonesia, as an example 50 illegal Indonesian fishing vessels were apprehended in the northern AFZ in 1998-99.^[29] The Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) believes that entrepreneurs are behind the activities of many of the Indonesian artisanal fishing boats, and that the Indonesian fishing boats are moving from artisanal to commercial activities. Several hundred Japanese fishing vessels are permitted to fish in areas of the AFZ or use Australian ports. The size of the Japanese fishing fleet impacts on the fishing compliance program as they need to be tracked and inspected. AFMA has stated that they believe a high rate of interception and apprehension of illegal fishing vessels in the AFZ is required as a deterrent to illegal fishing. When being debriefed crews from illegal fishing vessels have told AFMA that they plan on an apprehension rate of about 10 per cent; so they are generally safe.^[30] This would imply that illegal fishing in the AFZ is larger than thought.

Australia is also experiencing increased impacts of high seas fishing adjacent to the AFZ, and often the surface combatants are detailed to investigate and intercept. The South Tasman Rise Fishery lies south of Tasmania between longitudes 46^o30’ south and 48^o30’ south which straddles the AFZ. Australia claims the right to manage the orange roughy fishery as a straddling stock, as all available scientific evidence is that the fishery straddles the Australian AFZ boundary. In 1999, three South African and one Belize-flagged freezer trawlers appeared in the Fishery and after representa-tions to those countries, the ships withdrew. At the time there was no legal basis to force vessels to cease fishing in the area as it was on the high seas and the United Nations Fisheries Straddling Agreement (UNFSA) had not come into effect. The only approach Australia could take was to approach the flag states to request cooperation in managing the straddling stock. After legal action the three South African ships lost their high seas fishing licenses and the Belizean flagged ship was deregistered.^[31]

Each of Australia’s offshore territories also has an EEZ that must be monitored and enforced. However, little is known about the status of some of the fish stocks in those zones, which are subject to foreign fishing in their vicinity.

The Norfolk Island Fishery is about 1500km east of Brisbane, and Australia exercises control over the 200nm EEZ. There is no current fish stock assessment and while Japanese vessels have fished in the area since the 1950s they have been excluded from the fishery since 1997. A 30-54nm area around Norfolk Island is reserved solely for use of Islanders and exploratory fishing in the outer area of the AFZ is subject to strict catch and operational limits. Importantly, the remoteness of the waters makes surveillance and enforcement of the EEZ difficult.^[32]

The Christmas Island Fishery is about 2800km west of Darwin. The EEZ has been modified as Java (Indonesia) is less than 200nm to the north, the northern area of the zone has been narrowed where it abuts the Indonesian zone. Reef fish are regarded as being fully fished, while pelagic stocks have not been assessed but are regarded as being lightly fished; however there is evidence of increased fishing activities in the wider Indian Ocean that could impact on the fishery. The Cocos (Keeling) Islands Fishery is about 3700km west of Darwin. Fishing is artisanal or recreational and it is thought that some species are heavily fished. There appear to be limited opportunities for commercial fishing, although deep water trawling for tuna may affect the fishery.^[33] Australia has intercepted both Indonesian and Taiwanese fishing vessels in the AFZ adjacent to these two islands.^[34]

The distance of these fisheries from mainland Australia makes the surveillance, but more importantly, the interception of any intruder problematic. The Southern Ocean fisheries are a unique problem given their distance from Australia and the environmental conditions in those areas. The range of the patrol boats is insufficient to patrol the offshore fishing zones deep in the Southern Ocean, so this task is either allocated to the surface combatants (with tanker support) or contracted to civilian ships. While a civilian charter would seem preferable to using an expensive to operate and maintain warship, only a warship has the legal authority to provide armed force to deter or stop illegal activity.

The area of the Antarctic continent is about 24 million km² and the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT) comprises about 42 per cent of the landmass. The 200nm EEZ extending from the AAT is not included as part of the AFZ, although the regulations flowing from the Fisheries Management Act 1991 apply to Australian citizens and companies. Foreign vessels in the AAT exclusive economic zone are exempt from Australian fisheries regu-lations, but come under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). There has been little commercial fishing in this area as it is a difficult fishing environment.^[35]

The Macquarie Island Fishery is about 1500km south of Hobart. Waters within 3nm are under the jurisdiction of Tasmania, with the AFZ of 3-200nm under the jurisdiction of AFMA. The fishery was established as a developmental fishery in 1996 with a precautionary catch limit applied to the Patagonian toothfish with access restricted to one boat. There has been no direct evidence of illegal fishing in this area. While this fishery is outside the jurisdiction of CCAMLR, AFMA plans to manage it in accord with CCALMR arrangements.^[36]

The Heard Island and McDonald Island Fishery is located in the southern Indian Ocean about 4000km southwest of Perth. Commercial fishing is prohibited within the 12nm territorial waters, while delineated areas of the AFZ (12nm and 200nm) are managed separately by AFMA and CCAMLR. The fishery was surveyed in 1987, and between 1990-93 to determine appropriate fishing catches, and only two Australian fishing operators are allowed to fish in this area. The area is regarded as fully fished with an allowable catch in 1999 of 3690t of Patagonian toothfish and 1160t of mackeral icefish. The fishery suffers from illegal fishing, and it has been estimated that between 10,000-18,000t of Patagonian toothfish were taken in 1997 and up to 3500t was taken in 1998.^[37]

In October 1997 and February 1998, surface combatants with afloat support were sent 2200nm from FBW into the Heard Island and McDonald Island Fishery to monitor illegal fishing in the AFZ and apprehended vessels illegally fishing for the Patagonian toothfish (at an estimated cost of $13-15 million).^[38] During 1998-99, AFMA used the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) vessel Cape Grafton for civil surveillance in these waters, conducting a number of trips (at an estimated cost of $4.2 million p.a.).^[39] In April 2001, a Togo-registered (but Spanish-owned) fishing vessel was caught illegally fishing in the Heard Island and MacDonald Islands Fishery. When challenged by an AMSA chartered ship patrolling the area, the ship initially headed towards the port of Fremantle, but once on the high seas it turned towards Africa. The AMSA vessel chased the ship across the Indian Ocean for 14 days, while ADF personnel flew to South Africa and with the assistance of the South African Defence Force, boarded the ship, which was returned to Australia to face charges.^[40] The skipper of the South Tomi was fined $136,000, the illegal catch of 116t of toothfish was sold for $1.4m and the boat may be forfeited.^[41] In February 2002 a surface combatant and tanker apprehended two suspected illegal fishing vessels with about 200t of alleged illegal catch valued at $2.5m.^[42]

Peace Building, Peace Keeping and Peace Enforcement

The majority of Navy’s force element groups can contribute to peace building, peace keeping and peace enforcement. The Navy contribution to the UN sanctioned operation in East Timor should be well known, with the surface combatants undertaking ship escort duties, use of their sensors to provide battlespace awareness for the Commander on the ground, and helicopter or naval gunfire support to the troops on the ground. The Afloat Support and Amphibious Lift Groups, as well as other navies, transported and supported the troops on the ground. The Hydrographic Service under-took surveys while the Mine Warfare Force were involved in mine clearance.

The surface combatants have been regularly deployed to the Persian Gulf to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq since 1990, and are currently deployed there with an LPA commanding the operation as part of the Australian commitment to the War on Terrorism.

Amphibious Lift ships provided major support to the evacuation of Australian nationals from the Solomon Islands in 2000, as well as being used as the venue for truce negotiations. They have also been used as part of the Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville.^[43]

Prevention of Illegal Immigration, Drug Interdiction and Quarantine Operations

The legislation governing migration to Australia is the Migration Act 1958 and associated Regulations.^[44] There are two types of illegal immigration by sea. The first type is overt, where boats land at Christmas Island or Ashmore Reef (320km north of Western Australia and 160km from Indonesia). Interception off Ashmore Reef often means that the patrol boats have to ‘rescue’ the illegal immigrants, as there are no facilities on the reef. The illegal immigrants are usually from the Middle East and are intent on claiming refugee status. The second type is covert where boats try to land undetected on the Australian mainland, and are predominantly Chinese.^[45] In recent times illegal immigration has been a visible political issue, with the Norwegian registered tanker Tampa rescuing a sinking boat of asylum seekers in Indonesian waters, and instead of returning them to Indonesia, sought to land them on Australian territory. The later part of 2001 saw a concerted effort by people smugglers to transport illegal immigrants onto Australian territory. As a response, the Australian Government committed surface combatants, patrol boats, naval helicopters, a tanker and a hydrographic ship to patrol northern Australian waters to deter these incursions.

A subsidiary but major concern with illegal immigration is the possible introduction of serious exotic diseases that could affect the Australian agricultural industry and exports. The generally stated estimated cost of a single such outbreak is $30 million.

Most of the illegal drugs in Australia are illegally imported, with the big and more significant importations coming in by sea; the cost of this trade has been estimated at between $1.2-$2 billion p.a. As an example, Australia and New Zealand are concerned with sailing vessels bringing in cocaine. John McFarlane notes that weapon smuggling operates in reverse, with the weapons leaving Australia. Smuggling flora and fauna is not as profitable as drugs, but can return a tidy profit, and involves the illegal export of seeds and plants; and birds and reptiles.^[46]

Search and Rescue

Australia is signatory to the International Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974 (SOLAS) and the International Search and Rescue Convention 1979 and is responsible for search and rescue over a vast area of the Indian, Pacific and Southern Oceans. AMSA coordinates air and sea rescue over a 47 million km² area, through AusSAR. In each state and territory, the police are the local SAR authority and most of the SAR is undertaken by volunteer organisa-tions, with some commercial organisations involved. Where SAR incidents are at a distance from the Australian coast, ADF assets are normally requested to assist. The Navy has been heavily involved in search and rescue operations. The naval aviation force has been used both ashore and at sea, while the major surface combatants and the patrol boats provide extensive support. In January 1997, a major surface combatant rescued two yachtsmen 1400nm into the Southern Ocean, while in late 1997 the Navy was extensively involved in the Sydney to Hobart Race rescue.

Safe Navigation

Under the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS), Chapter V includes details on the safety of navigation. The current version of SOLAS does not specify government responsibility for producing hydrographic charts, but a 1983 resolution referred to the importance of charts and invited governments to conduct surveys and distribute charts, while a 1985 resolution urged governments to establish hydrographic or charting groups.^[47]

A revised Chapter V was adopted at the end of 2000 and comes into effect on 1 July 2002, which places the responsibility for safe navigation within their maritime zones on the coastal State. The International Hydrographic Organisation has set the following priorities for surveys:

make data available in GIS format for fishing, coastal zone management and scientific studies.^[48]

In the case of Australia, the RAN Hydrographer assumed responsibility from the British Admiralty for hydrographic surveys in 1920 and the publication of charts in 1942. In 1946 the Commonwealth Cabinet made the RAN Hydrographer responsible for the surveying and charting of Australian waters; the Hydrographer is also the ADF agency responsible for provision of operational surveying support and maritime military geospatial information for ADF operations and exercises.^[49]

The RAN Hydrographer publishes and maintains the Australian chart series, which covers about 12 per cent of the earth’s surface.

The Defence Geo-spatial Requirements and Policy Committee determines the mix of defence and civil surveying to be conducted on an annual basis and this is published in the national hydrographic surveying plan HYDRO-SCHEME.^[50] However it is important to note that due to resource constraints, ADF priorities for surveying would come before civil require-ments, notwithstanding SOLAS obligations.

Defence Aid to the Civil Power

This role can include a number of tasks, of which the protection of oil/gas platforms and assistance with natural disasters are the most recognisable.

Australia has a significant dependence on offshore oil and gas supplies, but did not discover commercial fields until 1962:

in 1963 the oil and gas fields in the offshore Gippsland basin were discovered and entered production in 1969;

the Barrow Island oil field in the Carnarvon Basin was discovered in 1964 and entered production in 1967;

major gas fields were discovered in 1971 off northwest Australia, first entering production in 1984; and

oil and then gas were discovered in the Timor Gap, between East Timor and Australia.^[51]

The Gippsland Basin in Bass Strait is between 20-80km offshore of Victoria and there are a total of 20 oil and gas producing fields.

From 1975 a detachment of Grumman Tracker aircraft from the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne were based in Broome to assist aerial surveillance in the north, ceasing in December 1980 when contractor aircraft took over the role. Tracker aircraft had also been involved in surveillance of the Bass Strait oil rigs from the late 1970s but this ceased on 31 December 1983 with the demise of the Navy fixed-wing aircraft and the assumption that civilian radar coverage would assist in managing the oil rig safety zone. In 1976, the Navy was given responsibility for the protection of the offshore oil platforms in the Bass Strait, which is a part of Australia’s territorial sea. While the offshore oil installations are vulnerable to sabotage, extortion or terrorism, the most relevant issue is actually a safety at sea issue, to ensure that ships do not collide with the rigs. In the late 1970s three of the 12 patrol boats were devoted to continuous surveillance of the Bass Strait oil rigs. In the early 1980s, patrolling in Bass Strait had been reduced to one patrol boat on continuous operations in the area. By the mid 1980s the commitment was reduced from a continuous presence to a program of not less than 33 ship visits annually, with the purpose of warning off shipping that might encroach the oil platform safety area.^[52]

The ADF also provides support to State Governments (upon request) in the event of natural disasters. Examples range from the extensive naval support provided in 1974-75 when Darwin was destroyed by Cyclone Tracy, to naval helicopters during the recent NSW bushfires over Christmas 2001.

Anti-Piracy Patrols

The Navy is not currently involved in anti-piracy patrols. While piracy is becoming a concern in Southeast Asia, regional navies have agreements for the hot pursuit of suspects.

Naval Capacity

While the increasing tempo of constabulary operations is placing pressure on the Navy, and this pressure is forecast to grow over time, there is now a concern with concurrency; as the commitment of ADF elements to the War on Terrorism has put enormous additional pressures on the Navy. While all of the Navy’s force element groups are fully utilised on a variety of operations, this section outlines the pressures facing the Patrol Boat Force.

Year	Illegal Fishing		Illegal Immigration
	Boardings	Apprehensions	Boats	People
1988-89	232	41	2
1989-90	334	46	3	243
1990-91	378	59	5	172
1991-92	247	15	3	81
1992-93	289	31	4	198
1993-94	231	31	6	200
1994-95	378	129	21	1089
1995-96	202	68	14	591
1996-97	289	117	12	365
1997-98	not reported	not reported	17	190
1998-99	366	55	42	923
1999-00	not reported	65	76	4189
2000-01	243	76	53	4118
TOTAL	3189	733	258	12359

Sources: Australian Customs Service, Submission to JCPAA Inquiry into Coastwatch, p. 19. Defence Annual Reports, AGPS, Canberra, various. Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Report of the Prime Minister’s Coastal Surveillance Task Force, Canberra, 1999, Appendix B-1. Australian Customs Service Annual Reports, AusInfo, Canberra, various.

The Patrol Boat Force devotes 1800 patrol days per year to maritime surveillance to monitor and enforce Australia’s sovereignty and sovereign rights, although during 1999-2000 there was a reorientation of patrol boat tasking from fisheries management to immigration res-ponse.^[53] As an example of the workload facing the patrol boat crews, if the 1800 days is spread across the 15 patrol boats, that equates to about 120 days at sea on maritime surveillance tasks per boat. However, boat maintenance require-ments add an extra 130 days a year, while Navy exercise and training commitments and regional engagement requirements can add up to another 100 days per year.^[54] When considered against the Navy’s personnel policy Op Tempo, which tries to limit the time at sea to 150 days a year, it is apparent that there are problems with the demands placed on the crews of the Patrol Boat Force. At an operational level, the 1800 days equates to about 4-5 vessels deployed at any one time, with the 1800 days spread between actual patrol time and as an operational response vessel in port on 4-8 hours notice to sail. Another important factor is that it might take up to 4-5 days to escort an illegal fishing vessel back to an Australian port, which means that the patrol boat cannot be assigned to another interception.

Table 1 draws on a variety of sources to show the workload of (predominantly) the patrol boats in intercepting illegal fisheries vessels and illegal immigrants. Looking first at illegal immigration, the number of illegal immigrants arriving by boat is increasing, as are the number of boats used, which makes the detection and interception task more difficult. The routes taken are also changing. While Coastwatch provides systematic coverage of northern approaches (Mackay to Port Hedland) with less intensive coverage of other areas, illegal immigrants are now using an East Coast route rather than landing in North.^[55]

Turning to illegal fishing, there are a high number of boardings and apprehensions in northern waters, which when combined with concurrent interception of illegal immigration by boat is placing pressure on Navy patrol boat numbers. With the numbers of intrusions increasing, the improved surveill-ance enabling better interception, and the workload of the patrol boats, it is not clear that there are enough patrol boats to meet the task. Interestingly, when Australia declared its 200nm Economic Resource Zone in 1977, the then Minister for Defence questioned whether the current 15 patrol boats would be enough to manage the increased surveillance and interception task.^[56]

An important issue therefore is the number of patrol boats available. When the structure of the Navy’s surface fleet was being examined in the early 1990s, the proposed reduction from 15 Fremantle class patrol boats numbers to 12 offshore patrol vessels created concern within those agencies involved in fisheries protection and barrier management. The current plans to replace the patrol boats with a larger boat built to civilian specifications raises some concerns over the commitment of the Government, and areas of Defence to the Navy’s interception role. The planned capital equipment program is a one-for-one replacement program, that does not appear to have been based on an assessment of the numbers of patrol boats actually required to meet the surveillance and interception task. It has been reported that the Navy prefers a one-for-one approach, while other elements within Defence prefer companies bidding for the project meet the number of sea days required with a variety of possible boat numbers.^[57]

The most recent advice is that a privately financed (private ownership) arrangement is preferred by Government, with no set criteria for the number of hulls to be provided. Rather the successful contractor would be required to provide the Navy with patrol boats that have the capacity to deliver 3000 patrol boat days per year (including meeting the requirements for

the coastal surveillance program)[58] Industry responses to the replacement patrol boat tender indicate that only 12 boats would actually be provided, rather than the current 15[59] But as has been shown, this fundamentally misunderstands the role of the patrol boats, where it is the ability to conduct interceptions that is critical, not general surveillance tasks.

Conclusion

There is some disparity between the policy documents that relate to protecting the national interest, as the surveillance and enforcement roles outlined in Australia’s Oceans Policy are not reflected in Defence 2000.

It was only in 2000 that the Navy was confident enough to develop its own maritime doctrine. While maritime doctrine can be universal in its application, it is not clear that it is well understood outside the Navy, or whether it has been incorporated into defence planning. The opportunities that are made available to Government through a balanced fleet that can operate over most of the conflict spectrum are becoming more evident; future plans for the Navy within the context of the overall ADF therefore need to consider this issue more effectively than in the past.

The constabulary operations undertaken by the Navy include most of the force element groups, of which the most visible is the Patrol Boat Force. As has been seen, there is an increasing requirement placed upon them. While duty aboard the patrol boats is rewarding, it can also be exhausting. Planning for the new patrol boats is in progress, with a Government preference for private financing with the contractor to provide the capacity to meet a requirement for 3000 patrol boat days. It is not clear that the Government (or elements within Defence) fully understands the mechanics of interception in the EEZ, where the number of hulls is assuming a greater importance. Any increase in the number of patrol boats required would increase capital, personnel and operating costs, which conceivably would have to come out of extant Defence funding. However, given the unique status of the coastal surveillance program, Defence could argue for additional funding from Government for this task.

Endnotes

^[1] The views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Australian Defence Organisation or the Royal Australian Navy.

^[3] Derek Woolner, ‘Australian Coastal Surveillance: Changing Policy Pressures’, Maritime Studies, July/August 2001, no, 119, pp. 1-9.

^[4] Department of Defence (DoD), Australia’s Strategic Policy, DPUBS, Canberra, 1997, pp. 29-35.

^[6] Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Australian Maritime Doctrine, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, 2000, p. 34.

^[9] Environment Australia, Australia’s Oceans Policy – Specific Sectoral Measures, Canberra, 1998, vol. 2, pp. 40, 42.

^[13] Peter T. Haydon, Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century: A ‘Medium’ Power Perspective, Maritime Security Occasional Power no. 10, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 2000, pp. 30, 37.

^[15] Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc, New York, 1979, pp. 15-17.

^[19] DoD, Defence Capability Plan 2001-2010: Public Version, Canberra, 2001, pp. 257-58.

^[24] The Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) covers an area 16 per cent larger than the Australian landmass and is the 3rd largest in the world at 8.9 million km².

^[25] Peter Venslovas, ‘Fisheries’, in Jack McCaffrie (ed.), Managing and Protecting the Offshore Estate, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1995, pp. 33-5.

^[26] Sherwood, The Navy and National Security: the Peacetime Dimension, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, no. 109, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994, p. 22.

^[27] DoD, Defence Report 1971, AGPS, Canberra, 1971, p. 21; Defence Report 1974, AGPS, Canberra, 1974, p. 9. Dick Sherwood, op. cit., pp. 22-3. Australian Customs Service, ‘Submission to the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit’, Inquiry into Coastwatch, 9 June 2000, p. 7.

^[29] Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA), Annual Report 1998-99, pp. 177, 179.

^[30] Geoff Rohan, ‘Fisheries a Valuable Resource’ in Doug McKinnon & Dick Sherwood (eds), Policing Australia’s Offshore Zones: Problems and Prospects, Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy no. 9, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 1997, pp. 40-1.

^[31] Albert Caton & Kevin McLoughlin (eds), Fishery Status Reports 1999, pp. 205-07. AFMA, op. cit., p. 146.

^[38] Derek Woolner, Developing Policy Pressures in Australian Coastal Surveillance, Research Paper no. 20 2000-01, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2001, p. 22.

^[40] AFMA, Southern Ocean hot pursuit nets $1.5 million fishing suspect, AFMA 05/01 Media Release April 20, 2001.

^[41] DoD, International Law Update, Directorate of Operations and International Law, December 2001, p. 7.

^[42] Minister for Defence Media Release, Navy battles 5m-high seas to apprehend suspected illegal fishing vessel, MIN 41/02, 7 February 2002; Navy apprehends second suspected illegal fishing vessel, MIN 48/02, 11 February 2002.

^[43] Alan du Toit, ‘Breaking the Spears: HMAS Tobruk’s Involvement in Truce Monitoring Operations in Bougainville’, Australian Defence Force Journal, no. 135, March/April 1999. Minister for Defence Media Release, Navy Ship Deploys to the Solomon Islands, MIN 260/00, 18 September 2000.

^[44] Jenny Bedlington ‘Illegal Immigration Issues’ in Doug McKinnon & Dick Sherwood (eds), op. cit., pp. 98-99.

^[45] Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Reference: Coastwatch, Hearings Friday 18 August 2000, PA 52.

^[46] John McFarlane, ‘The Potential for Illegal Activity’, in Jack McCaffrie (ed), op. cit., pp. 22-3.

^[48] United Nations General Assembly, Oceans and Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-General, A/56/58, New York, 2001, pp. 23-4, 93.

^[52] DoD, Defence Report 1975, AGPS, Canberra, 1975, p. 10; Defence Report 1980, AGPS, Canberra, 1980, p. 15; Defence Report 1981, AGPS, Canberra, 1981, p. 17; Defence Report 1982-83, AGPS, Canberra, 1983, pp. 20-1; Defence Report 1983-84, AGPS, Canberra, 1984, p. 25; Defence Report 1985-86, AGPS, Canberra, 1986, p. 40. Sherwood, op. cit., p. 24. Anthony Bergin, ‘The Legal Framework – Australia’s Offshore Zones’, in Anthony Bergin & Mohd. Sidik Shaik Osman (eds), National Coordination of Maritime Surveillance and Enforcement, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1996, p. 15.

^[54] Peter Briggs ‘The ADF Role in Policing the Offshore Zones’ in Doug McKinnon & Dick Sherwood (eds) op. cit., p. 153.

^[55] Report of the Prime Minister’s Coastal Surveillance Task Force, ‘Action in Source and Transit Countries’, http://www.dpmc.gov.au/docs/report.cfm

^[58] Update on the Replacement Patrol Boat, NHQ Australia Signal 282213Z AUG 00.

^[59] Peter La Franchi, ‘RAN Patrol Boat Dollars Revealed’, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, January 2002, pp. 30-1.

Maritime Studies